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CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS

President MILTON G. EVANS, D. D., LL. D.

A PASTOR is now ministering to a church attended by several hundred students of a denominational secondary school. The young men come from homes in which the Bible is well known and Jesus Christ reverenced. They are intelligent, alert in mind, and have high ideals. They respect their pastor and listen attentively to his sermons. Recently one of the lads asked him whether Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus Christ were two different persons. The pastor, astonished and pleased, inquired for the reason of the question. The young man replied that he heard the pastor constantly use the names Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus Christ, and it seemed to him that in his use of the terms he was not referring to the same person. This gave the pastor his opportunity to distinguish things that differ, and touch upon a problem that perplexes many today as in all days. In one form or another, " the Christ of Faith " and " the Jesus of History " are themes of perpetual discussion. They are usually treated in such fashion as to make them antithetic. Somehow many feel that if the Christ of Faith be true the Jesus of History is false, or that the Jesus of History gives no war-

rant for the Christ of Christianity. Practically the same sort of thinking has occasioned such books as *The True George Washington, The True Benjamin Franklin, The True Abraham Lincoln,* as though our idealization of these makers of history were unworthy of us, or detailed knowledge of their actual conduct and character would have made idealization impossible. The situation is serious in this age of minute and painstaking historical inquiry, when nothing is assumed to be true, but must be *proved* to be true. And in historical investigation, we are dependent either on testimony, direct or indirect, or on circumstantial evidence, or on both. On such sort of testimony we put men to death, even though the accused may be innocent. Contemporary historical evidence is not infallible. Why assume ancient evidence, contemporary in its day, may not be fallible also? Reflections of this sort make possible the seemingly self-contradictory question, Is belief in the historicity of Jesus essential to Christian faith? It seems evident that the question thus boldly put cannot be answered by a simple " Yes " or " No." It has too many implications. This involved question must be analyzed into a series of questions, to each of which an answer must be given. For example, first, Are the second word of the question, belief, and the last word, faith, intended to be synonymous? If not, then the question is not self-contradictory, and is altogether a pertinent one to discriminating thought.

Second, What is intended by the expression " Christian faith "? In this phrase is faith to be understood as a subjective state of mind only, and that state described as Christian? Or, is it to be understood in the derived sense of a proposition believed, i. e., *creditum,* and the one believing this proposition may be for that reason called Christian?

Third, if faith be construed as *creditum,* i. e., something believed, the question may be asked, Must the affirmation of the historicity of Jesus be included in a creed to make it a Christian creed? But even in this simplified form, the ques-

tion cannot be categorically answered until we ascertain the content of the words historicity and Jesus. If we mean by historicity that some person appeared in time and space who causally originated a subsequent series of phenomena wholly new in human society, then it seems that all the question implies is, whether what we now know as Christianity had its beginning in a person now known in history as Jesus of Nazareth. But to affirm the *fact* of a cause is to affirm neither its nature, nor its location in space or time. So that the word Jesus may stand for an originating *personal* cause in human history, but questions remain about the nature of person and about the time and place the person is reported to have lived. That is, we of the twentieth century are at once embarked upon a voyage of exploration into the first century. Then a friend may ask me, What do you mean by Jesus? How do you get your knowledge of him? Where do you get your knowledge? Since your sources give varying estimates, what one do you accept as indisputably trustworthy? If you cannot accept one singly, by what process do you reach reliable information? Do you accept the composite testimony of the earliest Christian writers after investigation and constructive thought have done their best? Are you sure that equally trustworthy testimony, if providentially preserved, might not have modified your present conceptions? Is it not true that though the earliest Christian documents have remained the same through the centuries, the Jesus of American Protestantism is not the Jesus of Luther's Germany?

Such possible questions asked by any chance acquaintance make evident the futility of attempting to recover the Jesus that evoked the faith of the first Christians by purely historical and literary judgments. The historicity of a some one called Jesus remains even though the historicity of words and deeds ascribed to him be denied. But Christianity cannot be defined in terms of a person who is historical merely. He may be historical and have no Christian values. Jesus was that

to most of his contemporaries. They knew him historically better than we may hope to know him. They saw his deeds and heard his words. They touched him in "life's throng and press." They knew him in terms of space and time; they could name towns he visited; repeat sayings he had spoken; recount numerous incidents they had witnessed. But they maligned him, rejected him, crucified him. History, however, is more than sequence of events causally connected, because history deals with persons, and persons are not content with causes merely; they render moral judgments, and their judgments are conditioned on their religious insight. For this reason some of the contemporaries of Jesus saw in him a significance that could not be explained except by reference to the unusual, the supernatural. He may be John the Baptist risen from the dead; or perchance Elijah; or maybe Jeremiah; or some unidentified Old Testament prophet. All high estimates these! But there were other possibilities. Maybe he is not a prophetic forerunner of the Messiah, but the Messiah himself. This was the conclusion of the most intimate of his disciples. This conclusion, however, is a judgment of value in another realm than that of history. It came not from "flesh and blood"; it was metahistorical, in that it was in another sphere than time and space. The creative mind of Peter under the inspiration of God in whom he believed recreated Jesus of Nazareth into Jesus the Christ. But the Christ of Peter's confession was not destined to become historical. The creative faith of the disciple conceived Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah of Jewish national expectation, a world-ruler after the manner of the Gentiles. The Christ of Peter's faith proved to have no foundation in historical fact, but his faith in the person who enabled him to construct an unhistorical Messiah was not seriously shaken. His creative faith took new experiences with Jesus and remade the Christ of national Jewish hope into a Christ ruling at the right hand of God. Here again the ascended Lord is Jesus of Nazareth transformed by

faith from a purely historical person into the metahistorical Son of God. While in history he transcends history, as God immanent in the universe also transcends it.

Likewise, Paul, historically the great interpreter of the Nazarene to the Gentile world, cared not to know him after the flesh. To know his historical antecedents and environment and teaching may make one a member of a Christ party, but it does not put one "in Christ"—a sphere of conduct and thought created by faith. External conditions may condition and mediate, but cannot cause the Christ of faith. It is for this reason that Paul can write that Christ is the power of God to those that believe—and *only* to those that believe. Without faith Jesus of Nazareth remains only a devout Jew, but more devout than others. But to faith he was God at work in human history. He was and remains the manifestation of God's purpose *for* men and his power *in* men. In this sense, at least, the historicity of Jesus is an essential affirmation in a Christian creed, else classification of thought forms and of religious movements is impossible in a study of the history of religions. He must be as historical as Confucius or as Gautama or as Mohammed. He is an actual personal fact in the development of Hebrew religion and the personal cause of the modification of that religion into Christianity, even though we may question the so-called historicity of many words and deeds ascribed to him. It is the assured verdict of most painstaking inquiry that "salvation is of the Jews"; and that some one named Jesus has been the mediator of that salvation to subsequent Christian history. All that the Christian need affirm is the reality of the object of his faith, the nature of the reality to be discovered by scientific and philosophic processes. That is, Christianity is comprehensive enough to include within itself a realistic, an idealistic, and a relativistic interpretation of its originating personal cause.

It is the function of science to discover and unfold the nature of the physical universe which is assumed by physicist

and chemist to be an objective fact, even though as philosophers both chemist and physicist may argue about its *reality*. The fact of experience is that what the metaphysician calls the "ontological consciousness" postulates reality as the condition of any scientific investigation. The scientists proceed as though they were dealing with things and persons other than the creation of their thought-processes. Similarly, in Christian history it is the function of the historian to discover and explain the nature of the personal cause that made such a history possible. That is, in a theistic interpretation of the external world, the idea of God is regulative; in a Christian interpretation of Jesus and his influence in human affairs, the idea of Christ is regulative. In both instances the facts given are external and occasioning, namely, the world and Jesus; in both spheres a suitable human attitude called faith is imperative. In both processes a religious attitude is dominant; in the one it is theistic, in the other it is Christian. The idea is expressed in the familiar words, "He who comes to God must believe that he is, and that he becomes a rewarder to those who seek after him." It has been faith, on the human side, that has gradually led the human race on the long pilgrimage from animism to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; for faith by its very nature creates values that transcend the given spatial and temporal relations. These values are the rewards granted faith in its creative activity. For this reason, the Jesus of John's Gospel is a nearer approach to the Jesus of contemporary Christian theism than the Jesus of the Synoptists. The latter seem too closely tied to time and space; the former sees in him a timeless and spaceless relation to men. Yet the Jesus-of-time is the mediating cause of the eternal Christ. Jesus of history and the reward of faith in him are so blended in experience that an early Christian wrote:

> That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld and our hands handled concerning the Word of life; and the life was manifested, and we

have seen and bear testimony, and report to you the eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested to us; that which we have seen and have heard we report to you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us; and our fellowship also is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ.

In the latter part of the New Testament period of the early church, Jesus of Nazareth was not viewed as a mere objective person. He had significance in a realm wholly distinct from that of satisfying the historian's quest for objective reality. His very name suggested values that have to do with the conscience, not with the causal judgment, except as he created moral values. "And thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he is the one who will save his people from their sins." A Christian interprets the originating cause in the light of its effects; and the effects are redemptive. Whatever else may contribute to the uniqueness of Christianity, if freedom from the power of sin is not an experienced fact, the sole purpose of the new moral force that entered human society in the person of Jesus of Nazareth has been thwarted. So that in Christianity, the highest development of religion thus far reached, salvation is deliverance from sin as an ethical state and from its consequences now and hereafter. The Christian just because of his experience believes that the one who thus delivers is Jesus, but this experience at the same time gives a new meaning to the word "Christ" of Jewish hope, and enthrones him as sovereign over the will. "Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from the body of this death? Thanks be to God, through Jesus Christ our Lord." To him it is historically true that in Jesus of Nazareth God came into human history as revelation, as justification, as sanctification, as redemption. That is, he has been the mediator of new conscious values in life. These values arise out of the conviction that historically associated with him is the certainty of God's saving power and redemptive love. This is true of the Christian who has felt the power and whose gratitude is evoked by this evidence of divine grace. By a generalization analogous as that of Newton

in announcing the law of gravitation, the Christian declares that which is true in his experience is possible for all, and that salvation is for the world, but on the same condition as for the individual. Evidently, faith has ranged far beyond the boundaries of historical fact. The constructive imagination of Newton only needed something as commonplace as a falling apple in order to make possible one of the most fruitful generalizations in the history of science. In other words, without contemporaries interested in something else than asking the bare question, Did this actually happen? Jesus of history could not have become the Christ of faith. It is due to their religious feeling and moral dissatisfaction that a Jew in whom there was no fault became their moral redeemer. Religious faith created values that hitherto had no existence in history, Christians embodied those new values in their every-day life. The human Jesus, who was the historical occasion and the creating faith of those new religious values and the more than fulfilment of national hopes, are combined in the familiar early Christian phrase "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

The so-called historicity of Jesus may be looked at from another angle. It is the *object* of faith that distinguishes the Christian from the Hindu or Mohammedan, else there is no significance in classification of religions historically. It is the task of history of religions to distinguish the real Rama or Krishna, if there be such, from the Vishnu of sacred hymns; the real Gautama from the Buddha of philosophic thought and sacred story; the real Jesus from the Jesus Christ of Peter's confession, from Paul's Son of God "revealed in him," from John's Logos-become-flesh. But if most thorough-going investigation should establish the actual objective historicity of Rama and Krishna and Buddha and Jesus, it remains true that it was faith in Jesus, not in the others, that has made for the moral advance of their respective worshipers. The difference is not in the pyschical states of the Vishnuite, or Buddhist, or

Christian. The emotional and intellectual and volitional reactions are identical in each. The difference is in the object that evokes the reactions and gives content to worship expressed in ritual and creed and conduct. The real query is, Why faith in Jesus saves morally, that is, solves life's problems, while faith in the historical founders of other religions has relatively failed? The answer is in the disciple's *conception* of Jesus as mediator of God's grace to him and the content of God's gift of grace. Ideally, to be a Christian is to have Jesus reproduce himself in us. To be saved is to have his sense of guiltlessness and his moral power in the vicissitudes of life. They refer these possibilities and actual results to Jesus, whose mission in the world was to effect them. For them, then, it is some sort of apprehension of what Jesus was and did that differentiates Christian creed from the creed of other faiths. The sort of apprehension must be adequate to have moral energies quickened by such human attitudes as imitation, gratitude, hope, and worship. The imperative thing is that the ideas about him be vivid enough to stimulate emotion and conduct; it is of secondary importance whether the idea was suggested by an incident in his life that has been preserved by narratives infallible in every detail. It is immaterial also whether a Christian knows all the facts about Jesus in order to have his moral and religious values enrich life. For this reason readers of literature of Christian experience are not surprised to read of hearers of the gospel message who abandon their national or tribal faith to accept Jesus because of his excellent moral character; others because of the quality of his teachings; others because of his kindness to the poor and distressed; others because of the marvels he is reported to have worked; others because of his sufferings on the cross; others because of the story of the resurrection. These new converts have made no critical study of the missionary's teaching. They accept the word about Jesus, and for them a historical certainty has arisen, namely, a new conception of the possibility

of human life. The point is, that it is the idea or conception that reacts on life and makes character, and not the correspondence of the conception with the actual in the world of facts. And it is character that God proposed to make in and through Jesus. The fact is that what is known as Christian character as distinguished from Hindu or Mohammedan is due not only to the intellectual assent that in a definite place, at a definite time, in a definite person God came into human history in a wholly unique way, but that the historical in the external human order has become the historical in the inner personal life of the believer. Unless the Christian today becomes a new creative force for the tomorrow, it avails little to try to prove a new creative force centuries ago.

THE CRISIS MOVEMENT IN PRESENT GERMAN THEOLOGY

By SELBY VERNON McCASLAND

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We need not be surprised if we fail to understand what the crisis theologians are trying to say. The Germans themselves have by no means been able to come to an agreement as to what Karl Barth and his associates mean.[1] An extensive literature devoted to Barth and the movement which he has inaugurated has grown up in Germany, Switzerland, and Holland. And there are the widest differences of interpretations. The movement has been called every sort of heresy, almost, from Gnosticism, Marcionism, a rebirth of Calvinism in its most orthodox form, to a modern resurgence of the extremest literalism of the application of the doctrine of Biblical inspiration. But Barth denies all the charges and says that his opponents do not have the least idea of his method or what he is talking about. The task of understanding Barth is increased by the difficulty of the language which he himself uses. He is a Swiss and spoke the Swiss dialect of German as a child, and still speaks it, for that matter, in his home. This fact means that the High German, in which his books are written, has been acquired in the schools, and is, for that reason, somewhat artificial. But the real difficulty inheres in the way he interprets the New Testament and the methods that he employs to state his position. There are certain features of his method or "system," as some have called it, which we may lay hold

[1] The founder and leader of the crisis movement in present German theology is Karl Barth, professor of theology in the University of Muenster. His most significant book is *Der Roemerbrief;* he has written, in addition, *Das Wort Gottes als Aufgabe der Theologie* and *Die Auferstehung der Toten;* and he publishes the journal called *Zwischen den Zeiten. Der Roemerbrief* appeared first in August, 1918, and has now gone through five editions and been fully revised and much enlarged. The most significant associates of Barth are Emil Brunner, professor of theology in Zurich, Karl Heim, professor of theology in Tuebingen, Rudolph Bultmann, professor of New Testament in Marburg, Friedrich Gogarten, and Eduard Thurneysen. Brunner's most widely known volume is *Glaube und Mystik;* Heim's is *Glaubensgewissheit;* and Bultmann's, reflecting this movement, is his recent little volume *Jesus.* The movement originated in Switzerland and is decidedly Calvinistic in its theological complexion.

upon, that shed real light upon what he is saying, and help in understanding what it is all about.

The entire crisis movement is, apparently, the theological expression and formulation of that type of thinking and philosophy of life which, during the last quarter-century, as a reaction against the typical manifestations of modern civilization, has produced that chaotic form of art which we called expressionism. It has manifested itself in every field of artistic expression and has now, at last, entered the field of theology. The phenomenon indicates how closely theology is allied with art in its manifold forms of expression. The forebodings of catastrophe, which oppressed the expressionistic thinking from the beginning of that movement, came to their most tragic realization with the outbreak of the war; and, with the pessimism which has settled over Germany as a result of the desolation that has been brought her by the war, the movement has reached its culmination in the crisis theology.

I

In the first place, one notes that Barth uses all the expressions and phraseology of Paul's theology, and claims to find in them the adequate expressions of his own theological views; or, rather, perhaps, he claims that he has rediscovered Paul, and allowed his real voice to be heard again today, and that Paul's message is the message which this present age needs just as it was of the age for which Paul wrote; that Paul wrote not only for his own time, but for all time; that the ultimate religious problems of Paul were the same as ours, and that his answers must be our answers.

Barth holds, in line with this use of Paul, and his idea of inspiration, that the ultimate religious problems of yesterday, today, and tomorrow are ever the same, that the truth about them and their solutions was discovered long ago and is still valid for the present day. He holds, in fact, that history is simply a movement in a circle; that nothing new comes to

light as the centuries come and go; and that the proper understanding of history is the recognition that the truth of yesterday is the same as that of today and of tomorrow. On that basis, since Paul has discovered all the ultimate religious problems and stated their solution once for all, it is necessary now to do nothing more than to hear the voice of Paul again to solve the problems which are so troublesome in our own day —that is, to see that there is no such thing as a solution at all.

II

At the same time, however, one soon notes that the resurgence of orthodoxy which has come to light in Karl Barth has a different complexion from the usual traditional interpretation of Paul. He uses all the language of Paul, but by the use of a very elaborate and exaggerated dialectic, he has given his school of thought a weapon of apologetic which is just about invincible. When his enemies get him into a corner, he is always able to say that they have misunderstood him, and that their charges against him are not at all true. In its last analysis, Barth's chief significance seems to be that he has developed a dialectical method which enables him to use all of the traditional phrases of orthodox theology, and in a way that is beyond the attack of those who try to state religious problems and experience in modern terms. But there are certain features of his method and point of view which stand out very clearly.

The crisis movement has a great deal to say about Schleiermacher. It does not consider him an evangelical Christian at all. But it owes one debt to Schleiermacher more than to any one else. Schleiermacher was the greatest expert in the use of dialectic that German theology, or that of the world, perhaps, has ever known. And this same instrument has become the weapon of warfare of this modern school. They have gone to such an extent with it as Schleiermacher never dreamed; and have just about robbed it of its real use and

reduced it *ad absurdum*. One gets only the impression of a formless chaos, lacking in systematic statement or definite meaning, when reading Barth.

On the other hand, however, Barth reacts in the most violent way against Schleiermacher's fundamental position, which made religion a matter of personal experience of the infinite—a feeling of absolute dependence, which all human beings possess, in their ultimate experiences. It is the merit of Schleiermacher to have discovered that religion is a normal function of human life; that, legitimately understood, it goes hand-in-hand with the best scientific knowledge in every realm; and that religion, while it is a friend of science and has nothing to fear from it, is not dependent upon science in any way for its own existence and function. He translated the old theological expressions for infinity and eternity and immortality into qualitative terms and emphasized the importance of ethical living and of a type of experience that is superior to the quantitative thinking and feeling of this world. For him, the sum of the matter is, "In the midst of finity to become one with the infinite and to be eternal in an instant, that is the immortality of religion." At the same time, Schleiermacher recognized the place of the scientific method in the interpretation of Christianity to such an extent that Christianity had only relative superiority to other world religions; and other, lower forms of religion, which led up to Christianity, like a stairway to the highest step, while relatively inferior in point of evolutionary development, were, yet, just as valid and legitimate as religions as Christianity itself. In this respect, he gave up the central position that had characterized Christianity from the beginning. He gave up its exclusive claim to absoluteness, and Jesus no longer has the position of the ultimate and infinite norm which he had always occupied. Schleiermacher's basing of religion in experience and interpretation of its ultimate values and ideals in qualitative terms was part and parcel of the romantic movement which found such elaborate expression

in the philosophy and art and literature of the time. But in his hands Christianity had become pagan. It had lost its Christ.

The reaction against Schleiermacher came in the Ritschlian school, which took over his discovery of the place of experience in religion, but made religion Christian again by identifying the experience of genuine religion with the experience of the *Christustatsache* of the church. It made no difference for this school if scientific criticism did make the historical manifestation of Christ relative, the Christian had something far better and more reliable; he had experienced the fact of Christ in his life; and the discovery of Schleiermacher was used as the basis for the position. The Ritschlians, then, gave their position a very strong ethical emphasis and brought about the ultimate identification of the best attainments of culture and civilization in general with the Christian religion. That position was the prevalent one in Germany before the war. It was assumed, therefore, and preached, by the Germans when they entered the war—since their culture, which, in their judgment, was the most beautiful flower of civilization, was the incarnation of the Christian religion—that God would give them the victory over their enemies. God had led them in the development of their culture, of their religion, and he would not desert them, now that the world had combined against them to destroy it.

III

But the experiences and the outcome of the war were a disillusionment for the Germans. Their arms were not victorious in the field, and the old regime, which was the highest expression of their religious, cultural attainment, was repudiated and driven out by rebellious elements within the folk itself; and a democracy, which is utterly foreign to German theological thought, was introduced in its stead. The finest developments of their religious culture had been profaned, therefore, and the most highly valued edifices of their cen-

turies of religious effort and evolution lay in ruins before their eyes.

What could be done about that? How could religion still serve its function in human life; how might these precious ruins be salvaged? Two of the presuppositions of the pre-war thinking, the pillars of German religious life of that time, could not be given up by the theologians, and they have been retained. In the first place, utter confidence in the superior quality of the pre-war culture, as the finest achievement that civilization has yet produced, has been retained. No German theologian questions that point, nor would he allow any one else to question it. The present theologian still, consciously or unconsciously, assumes that there was nothing wrong with the cultural quality of the organizations that have been broken down by the war. On the other hand, he sees them lying in ruins before his eyes.

The other presupposition of their religious life that has been brought over is God. No theologian in Germany today raises the fundamental question as to the existence of God. God is there, and is taken for granted. But now history has proved false the old assumption that God was leading and reigning and being glorified in their culture all this time. Since the old order, really the perfection of all that modern civilization could possibly produce, is broken down, it is the inevitable conclusion that the old view, that identified religion and culture and assumed that God would bring about the victory of their righteous cause, was wrong—not that God was not there, nor that the cause was not right, but that religion has nothing whatever to do with culture, and that it is the function of religion continuously to serve as the crisis of culture and to pronounce its doom. Culture is good, it is necessary, and men should strive to attain it, but that has nothing whatever to do with religion. The most ethically organized culture that civilization can produce has no religious value whatever; and the most highly cultured man may be at the same time utterly

irreligious. There is simply no relation between culture, effort toward the Christianization of the social order, toward the alleviation of human ills and the enrichment of human life, and religion. Those products of civilization should be sought after, but to make them the objects of religious effort is to turn religion into sociology and the church into a club. It is to rob religion of its real mission; or, rather, to dismiss the function of religion out of the realm of human life.

IV

That bitter opposition to all social effort in the name of religion, which is the reaction against the strong ethical emphasis of the Ritschlian school, has as its natural corollary, the rejection of the basing of religion in the realm of experience, which had been the result of the romantic school of thought, and was formulated for theology by Schleiermacher, and was made the corner-stone, also, of the Ritschlian theology. The emphasis upon experience made by Schleiermacher was the natural theological corollary of the movement in education toward the enrichment of the human personality and the living of a full and abundant life. That prevails to such an extent in our own day that we simply take it for granted. But that position is too closely related to the culture-religion of the pre-war period to be accepted by the crisis theologians. For them, the most irreligious thing that a man can do is to feel the religious certainty that Schleiermacher got from his experience of the infinite and of being eternal in a moment of time, or that Ritschl got from his immediate experience of the Christ-fact in his consciousness. The new school turns its back, therefore, upon the basing of religion upon immediate experience of the infinite, or of the presence of the Christ-fact in consciousness. It will have nothing to do with any experience that would bring a feeling of comfort or certainty into human life in the name of religion. Religion is always exactly the opposite of comfort and certainty, and keeps the individual

always struggling in doubt, ever uncertain of his decisions, continuously at the crossroads of life.

Central in this type of thinking, is the absolute dualism of all divine and human categories. There is a gulf between God and man that can never be bridged. God is the unknown God. He is the *agnostos theos* of Paul, the *deus absconditus* of Luther, and a combination of the *majestas dei* and the *mysterium tremendum* of Calvin. Man has never known anything of God and never will; he can know nothing of God, simply because he is man and God is God. There is no overlapping of the categories. One of the most prominent features of the new movement is the recognition of what Barth, following the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard, calls "the infinite qualitative difference between man and God." It is an absolute dualism which can never be bridged or broken down.

V

God has, however, given to man a revelation in the Bible. The divine world, the world of God, the world which man does not, and cannot, ever know, has made contact with the human world, the world of man, the world which man knows; the contact was like the intersection of two planes, a known and an unknown, and the line of intersection runs through all history, through every moment of time, and forms the continuous crisis of this world with its culture. But the unknown plane intersects the known plane just as a tangent intersects a circle, in that it really does not intersect it at all. The point of intersection is the resurrection of Jesus, through which alone the unknown world of God has touched the world of man. Or, the revelation which God has made is like a cavern in the earth, or a crater that has burned out, or an irrigation canal, in which the water of life once flowed, which has now run dry. Men of faith are dwellers along this canal, and profit by the impression of revelation left by the stream which broke from its fountains during the years one to thirty, making that period

a time of discovery and revelation, but, at the same time, making it possible that every time might become one of discovery and revelation. It is possible, also, that the stream of revelation might dig for itself other river-beds and flow for peoples whom we have never known; we would not deny the possibility; God's sovereignty and freedom remain. The most that we can possess in the way of certainty, however, is to observe the dry canal and the burned out craters, which assure us that there is such a thing as another world and that a revelation was one time made, but we can never do more than to see where it once was; we can see only enough to make us realize that we are wanderers in the night, with neither torch nor tints of dawn. We can see enough of the remains of revelation which was once made known from that world of God, which we can never know, to this world of ours, which we do know, to cause us to realize how utterly lost and hopeless we are in the midst of this entirely chaotic and purposeless finite process, which we call human history. The human being is able thus to realize his utter valuelessness and insignificance, and, stripped of whatever consolations culture and a profane religious experience had afforded him, when he has had the pride and hope and courage of his spirit entirely broken, he stands, at last, as a naked human being, alone before God. Until one has realized this broken condition of complete despair, one has not come to know faith in God. Faith is not something that we have, or can have, but something that we do not have and never shall have. It is just the realization that we do not have it and never can attain it. This state of utter despair is the goal of the religious life, and the most dangerous symptom that can come into the life of faith is the feeling of peace and security and victory. But the dialectic transforms this hopelessness and utter lack of all confidence or repose into the highest of all satisfactions; for, when man realizes that he is nothing, has nothing, and can hope for nothing, this is the one and only evidence that he is in the hand of God, who

is absolutely different, and entirely inaccessible, and wholly incomprehensible. Faith is ultimate and absolute, but it sees the world only as a problem that can never be solved, and life as a chaos that is never resolved into order or form or intelligible meaning.

VI

Fundamental to this point of view, is the doctrine of sin which it involves. Sin has nothing whatever to do with ethical living or noble idealism; it has nothing to do with personal attainment or social effort. Ethical living and personal and social idealism may be the greatest hindrances to righteousness before God, because they prevent man from seeing his own lost condition and cause him to be happy in his own attainments. Sin, rather, is just the normal state of a human being. Man was born a sinner. He was born totally depraved. He was born a man instead of God, and that makes him a hopeless sinner. An impassable chasm stands between man and God. All on one side is sin and all on the other is righteousness. Man is by nature forever chained to the sin of his own humanity and mortality. The idea is the same as that which entered into Christian thinking from the Oriental mysteries of the Hellenistic world, in which human nature was considered inherently sinful and evil and capable of purification only by sacramental contact with the divine substance. The same thought of sin was preserved in Catholic thinking, giving rise to their sacramental methods of salvation, and has found expression in varying forms in Protestant theology. In both cases, a sacramental technique of salvation is required and provided. The crisis theologians have taken over all of the sacramental method of Paul; it is their claim that they have discovered the real message of Paul for the first time, that the living voice of Paul may now be heard again in all of its original freshness. But they differ from Paul, as well as from the mystery religions of his day, and, also, from the sacramen-

talism of the Catholic Church, in that there never does come a consciousness of peace and victory and of the possession of the divine life, which the sacraments have always brought to the initiate. The sacrament in the crisis school is faith, but faith remains always the expression of despair in its ultimate form.

VII

The central factor, therefore, in this sacramentalism of the crisis movement, is Christ. He is the line of intersection of the unknown plane of the world of God with the known plane of this world of man; he is the bridge across the unbridgeable chasm between God and man; he it was who lighted the fires of the craters that have now burned out, and caused the water of life to flow for a time in the canal which has now run dry. But, exactly at this point, we encounter one of the most unusual features of the whole point of view. Their opposition to all forms of religious experience makes it necessary to give up the warm, personal, experiential quality of faith, which characterized the mysticism of Paul, and the experience of the romantic of Schleiermacher and the Christ-fact of Ritschl. They condemn every form of mysticism, just as personal relation and contact with God in general, as the expression of man's irreverence and profane boldness in attempting to enter sacred precincts, where he could not possibly go, and where he has no right to be. They rationalize the meaning of Christ, therefore, and the whole Christology becomes a mythus. Christ becomes the permanent crisis between time and eternity, finity and infinity, which is present, as the dominating factor, and the decisive moment, in every instant of time. He was present just as well before the birth of Jesus and the beginning of the Christian age as since that time. He is the crisis which marks the infinite qualitative difference between all that pertains to God and the things that belong to humankind. Faith in Christ is the consciousness

and awareness of this crisis. The life of Jesus of Nazareth sinks away into utter insignificance, just as with Paul and Ritschl. It really makes no difference whether Jesus was historical or entirely mythical. The only matter of importance is the testimony which Paul and the other inspired writers bore to the Christ. The validity of our faith rests upon the revelation that was given to those who lived in that time of discovery and revelation, from the year one to thirty A. D.

This process of rationalization is applied to all of the terms of Paul's theology. Barth finds every word of Paul pregnant with meaning for our own day; and he boasts that when he is through with his commentary, there is no remainder of parts of the Pauline theology, influenced by the contemporaneous religious thought forms of the time, which he has left over or rejected. They are all usable for him. He has thought over those points of Paul's teaching which are uncomfortable and offensive to modern sensibilities, so long, that he is able to understand them and to discover in these very features, which the modern theologians leave over, the very heart of the Pauline gospel. But, when he has finished, the rationalization and dialectic which he has applied to Paul have changed his appearance so much that Paul would no longer be recognizable either to his contemporaries or to himself.

VIII

Barth's method of turning the Christology into a mythus and rationalizing the experience of faith makes him turn with the utmost bitterness against the researches of the historical method, which, if accepted, cannot but undermine the claim of absolute finality and normativity, which he makes for Christianity. He will have nothing of relativity. He will have nothing of a point of view which places the materials of the Christian religion on a par with similar materials in other world religions, and ascribes the same relative validity and

finality to Jesus, and the Christ-mythus of the Christian religion, that is attributed to the founders and systems of salvation of other religions. In the same spirit, also, he casts away, as wolves in sheeps' clothing, all that the investigations of recent years have given us in the social and religious sciences. And, with all this, he turns away from the standardized methods of Biblical interpretation, by literary, lexicographical, archæological, and sociological processes. He would introduce, in their stead, a way of going behind the historical data collected by the empirical processes of the prevailing method, in which he discovers a *word* in the words that are written, in which he reenters the original spirit of the author and his time to such an extent, that the differences between him and us, and his time and ours, fall away; so that the answers to all ultimate religious problems, which remain ever the same, which Paul formulated once for all, become available for us again, and in such a way that they do not need to be discarded because they are offensive to our modern sensibilities. What we have in Barth, therefore, is a new rationalization and allegorization of old theological forms, to make them usable for men of our own day. He attempts thus to recover the assurance of absolute certainty which the old orthodoxy has always furnished those who could hold it. And, by his dialectic and rationalization, he attempts to free the old forms from the offensive features which have caused the modern conscience to rebel. The casting away of the assurance that was derived formerly, on the one hand, from confidence in cultural attainments, and, on the other, from personal mystical experience, as well as of certainty based upon scientific or philosophical methods of any sort, made it necessary for Barth to return to the way of certainty that is entirely otherworldly; and the dialectic that is necessary as an apologetic for this conception and exposition of salvation in Christ, has robbed the Christian plan of the mystical consolation which has inhered in all of its traditional forms.

IX

The crisis school is, therefore, the most hopeless pessimism, in regard to all effort which might be directed either toward the enrichment of human life or toward the improvement of human society, so far as any religious significance might be attached to either of those efforts. Efforts in those directions are good and legitimate, but they have nothing whatever to do with religion. It is not the place of religion to enter these fields. The view has evidently grown up out of the foreboding depression which produced expressionism in art and the disillusionment that came with the breakdown of German institutions and hopes in the war. They feel that nothing more could possibly be produced or attained than was incorporated in those institutions that have broken down. Moreover, there is nothing to be hoped for in this world besides endless struggle, and war, a competition in the struggle for existence that assumes the nature of war in any of its ultimate forms. It is hopeless to attempt to eliminate war. The advocates of international relations set up on the basis of a warless world have simply not faced all the facts of life; and any social optimism that is based upon this superficial view of the ultimate nature of the essential processes of life itself, is doomed, sooner or later, to an inevitable, tragic disillusionment. When the crash of disillusionment has at last broken upon the human spirit, the only way of escape is, forsaking the deceptions and illusions of this human world, to flee to that absolute, infinite, eternal refuge, to the world where God alone dwells and reigns. This the crisis theologians are attempting to do.

X

Characterizing the movement as a whole, one must recognize that it is fundamentally and utterly religious. It is not the attempt of scientists to make an orderly arrangement of the phenomena of life and to make an empirical approach to

a solution of the problems presented. It is not the calm deliberation of the philosopher attempting to bring order out of chaos. It is, rather, the cry of despair of a human soul, caught in the grips of the tragedy of life, seeking rest and finding none. It is the pessimism that sees only the chaos of the mechanical and material progress of the modern world and that stands dazed before the collapse of the culture and institutions, around which the very life of the German people has been organized, and in which its genius and character and hope have found their proudest expression.

The crisis movement as such has not found a very wide acceptance in German theology—that is, the formulation of the movement which Barth has made has not. It is too Calvinistic to suit most of the Germans. And its dialectical method is too bizarre to meet with wide approval. Moreover, its turning away from the use of the historical method and the results of the modern religious and social sciences, does not meet with general approval. But, on the other hand, the pessimism which is the basis of the movement, the turning away from all social or cultural effort in the name of religion, the abandonment of all the organizations of society in its varied forms to the dismal pessimism of an endless struggle for existence, is practically universal among German theologians. And German youth at the present time will listen to no other type of theology than this otherworldly flight from a dark social pessimism. A few prominent Germans are interested in an effort to apply religion and religious ideals to the problems of society, but they are men of the last generation and not of this. They find no response on the part of students. The religious quest in Germany has taken on the form of a struggle for absolute certainty, and for infinite reality. Nothing short of ultimates can bring satisfaction. The crisis movement, therefore, while, as such, it has not found general acceptance, is, nevertheless, even because of its bizarre, chaotic form, the most characteristic manifestation of the religious situation in post-war Germany.

XI

Karl Barth himself, however, and the peculiar form of this social pessimism—which characterizes all forms of theological thought in Germany at the present time—to which he has given classic expression in the crisis movement with the dialectical use of a mythological exposition of Scripture, cannot be considered entirely as a product of the breakdown of the institutions and ideals of the Germans which followed the war. The prevalent pessimism in general has arisen out of this post-war situation and is the product of bitter disillusionment; but Barth is, no doubt, the theological manifestation of that type of feeling and thinking of the last quarter-century which has produced expressionistic art in its varied forms—painting, plastic, architecture, and literature. This school of art is grounded in a very definite metaphysical interpretation of life and reality. One sees in a museum of expressionistic painting, for example, simply a huge aggregation of formless chaos. The artist has not attempted at all to paint his subjects as one sees them with the natural eye. He does not believe that this picture of the unaided eye represents the essential reality of the object painted. He makes an effort, instead, to use the particular specimen which he is painting as a transparent medium, through which reality in its essentiality becomes visible. The form and characteristics of the individual subject being painted are broken through. The man or animal or landscape loses all peculiar identity and becomes the type of ultimate and universally valid reality. Instead of a particular man, one attempts to paint man in the universal, generic sense. The individual fades out and disappears as he is made a type of man in general. The type of man in general is naturally dependent entirely upon the abstract conception of man which the artist himself holds. He tries to paint what he has in his own inner experience. In other words, he expresses himself. That is where the school gets its name. The

effort of the human spirit to break through the mechanical pressure and limitations, that have developed at such an enormous rate with the perfection of modern machines and industry, in which the individual becomes scarcely more than a machine, has led to the urge of self-expression and affirmation. Expressionism in its varied forms is the result. This effort to use the individual form as a transparent medium through which the infinite and universal may be seen, with the experiments in shades and colors, geometrical lines and figures—revolt against every tradition—naturally gives the finished picture a chaotic effect. But this chaos is exactly what the artist wants to paint. This visible, tangible world is chaotic to him. He experiences it only in distorted forms. Reality is not to be found in these external, visible forms at all. Reality is metaphysical. One must break through the visible, apparent forms in order to symbolize the real, which always remains invisible and intangible. The world of reality, therefore, is not the world of objects which we see—which artists paint—but an entirely different, invisible world. It may be symbolized, it may be experienced, but cannot be seen. The school of thought is utterly pessimistic in regard to this every-day world in which we live. It has no reality and no validity in itself.

The crisis movement in theology has grown up out of this type of thinking—which has prevailed for a quarter-century but realized the fulfilment of its direst forebodings only as the cataclysm of the war broke upon the world. Its use of the mythological method of interpretation of the Bible is nothing other than the effort of the expressionists to see through the individual as a transparent medium into the world of reality itself. So it is that the crisis theologians are entirely indifferent to the question of the historicity of Jesus—in spite of the fact that they hold to the inspiration of Scripture. The story of Jesus has become for them a mythus. They speak of the Christ, not of the earthly Jesus. The Christ-mythus gathers up in itself once and for all that which is first and last and

universal in the experience of the whole human race. It makes no difference whether Jesus ever lived or not. The mythus does not derive its validity from his manifestation as a human being. They do not deny the historicity of Jesus, but are not concerned about it. That is, Jesus as an individual manifestation of mankind has faded out entirely, and the Christ, as the unlimited and universally valid, unconditioned type of humanity, has taken his place. Just as the expressionistic painter, seeking a valid norm for the present, turns to the past and attempts to recover the feeling of bewilderment, which primitive man felt as he looked out upon the weird phenomena of the universe for the first time, so Barth resorts to the Christ-mythus as the original, absolute, and eternally valid norm of all human life. In the effort to carry through this mythological interpretation of the Bible, these theologians have applied allegory and dialectic and paradox and weird and bizarre figures, until the impression that one gets from reading their books is very similar to the baffling chaos of a museum of expressionistic art. The theological manifestation of expressionism was late in appearing; the expressionistic form of painting and of art in general has already given way, largely, to a new realism. The innate conservatism of theology causes it to be slow in assuming the forms of contemporary thought. But there can be no doubt that the crisis movement is expressionistic theology; that it rests upon the same metaphysical presuppositions and the same pessimism as to the reality and validity of this visible world of men and things, in which we live, as do the various forms of art which have arisen in the expressionistic school.

XII

Finally, after this crisis movement is stripped of its maze of confusing verbiology, in addition to the revival of the sacramental conception of sin and of human depravity, and of the interpretation of faith as the continuous experience of utter

despair, there are two significant features that stand out very clearly. In the first place, the movement is utterly pessimistic in regard to this world; nothing permanently valid or worth while can be attained in any sort of social effort, either religiously, politically, or culturally, in its widest sense; and the presupposition is fundamental, that the affairs of mankind in general will continue, just as they have ever been, a hopeless, meaningless chaos. And in the second place, the movement, in turning its back upon this world, in abandoning the religious significance of social effort and pronouncing the doom of culture in the name of religion, has brought the doctrine of the transcendence of God—incomprehensible, inaccessible, beyond the range of any sort of mystical experience, awful, unknown, burning in his wrath and terrible in his judgments upon all that man might possibly attain or might presume to be religiously valid, continuously bringing all the processes of civilization under the cataclysmic crisis of the standard of his divine righteousness—to the extremest expression that it has ever attained in the long history of the church. God is the first, continuous, and last word in this theology.

Americans will react in different ways to these two fundamental propositions. The first one is obviously a negation of the whole program of the integration of the religious attitudes into every phase of the complicated processes of the social order, which we are attempting. The German pessimism in this regard is evidenced clearly by the fact that Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* has already passed through a hundred editions over there. The issue is one which must be faced also in America, and upon its solution will rest the morale of our social endeavor. The rebirth of the exaggerated Calvinistic doctrine of the transcendence of God may be judged upon its own merits. The disregard of the results of scientific historical scholarship in their implications for the doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture, and the adoption of a bizarre mythological and allegorical method of interpretation

of the Bible, in order to retain the semblance of inspiration, may also, of course, be judged upon their own merits. But, after all, the fact that the crisis movement clothes itself in these worn-out, almost incomprehensible, scientifically untenable forms of the past, is a mere incidental, and should not be allowed to obscure the real message which constitutes the heart of the movement and gives the best indication of the direction in which the religious experience of Germany at the present time is moving.

WAS THE GOSPEL OF MARK WRITTEN IN LATIN?[1]

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At the head of many manuscripts of the Gospels is found a note to the effect that the Gospel of Matthew was written in Hebrew (ἑβραιστί), *the Gospel of Mark in Latin* (ῥωμαιστί), those of Luke and John in Greek (ἑλληνιστί).[2] In the subscription to the Syriac Vulgate (*Peshitta*), to the Harclean Syriac, and to several Greek manuscripts[3] it is stated that the Gospel of Mark "was written *in Latin* at Rome: ἐγράφη ῥωμαιστὶ ἐν Ῥώμῃ." My purpose is to see if this information regarding the original language of the Gospel of Mark is correct.

The Roman origin of this Gospel is accepted by the majority of critics.[4] Even if Greek was known to many folks of all classes in Rome, Latin was, meanwhile, the language usually spoken. Normally a work composed at Rome and intended primarily for Romans should be in Latin.

It is true that the oldest documents of the Roman church which have come down to us, the Epistle of Clement, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Apologies of Justin, are in Greek. But the Epistle of Hermas is addressed to Greeks. Hermas was apparently a Greek slave. Greek was the mother tongue of Justin, while the emperors to whom he was writing had a Greek cabinet. These cases by no means prove that Greek was the only language, nor even the chief, of the Christian groups of Rome.

[1] *L'Evangile de Marc a-t-il été écrit en Latin? Revue de L'Histoire des Religions,* pp. 161-192, 1926. The privilege of publishing in English translation has been graciously extended by the author and original publisher to the Crozer Quarterly. The author has extensively revised and added to the original French article. Chapters VI and XIV are part of the new material.

[2] H. von Soden, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments,* 2nd ed., Göttingen, I, p. 297 [51].

[3] Among others, two manuscripts of the Barberine Library of Rome (really the Vatican Library), viz. 160 (Sod. ε 213) and 161 (ε 1005) according to H. B. Swete, *The Gospel according to St. Mark,* 3rd ed., London, 1920, p. xli.

[4] See especially B. W. Bacon, *Is Mark a Roman Gospel?* (Harvard Theological Studies), 1919.

Was the original Mark in Greek or in Latin? This can be determined only by an examination of the text. Nor will a cursory glance suffice.

In 1914 H. C. Hoskier, amazed by the strange disagreements of the Greek texts, proposed the hypothesis that the Gospel had been written in two languages at the same time. On this hypothesis the author would have produced simultaneously two editions, one Latin and one Greek.[5] This hypothesis is only a compromise. To suppose that a translation had been made at the first moment, for which there was no shadow of proof, would require that one of the two texts was the original, the other the translation.

The task is to make a comparison of the oldest forms of the Latin and of the oldest forms of the Greek which have come down to us.

Among the Latin the oldest, unquestionably, are those designated by the letters *k* and *e*.

k Codex Bobiensis (4th or 5th century) in the National Library of Turin. It contains the second half of Mark VIII-XVI except for a few lacunæ in chapter VIII. Edition J. Wordsworth and W. Sanday (*Old-Latin Biblical Texts,* no. II) Oxford, 1886. New collation by C. H. Turner and F. C. Burkitt (*Journal of Theological Studies,* Oct. 1903). Photographic edition, Turin, 1913.

e Codex Palatinus (5th century) in the episcopal palace at Trente. It contains Mark I: 21-VI: 9 (a few lacunæ) and short fragments of chapters VII-XIII. Edition C. Tischendorf, *Evangelium Palatinum Ineditum,* Leipzig, 1847. Studied by H. J. Vogels, *Evangelium Palatinum,* Münster, 1926.

These two manuscripts give essentially the same text. It is called "African" because it is that used by St. Cyprian in

[5] H. C. Hoskier, *Codex B and its Allies,* London, 1914, Part I, pp. 126, 172. M. Robert Stahl was the first to draw my attention to the possibility of a Latin original for Mark.

the middle of the third century,[6] and rightly, although its African origin may not actually have been proved. It is the only one that it is profitable to compare with the Greek text. The other Old-Latin versions have retained some traces of the "African" text but have been manifestly conformed to the Greek. For them the question of priority does not arise.

The Latin text which will be examined is that of *e* for Mark I: 21-VI: 9, that of *k* for Mark VIII: 9-XVI: 8. Those parts of the Gospel which are wanting in these two manuscripts will not be considered.

For the types of Greek texts the oldest appear to be the ones which manuscripts B, D, and W give:

B *Codex Vaticanus* (4th century) in the Vatican Library. Edition Vercellone and Cozza, Rome, 1868. Photographic edition *Codices e Vaticanis Selecti,* iv, *Novum Testamentum,* Milan, 1914.

D *Codex Bezae* Graeco-Latin (5th or 6th century) in the Library of Cambridge University. Photographic edition *Codex Bezae Cantabrigensis,* vol. ii, Cambridge, 1899.

W *Washington Manuscript* (5th century) in the Library of Congress (Washington, D. C.). Collation by H. A. Sanders, *The Washington Manuscript of the Four Gospels* (*University of Michigan Studies IX*) New York, 1912. Photographic edition 1913.

The texts given by these three manuscripts present in Mark differences far more numerous and striking than in the other Gospels. We shall see that they give the impression of having been derived from independent Greek versions which have been more or less corrected, the one by the other.[7]

Because of this interchange of corrections it occasionally happens that a primitive reading is preserved in later manu-

[6] This has been proved by W. Sanday, *Old-Latin Biblical Texts,* no. ii, pp. xlii-xlvii; and by H. von Soden, *Das lateinische Neue Testament in Afrika zur Zeit Cyprians,* Leipzig, 1909, pp. 106-220.

[7] The last eleven chapters of W have been corrected rather more than the first five.

scripts whose ancestors have also suffered correction, and in fact more than the others, but of a different type. Of these I will mention only two:

θ The Koridethi Gospels (7th or 9th century) at Tiflis. Edition of G. Beerman and C. R. Gregory, Leipzig, 1913.

Ψ Codex Laurensis (8th or 9th century) on Mt. Athos (Laura). Edition of K. Lake *Texts from Mt. Athos* (*Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica,* vol. v, part ii), Oxford, 1902.

In the case of two versions set in contrast, one Latin, the other Greek, it may seem a simple matter to decide which is the original, which the translation. As a matter of fact it is by no means easy. The Greek and Latin imitate each other very closely. The scrupulous weighing of selected passages and listing of general characteristics are required.

At the very beginning one thing must be said. The copyist of *k* was grossly ignorant. It is perfectly evident that he understood very little of the Latin he had before him and as a scribe was totally inexperienced. In every line he makes mistakes past belief. He writes: *verum in quo oritur* for *vermis non moritur, regnus* for *petrus, feribas* for *scribas, nuptis* for *vultis, filia* for *folia, nomen* for *non enim* or for *pater, et sum* for *tuum, in tribus* for *inscriptio, inprobitas* for *hœrebit ad, illi monet* for *illo omnes, si mulier* for *similiter,* etc. It has not been my object to remake the critical edition of *k* which has been provided by Hans von Soden (*Das lateinische Neue Testament in Afrika zur Zeit Cyprians,* Leipzig, 1909, pp. 429-449). I have followed as a rule the critical text of von Soden. Accordingly, in my first example I have given *servis suis* instead of *discipulis suis, domus* instead of *domui, utrum* instead of *verum, gallorum cantu* instead of *gallorum gallo,* von Soden's corrections which no one will challenge. And for my own part I propose the correction *dixit* instead of *dixi* which the manuscript gives.

I. The Parable of the Porter

At the end of Chapter XIII the Latin has a little parable the sense of which has been lost in the Greek:

XIII: 34-37 quomodo homo peregrinans reliquit domum et dedit servis suis potestatem, uniuscuiusque opus suum, et ostiario praecepit ut vigilet, sic vigilate quia nescitis quando dominus domus venit, utrum vespera an nocte media an gallorum cantu an mane, ne veniens subito inveniat vos dormientes; quod autem uni dixit, omnibus vobis dico.

B [8] ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀπόδημος ἀφεὶς τὴν οἰκίαν ἑαυτοῦ καί δούς τοῖς δούλοις ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἑκαστῷ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ, καί τῷ θυρωρῷ ἐνετείλατο ἵνα γρηγορῇ. γρηγορεῖτε οὖν· οὐκ οἴδατε γὰρ πότε ὁ κύριος τῆς οἰκίας ἔρχεται, ἢ ὀψὲ ἢ μεσανύκτιον ἢ ἀλεκτοροφωνίας ἢ πρωΐ· μὴ ἐλθὼν ἐξαίφνης εὕρῃ ὑμᾶς καθεύδοντας. ὃ δὲ ὑμῖν λέγω, πᾶσιν λέγω, γρηγορεῖτε.

The Latin has two words which are not represented in the Greek: *sic* and *uni*.

In the Latin the parable is limpid. Its meaning is determined by the correlation of *quomodo* and of *sic*, its instruction by the contrast of *uni* with *omnibus*. "*As* a man left his home to go on a journey and gave authority to his slaves, to each his task and gave orders to the porter to watch, *so* watch (ye), for you do not know when the master of the house will come, at even, at midnight, at the cock-crowing, or in the morning: lest coming unexpectedly he find you sleeping. What he said *to one alone*, I say *to all* of you." Here what in the parable is said to the porter alone is said to all.

In the Greek the meaning is vague and confused. There is a general impression that the translator had failed to read or appreciate the word *sic*, or else that a copyist had corrected οὕτως into οὖν without noticing its correlation with ὡς. The result

[8] The variants of D and of W do not affect the sense.

is that the first member of the comparison is detached from the second and forms a separate phrase: " (*It is*) as a man . . . watch *therefore,* for you do not know . . ." The *therefore* introduces a conclusion where it should reveal a comparison.

Another error has impaired the meaning. *Dixit* has been read *dixi.* This last point is not conjecture, for the manuscript reads *dixi.* The correction is easy because of the word *uni* which can be applied only to the porter. The error *dixi* passed over into the Greek. The translator has not corrected *dixi,* and, since the word *uni* no longer had any meaning, he suppressed it and replaced it by ὑμῖν: " What I say *to you,* I say *to all.*" The conclusion of the parable is thus displaced by a generalization which, oddly enough, does not appear to have been conceived in connection with Mark's text but with Luke XII: 41 where Peter asked: " Lord, do you speak this parable for us or for all? " and did not obtain any answer.

H. B. Swete (*The Gospel According to St. Mark,* 3rd ed., London, 1920, p. 319) evolves from the fragment the lesson: " Watching was not to be limited to the θυρωρός, all must keep vigil till He returned." This natural meaning, however, is in the Latin (with the reading *dixit*) and is not in the Greek.

The Latin provides an orderly little picture which the Greek breaks up into three fragments.

II. Sleep On, Awake

At the conclusion of the Gethsemane scene the Greek and Latin have a very real difference. Twice Jesus has gone apart to pray; twice returning he has found his three companions asleep:

XIV: 41-42 et venit tertio et, ubi adoravit, dicit illis: dormite iam nunc, ecce adpropinquavit qui me tradit. et post pusillum excitavit illos et dixit: iam hora est, ecce traditur filius hominis in manus peccatorum, surgite, eamus.

D καὶ ἔρχεται τὸ τρίτον καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· καθεύδετε λοιπὸν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθε· ἀπέχει τὸ τέλος καὶ ἡ ὥρα. ἰδοὺ παραδίδοται ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν ἁμαρτολῶν· ἐγείρεσθε, ἄγωμεν· ἰδοὺ ἤγγικεν ὁ παραδίδων με.

B . . . . . ἀπέχει· ἦλθεν ἡ ὥρα . . . . . .

Of the twelve words in the Latin: *ecce adpropinquavit qui me tradit et post pusillum excitavit illos et dixit* the last seven are not represented in the Greek at all; the first five, while in the Greek, are in another position three sentences farther on. In return, the Greek has ἀπέχει (τὸ τέλος) which is not represented in the Latin.

In the Latin two times are indicated. First Jesus says: Sleep on! After a moment (*post pusillum*) he awakes the sleepers: Arise, let us be going! In the Greek he says in the same breath: Sleep on, awake, let us be going!

Which is the original form? Apparently the former. It is not natural to say in the same breath: Sleep on, awake! The separation of the two commands should be primitive, the bringing of them together, secondary.

We can settle this point because we have an external witness. About 180, two centuries before our most ancient manuscripts were penned, Irenæus wrote: "*Inveniens eos dormientes dominus primo quidem dimisit, significans patientiam dei in dormitione hominum, secundo vero veniens excitavit eos et erexit.*" "And when, in the first instance (*primo quidem*), the Lord found the disciples sleeping, he let them sleep to indicate the patience of God in regard to the slumber in which men lay; but coming the second time (*secundo vero*), he awaked them and made them stand up."[9] This passage proves that Irenæus read the words: *et post pusillum*

[9] *Haer.* IV, xxii, 1. Due to error C. H. Turner, *Novum Testamentum S. Irenæi*, Oxford, 1923, p. 42, refers this passage to the Gospel of Matthew, XXVI: 45-46, where "Sleep on, awake" are joined as in the Greek Mark. A. Merx, *Die vier kanonischen Evangelien*, II, 2, Berlin, 1905, p. 156, has correctly seen that the passage in Irenæus refers to our Latin (*k*) Mark.

excitavit illos et dixit, which are not represented in the Greek and which exist only in *k*. *Irenæus* quoted the text having the two times. This text, of which *k* is the only witness, was therefore read about 180. The Greek has no attestation so old.

It is necessary to account for the displacement in the Greek of *ecce adpropinquavit qui me tradit* and for the absence in the Latin of *ἀπέχει (τὸ τέλος)*. One very simple explanation will account for these two facts.

It is possible to detect the way in which the confusion arose. A peculiarity of the Greek lies in the words: *ἀπέχει τὸ τέλος* in D, *ἀπέχει* in B. This is a notation for the copyist which has crept into the text.

The word *τέλος* is inserted in manuscripts for the guidance of the copyist. An instructive example is shown in folio 290 of D where we read: (Mark II: 22) *καὶ ὁ οἶνος καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ ἀπολοῦνται: τέλος:* Right at this point many manuscripts add: *ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς.* The word *τέλος*, inserted by a corrector, informs the copyist that that is the real *end* of the phrase and that no addition is necessary.[10]

The twelve words wherein the divergence between the Latin and the Greek is so pronounced are preceded by *iam nunc* and followed by *iam hora est.*

In the first part of the Latin text a translator has skipped [11] from *IAM nunc ecce adpropinquavit* . . . to *IAM hora est ecce* . . . His mistake was made the easier by the repetitions: *ecce . . . ecce; traditur . . . tradit.* He has translated *dormite IAM hora est ecce traditur* by skipping *nunc ecce adpropinquavit,* etc. Then he observed the omission. He translated the end of the mutilated sentence (ecce adpropinquavit qui

[10] Compare D folio 288b, Mark I: 45, *καὶ ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντοθεν: τέλος :.* At this point manuscript 579, (Sod. ε 376) of the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris adds: *καὶ ἐλάλει αὐτοῖς τὸν λόγον.* There too the word *τέλος* indicates that nothing need be added.

[11] These skips from one word to the same word later repeated (du même au même) are well known. L. Havet, *Manuel de critique verbale,* Paris, 1911, p. 133, cites the following phrase from Quintilian: "nec *quod* virtus est *utique,* iustitia est, at *quod* non est virtus *utique* non potest esse iustitia," where one copyist has skipped from *quod* to *quod,* another from *utique* to *utique.*

me tradit), and placed his addition at the end of the passage. He indicated this error by the note: *ἀπέχει τὸ τέλος*, this is not the *end* (of the phrase). Actually the *end: ἰδοὺ ἤγγικεν* . . . . . is thus set at some distance from *ἀναπαύεσθε*.

D (or his archetype) did not understand this note. He copied it without a break at the place where he read it: *ἀναπαύεσθε· ἀπέχει τὸ τέλος*.[12] He has left the words: *ἰδοὺ ἤγγικεν*, etc., misplaced at some distance from where this note would put them.

B understood *τὸ τέλος* as a note and did not copy it. But he did not understand *ἀπέχει* and copied it. He placed an *ἦλθεν* before *ἡ ὥρα* to make sense. In this context the little intrusive *ἀπέχει* is quite devoid of intelligible sense. Through the centuries it has triumphantly resisted the efforts of the commentators.[13]

To summarize, a notation intended for the copyist (*ἀπέχει τὸ τέλος*) has made its way into the text. This is the reason that *ἰδοὺ ὁ παραδιδούς με ἤγγικεν* is misplaced in the Greek and that *ἀπέχει* (*τὸ τέλος*) is not represented in the Latin.

This is a beautiful case where it is necessary to revert to the Latin to reduce the confusion of the Greek.

There is an exactly opposite case where *τὸ τέλος*, originally a part of the text, has been treated by the copyist as a simple *nota:*

XIII: 29 in proximo et in foribus est finis. BD *ἐγγύς ἐστιν ἐπὶ θύραις* (*τὸ τέλος* omitted).

The Latin makes sense. In the Greek the verb suffers from the lack of a subject.

[12] Similarly in the Latin manuscripts the *d'* standing for *deest* (sign of a lacuna) occasionally has crept into the text in the form of *id.*

[13] One of the most recent, E. Klostermann (*Das Markusevangelium*, 2nd ed., Tübingen, 1926) makes *καθεύδετε* have the ironic meaning: "Are you still sleeping?" and *ἀπέχει* "Enough!" But this meaning of *ἀπέχει* is very rare, and *τὸ λοιπόν* hinders taking *καθεύδετε* as interrogative.

III. Jesus' Cry

The strange misunderstanding made possible by Jesus' cry (Heli, Elijah) on the cross is clear only in the Latin account:

XV: 34-35 exclamavit voce magna: heli heliam etzaphani, deus meus, deus meus, ad quid me maledixisti. et quidam eorum qui aderant, cum audissent, aiebant: helian vocat.

D ἐφώνησεν φωνῇ μεγάλῃ· ἡλεὶ ἡλεὶ λαμὰ σαφθανεί, ὅ ἐστιν μεθερμηνευόμενον· ὁ θεός μου, ὁ θεός μου εἰς τί ὠνείδισας με; καί τινες τῶν παρεστώτων ἀκούσαντες ἔλεγον· Ἡλίαν ψωνεῖ οὗτος.

B ἐβόησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς φωνῇ μεγάλῃ· ἐλωὶ ἐλωὶ λαμὰ ζαβαφθανεὶ, ὅ ἐστιν μεθερμηνευόμενον· ὁ θεός μου εἰς τί ἐγκατέλιπές με; καί τινες τῶν ἑστηκότων ἀκούσαντες ἔλεγον· ἴδε Ἡλίαν φωνεῖ.

Whatever the Hebrew words may be which the words *Heli heliam etzaphani* pretend to transliterate, it is with regard to this transliteration that the author has conceived the misunderstanding of the people who say: *Helian vocat*.

In the Greek of D the words are corrected after the Hebrew but the resemblance between ἡλεὶ and Ἡλίαν is less close. In B ἐλωὶ ἐλωὶ is a more learned correction after the Aramaic; this brings Jesus' cry in line with occasional Aramaic words which are attributed to him elsewhere in the Gospel. But there is no resemblance between ἐλωὶ and Ἡλίαν; the misunderstanding becomes impossible.

The meaning given to Jesus' cry by the Latin: *deus meus, deus meus, ad quid me maledixisti* is a curious combination of Ps. XXII: 1 (*My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?*) and Deut. XXI: 23 (*He that is crucified is accursed of God*). This meaning is exactly in line with Paul's teaching: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse for us; for it is written: Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. III: 13). Jesus, hanging upon a tree, is

expressly cursed by God (*me maledixisti*). Thus is realized in conformity with the Pauline mystery, what was proclaimed in another place in the Gospel (X: 45), that the death of Jesus would serve as the price of purchase (*pretium, λύτρον*).

In D *ὠνείδισας* is a weak translation of *maledixisti,* understood to mean: *thou hast reproached me* instead of *thou hast cursed me.* This is a mistranslation not of the Hebrew but of the Latin.[13a] As for B, he restored the text of Ps. XXII: 1 (*ἐγκατέλιπες, thou hast forsaken me*), and accordingly lost the profound significance of the passage.

In contrast to the stupid folk who thought that Jesus was calling Elijah is the centurion who comprehended the mystic force of Jesus' cry. He recognizes that Jesus cried: *My God, my God* because he is truly the son of God.

XV: 39 cum vidisset autem centurio . . . quia sic exclamavit, dixit: vere hic homo dei filius est.

θ *ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ κεντυρίων . . . . . ὅτι κράξας ἐξέπνευσεν, εἶπεν . . .*

D *ἰδὼν . . . . . οὕτως αὐτὸν κράξαντα καὶ ἐξέπνευσεν . . . . . .*

B *ἰδὼν . . . . . ὅτι οὕτως ἐξέπνευσεν . . . . .*

The words *sic exclamavit* are essential. By Jesus' cry the centurion recognizes that Jesus is God's son. The Latin gives the real meaning.

The Greek texts lose the point. *θ* translates adequately the prefix *ex* of *exclamavit* which expresses the completed action[14]: *κράξας ἐξέπνευσεν,* but he omits *οὕτως* which is indispensable for the meaning. D translates accurately: *οὕτως αὐτὸν κράξαντα,* but by way of correction he receives *ἐξέπνευσεν* from another manuscript. This intrusion produces a monstrous construction. B takes *ἔξέπνευσ* but omits *κράξας* which is the key to the passage. The centurion's confession seems to have

[13a] The readings of Colbertinus *c: exprobrasti me* and of Vindobonensis *i: me in opprobrium dedistis* are Latin retranslations of *ὠνειδισάς με.*

[14] See Barbelenet, *De l'aspect verbal en latin,* Paris, 1913; and A. Meillet and J. Vendryes, *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques,* Paris, 1924, p. 284.

been prompted not by the cry which Jesus uttered but rather by the speediness of his death. This is practically meaningless.

IV. Elijah Has Come

Another passage about Elijah is also massacred in the Greek. Jesus is asked if Elijah must not come *first,* that is before the Son of Man. The objection apparently is that John the Baptist in whom some see Elijah has been killed and consequently has not prepared the ways as he should in accordance with the prophecy of Malachi. Here is Jesus' response:

IX: 12 helias primo disponit omnia quia scriptum est super filio hominis ut multa patiatur et inludetur. sed dico vobis quia helias venit et fecit quanta oportebat illum facere, sicut scriptum est super eum.

B [15] *Ἠλίας ἐλθὼν πρῶτον ἀποκαθιστάνει πάντα καὶ πῶς γέγραπται ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; ἵνα πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ ἐξουδενωθῇ. ἀλλὰ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι καὶ Ἠλίας ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ἐποίησαν αὐτῷ ὅσα ἤθελον, καθὼς γέγραπται ἐπ' αὐτόν.*

The meaning of the two Latin sentences is clear. The first explains the prophecy of Malachi. Yes, Elijah makes all things ready *because* the Son of Man must suffer and be mocked. It is Elijah's task accordingly not to prepare the glory but the sufferings of the Son of Man. The second says that Elijah actually came and did everything that he should have done in accord with the Scripture thus interpreted. The death of John the Baptist is a preparation. The same idea is developed in chapter XII of the Revelation where a *witness* who repeats the miracles of Elijah is killed before the arrival of the Son of Man.

Obviously this passage has suffered two corruptions which have destroyed the meaning in Greek.

QUIA has been copied or read QUID. The explanation

[15] The variants of D and W do not affect the meaning.

quia scriptum est has become a question: *quid scriptum est . . .?* πῶς γέγραπται . . . . . ; which is to be understood: *How was it written that . . . ?* This question makes havoc of the sentence. The relationship of Elijah with the Son of Man becomes incomprehensible.

The other mistake has taken place in the Greek: ἐποίησεν ὅσα ὤφελον (*fecit quanta oportebat illum facere*) has been changed to ἐποίησαν ὅσα ἤθελον (*they did what they wished*).[16] The verb has no subject. It sounds as if it were concerned with the murderers of John the Baptist. But the meaning is far from right. The essential note, namely that John the Baptist did just what he should have done, is lost. And the end of the sentence *in accord with what was written concerning him* lacks point. It certainly is not in accord with a prophecy that they have done to John the Baptist " what they wished."

The Latin makes sense. The Greek is hopelessly obscure. Here the superiority of the Latin is striking. The Latin is manifestly original.

V. Gehenna and Salt

Here is another passage where the Greek is corrupt to the point of unintelligibility. The meaning is given by the Latin.

It is the end of the discourse on the expulsions. If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out; it is better for thee to enter the Kingdom of God mutilated than with all thy members to fall into gehenna. . .

IX : 47-50 . . . in gehenna incidere ubi ignis non exstinguetur et vermis non moritur, omnis autem substantia consumitur. bonum est sal, sed si sal fatuum, fatuum fuerit in quod illud condistis. habetis in vobis pacem, pacati estote in invicem.

[16] ἐποίησεν instead of ἐποίησαν is preserved by Θ.

D . . . . . *ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν ὅπου ὁ σκώληξ αὐτῶν οὐ τελευτᾷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται· πᾶσα γὰρ θυσία ἁλὶ ἁλισθήσεται. καλὸν τὸ ἅλας· ἐὰν δὲ ἄναλον γένηται, ἐν τίνι αὐτὸ ἀρτύσετε; ἔχετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἅλα καὶ εἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἀλλήλοις.*

B . . . . . *πᾶς γὰρ πυρὶ ἁλισθήσεται* . . . . . .

Θ . . . . . *πᾶς γὰρ πυρὶ ἀναλωθήσεται καὶ πᾶσα θυσία ἁλὶ ἁλισθήσεται* . . . . . .

Ψ . . . . . *πᾶς γὰρ πυρὶ ἁλισθήσεται καὶ πᾶσα θυσία ἀναλωθήσεται* . . . . . .

The Latin is perfectly coherent. In the terms of the figure it deals with the necessity which may arise in the Church when excellent members must be expelled. Even the eye must at times be plucked out. Even perfectly good salt becomes flat; then all the food is spoiled. The important thing is to preserve peace. Therefore, pluck out the eye rather than " fall into gehenna, where the fire is not quenched, where the worm dieth not," [17] but where every substance is consumed. Salt is good, but if the salt is tasteless everything will be [18] tasteless in which [19] you put it. Have peace in yourselves [19a]; be at peace one with the other.[20]

It is an easy enough matter to count up the mistakes and changes which have arisen in the Greek.

1. The words *omnis substantia consumitur* have been translated in two different ways. Literally: *πᾶσα οὐσία ἀναλωθήσεται, every substance will be destroyed.* Freely, according to the meaning: *πᾶς πυρὶ ἀναλωθήσεται, every (individual) will be destroyed by the fire.*

But *ΟΥΣΙΑ* (*substance*) has been read *ΘΥΣΙΑ* (*sacrifice*). The error was very easy, for the only difference between the

[17] This quotation is from Is. LXVI: 24. The Greek changes the order (worm before fire).

[18] The original text was doubtless: " si sal fatuum *fuerit,* fatuum *erit* . . ." The error is accounted for by the repetition *fatuum fatuum.*

[19] *In quod* for *id in quod.* Cf. XIV: 70, *qui stabant* for *ei qui stabant;* XIV: 20, *qui tinguet* for *is qui tinguet,* etc.

[19a] *Habetis* is probably an imperative; as *adferitis* for *adferte* (H. Roensch, *Itala und Vulgata,* Marburg, 1875, p. 294).

[20] *In invicem,* an idiom of the spoken language. Cf. *quaeritis in invicem* (*Codex Bezae,* Latin, John XVI: 19).

words is the dot in the *0*. This introduced the unexpected note of sacrifice. A learned corrector desired to find some meaning. He discovered that every sacrifice must be salted, according to Leviticus (II: 13, *πᾶν δῶρον θυσίας ἁλὶ ἁλισθήσεται*). Accordingly he corrected *πᾶσα θυσία ἀναλωθήσεται* to *πᾶσα θυσία ἁλὶ ἁλισθήσεται* because in the following sentence it is salt that is discussed.

Once *ἀναλωθήσεται* had been corrected to *ἁλισθήσεται* this correction made its way into the other translations. And *πᾶς πυρὶ ἀναλωθήσεται* became the enigmatic *πᾶς πυρὶ ἁλισθήσεται* whose meaning is hopelessly lost.[21]

θ and *Ψ* have combined the two translations. *θ* is a witness for the translation, *πᾶς πυρὶ ἀναλωθήσεται*, and *Ψ* for *πᾶσα θυσία* (for *οὐσία*) *ἀναλωθήσεται*.

I have pointed out how one may pass from the Latin to the Greek. May one pass from the Greek to the Latin and consider that *θυσία* became *οὐσία*, translated *substantia?* No, because *ἁλὶ ἁλισθήσεται* is not represented in the Latin. The priority of the Latin would appear certain. The idea that every substance is consumed in gehenna is natural. On the contrary the Greek is "one of the most difficult passages to interpret in the N. T."

2. Furthermore *fatuum fatuum* was taken to be a copyist's repetition. The reading was simply *fatuum fuerit* (*ἐὰν ἄναλον γένηται*). In line with his reading *in quod* was understood as an interrogative (*ἐν τίνι*) and *condistis* was read *condietis* (*ἀρτύσετε*). The sentence is intelligible, but its meaning has been entirely changed: *if the salt becomes tasteless, with what will you season it?* This sentence is very obscure in its context. On the contrary the Latin is in perfect harmony with the context. The tasteless salt makes tasteless everything it touches, as the offending hand, foot, eye corrupt the whole body.

[21] "This is confessedly one of the most difficult passages to interpret in the N. T. In the first place, it seems necessary to connect *πυρὶ* with *πῦρ* v.48, and *ἁλισθήσεται* in v.49 with *ἅλας* in v. 50. And it is this connection with what precedes and follows that makes trouble." E. P. Gould, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Mark*, Edinburgh, 1912, p. 180.

3. Finally *pacem* was changed to *panem* which in turn was corrected to *salem*[22] because of the fatal nearness of the word salt. This is no conjecture. In *k* the reading is *panem*. The word *pacem* is easily restored because of the context *pacati estote*. Perhaps a corrector wrote *salem* above *panem* because salt has just been spoken of. *Salem* has passed over into the Greek. This was then translated: ἔχετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἅλα (or ἅλας), *have salt in yourselves,* which is an abstruse precept the meaning of which is not evident to me and which has not the slightest connection with *be at peace one with another*. On the contrary, the Latin: *habetis in vobis pacem, pacati estote invicem* provides a rhythmic and even rimed conclusion.

In brief, salt has caused two mistakes. It has spread itself beyond its own sentence. It has unduly "salted" what precedes and follows.

VI. The Resurrection of Jesus

To the examples which I have furnished Professor Alfaric, of the University of Strassburg, in a letter to me adds another very important one, viz: the exquisite scene of the resurrection of Jesus:

XVI: 4 subito autem ad horam tertiam tenebrae diei factae sunt per totum orbem terrae et descenderunt de coelis angeli et surgente in claritate filio dei[22a] simul ascenderunt cum eo et continuo lux facta est. tunc illae accesserunt ad monimentum. . .

The Greek has nothing corresponding to those thirty-eight words.

It looks as if in Greek several lines had been skipped between τοῦ μνημείου (v. 3) and εἰς το μνημεῖον which was to translate *ad monimentum*. This would be a skip from one word to

[22] *Salem* for *sal*, a neuter accusative formed like a masculine accusative. Cf. *marem, retem, ossum* in Codex Veronensis (*b*). Edition E. S. Buchanan, Oxford, 1912, p. xiii.

[22a] Turner's reading.

the same word later repeated. The resurrection of Jesus would have been straddled.

Is the passage which exists only in *k* original? Professor Alfaric thinks it is:

"The initial *subito,*" he says, "and the *continuo* are entirely in accordance with Mark's style. The mention of the third hour is also quite in keeping with his usage (cf. XV: 25, 33, 34). In addition he gives to Jesus the title *Son of God* (I: 1), and he has just made the centurion give this title to Jesus (XV: 39).

"In addition he also represents the angels coming from heaven to gather the elect (XIII: 27).

"It is understood that having brought miraculous darkness at Jesus' death (XV: 33), he brings a miraculous light at his resurrection, making it come forth from the sudden darkness.

"The passage, finally, provides an explanation of the presence of an angel in the tomb. Without this explanation there is a real blemish."

These arguments of Professor Alfaric seem to me convincing. The account of the resurrection of Jesus is original. The text of *k* alone has saved one of the most important passages of the Gospel.

VII. Errors in Readings

When a manuscript, which itself is a copy, is translated it is well-nigh inevitable that errors of reading slip in, due either to the mistake of the copyists or to the haste and carelessness of the translator himself. The bad reading is at once revealed if there is another translation extant which escaped it. The following are examples:

ACCEPIETIS read ACCEPISTIS by BW: XI : 24 credite quia accepietis D *θ πιστεύετε ὅτι λήμψεσθε* BW *ὅτι ἐλάβετε* (absurd).

ADPROPINQVARET read ADPROPINQVANT by B: XI: 1 cum adpropinquaret D *ὅτε ἤγγιζεν* B *ὅτε ἐγγίζουσι.*

TENENS read TENDENS by DW: I: 31 tenens manum eius B *κρατήσας τῆς χειρός* (the sick woman's hand) DW *ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα* (Jesus' hand).

CVSTODIEBANT read CRVCIFIGEBANT by B *θ* (*crucifixerunt,* used immediately before) : XV: 25 custodiebant illum D *ἐφύλασσον αὐτὸν* B *θ ἐσταύρωαν αὐτὸν* (although Jesus was already crucified).

ACCENDITVR(VR can be in ligature) read ACCEDIT by B: IV: 21 *numquid accenditur lucerna* W *μήτε καίεται ὁ λύχνος* D *μήτι ἅπτεται* B *μήτι ἔρχεται* (daring personification).

COEPIT read COIECIT by B: XIV: 72 coepit plorare D *θ ἤρξατο κλαίειν* B *ἐπιβαλὼν ἔκλαιεν* (meaning very obscure).[22b]

NEMINIDIXERIS read NEINTROIERIS by B: VIII: 26 nemini dixeris in castello D *μηδενὶ εἴπῃς εἰς τὴν κώμην* B *μὴ εἰς τὴν κώμην εἰσέλθῃς* (a bizarre prohibition). The prohibition laid on the blind man who has just been healed not to speak to any one in the village is more natural than the prohibition not to enter the village.

Again the bad reading is in all the Greek manuscripts either because the fault arose from the Latin archetype or because through the work of correctors variants were removed. Examples:

INIVRIAM read INVIDIAM: XV: 10 per iniuriam tradebant eum *διὰ φθόνον παρεδεδώκεισαν αὐτόν* (inferior meaning).

22b For Theophylact *ἐπιβαλών* means *having veiled the head.* Attempts have also been made to translate it: *having thought,* or *having laid hold of the word,* or *having escaped.* I think that COEPIT may have been read COIECIT: *conicio* or *coicio* (*manus*) rendered by *ἐπιβάλλω*(*τὰς χεῖρας*) to put (one's hands over one's eyes). In 11 of the 18 occurences of *ἐπιβάλλω* in the N. T. it has for its complement *τάς χειρας* or *τὴν χεῖρα.* It is also possible that *ἐπιβαλών* may be, as Euthymius points out, a synonym for *ἀρξάμενος.* In this case the two forms *ἤρξατο κλαίειν* and *ἐπιβαλὼν ἔκλαιεν* would be understood as two independent translations of *coepit plorare.*

PERCVTIEBANT read PERCIPIEBANT: XIV : 65 alapis eum percutiebant D *ῥαπίσμασιν αὐτὸν ἐλάμβανον* (B *ἔλαβον*).

GRABATTO read QVADRATO: II: 3 portantes in grabatto paralyticum *παραλυτικὸν φέροντες αἰρόμενον ὑπὸ τεσσάρων.*

DISSVPAVIT read DISTVRBAVIT: IX: 26 clamavit et dissupavit eum, et exivit de eo . . . *κράξας καὶ πολλὰ σπαράξας ἐξῆλθεν.*[23] In the Latin it is Jesus who utters the cry and routs the spirit. In the Greek it is the spirit who utters the cry; nevertheless it has just been stated twice that he is dumb.

HAEC read FECIT: XIV: 8 quod habuit haec praesumpsit et unguentavit . . . B *ὃ ἔσχεν ἐποίησεν προέλαβεν μυρίσαι.* In these two texts under comparison it is to be noted that *ἐποίησεν* is not represented in the Latin and that *haec* is not represented in the Greek. This is my reason for feeling that HAEC was read FECIT which produced four successive verbs. In the Latin the woman sacrificed[24] everything that she possessed to anoint Jesus. She did far more than the widow who cast a *quadrans,* a day's support, into the Temple money chest. The Greek provides two enigmas. What is the force of *ὃ ἔσχεν ἐποίησεν* ? Of *προέλαβεν μυρίσαι* ? A meaning—but an intricate one—may be found: *the woman has done what she had (in her power to do)*; she has anointed my body for burial *in the nick of time.* Actually it is rather too soon! The failure to read HAEC correctly has entailed a wrong meaning for *praesumpsit.* D and W had the good reading *ὃ ἔσχεν αὐτὴ προέλαβεν,* but the absurd *ἐποίησεν* has got into their text.

The bad reading may come from a word accidentally skipped (or illegible):

(*Confortamini* skipped) XIII: 9-10 . . . ad testimonium illis et in omnes gentes, sed confortamini, prius enim oportet

[23] Cf. IX: 20 conturbavit B *συνεσπάραξεν.*

[24] It is extremely difficult to bring out the real force of the French *la femme a prélevé tout son avoir.* Not only has she used her present possession but has mortgaged her future. (*Translator.*)

praedicari evangelium DW *εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς καί εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη· πρῶτον δὲ δεῖ κηρυχθῆναι* . . . . . D and W, while not reading *confortamini,* have read *sed* (*δὲ*). B skipped *sed* as well (as *confortamini*) which resulted in transferring *εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη* from the first sentence to the second, completely changing the meaning.

Other bad readings have arisen from the Greek itself in one manuscript while another was keeping the reading conformable to the Latin:

ΑΝΕΠΕΙΣΑΝ read *ΑΝΕΣΕΙΣΑΝ* by B: XV:11 persuaserunt populo D *ἔπεισαν τῷ ὄχλῳ* W *ἀνέπεισαν τόν ὄχλον* B *ἀνέσεισαν* (aroused).

ΕΝΑΓΚΑΛΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ read *ΠΡΟΣΚΑΛΕΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ* by D: X:16 complexus illos B *ἐναγκαλισάμενος αὐτὰ* D *προσκαλεσάμενος* (more common word).

ΠΡΟΣΧΕΡΟΝΤΕΣ read *ΠΡΟΣΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΕΣ* by B: IX:45 gaudentes salutabant eum D *προσχέροντες* (for *προσχαίροντες*) *ἠσπάζοντο αὐτόν* B *προστρέχοντες* (an attractive correction).

ΘΕΛΕΤΕ read *ΛΕΓΕΤΕ* by B: XV:12 quid vultis faciam regi iudaeorum? DW *τί θέλετε ποιήσω τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ἰουδαίων*; B *τί ποιήσω λέγετε τὸν βασιλέα* . . . . . *Ψ τί ποιήσω ὃν λέγετε τὸν βασιλέα* (*Ψ* improves B but entirely changes the meaning).

ΑΜΑ read *ΑΛΛΑ* and *ΠΟΛΛΑ* changed to *ΠΛΟΙΑ* byB: IV:36 simul multi erant W *ἅμα πολλοὶ ἦν* B *ἄλλα πλοῖα ἦν* (*ἄλλα* entails *πολλὰ*, interpreted *πλοῖα* on account of the preceeding *πλοίῳ*). These *other boats* were produced from a dehiscent letter M. There is no further mention of them in the account.

Sometimes the modification of the Greek was passed on to different manuscripts which served as seed-plots for ours:

ΕΤΥΠΤΟΝ read *ΕΝΥΠΤΟΝ* XV:19 percutiebant eum *ἔτυπτον αὐτὸν καὶ ἔνυπτον αὐτῷ* (two different readings having been combined).

ΛΑΛΕΙΝ read *ΕΛΑΛΕΙ* VIII : 31-32 occidi et post tertium diem resurgere et cum fiducia sermonem loqui . . . . . *ἀποκτανθῆναι καὶ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναστῆναι, καὶ παρρησίᾳ τὸν λόγον ἐλάλει.*

Here the error produces a serious misconception. Jesus is announcing that he will die, will be raised again, and *will speak the word openly*. This is in contrast to the secrecy which he continually has imposed (I: 25, 44; III: 12; V: 43; VIII: 26, etc.) and which he is about to bid them guard until the time of his resurrection (IX: 9). After the resurrection the secret will be divulged. This is one of the key passages of the Gospel.[25] Tatian and the Sinaitic Syriac version understood the meaning aright (*τὸν λόγον λαλήσει*). The Greek manuscripts which read *ἐλάλει* are contradicted by the rest of the Gospel. Jesus *was* not still speaking openly. On the contrary he had just forbidden his disciples to say that he was the Christ (VIII: 30). He was not announcing *openly* his resurrection. On the contrary it was to cause great surprise (XVI: 8).

Certain errors are of hearing rather than of reading. Frequently in fact the text was dictated aloud to many copyists.

For example, *ἔπεισαν* heard *ἐποίησαν* by *θ*: XV: 11 persuaserant populo ut . . . . . D *ἔπεισαν τῷ ὄχλῳ ἵνα* . . . . . *θ τὸν ὄχλον ἐποίησαν ἵνα* . . . . . .

αἰτίαν heard *ἀλήθειαν* (pronounced probably *alithian*) by BD: V: 33 dixit quid esset facti W *εἶπεν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰτίαν* B *θ εἶπεν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.*

ἐκείνη heard *καινή* by B : I : 27 doctrina haec B *διδαχὴ καινή* D *ἡ διδαχὴ ἐκείνη ἡ καινή* (agglomerate).

κώμας καὶ πόλεις heard *κωμοπόλεις* by B: I : 38 eamus ad castella et civitates *Δ* (*Codex Sangallensis*) *ἄγωμεν εἰς τὰς κώμας καὶ πόλεις* B *εἰς τὰς κωμοπόλεις.*

[25] See F. C. Burkitt, *Journal of Theol. Studies*, 1901, p. 112: ". . . the central thought, therefore, of the prediction is less the resurrection from the tomb than the renewed freedom for the Gospel after the great struggle. . ."

In the thirty-two cases of notable divergences between the Latin and the Greek which have been analyzed so far it is easy to explain the divergence on the basis of the Latin. For the most part it is impossible to explain it on the basis of the Greek.

VIII. Ambiguous Forms of the Latin

The Latin has certain peculiar ambiguities which are such as to cause the translator to stumble.

For example, certain verbs have the same form in the present and perfect: *venit, invenit, ascendit* should be translated sometimes: *he comes, he finds, he ascends,* at other times: *he came, he found, he ascended.* The context alone indicates which is to be chosen. A slavish translator can make a mistake in such cases.

The following are cases where a perfect has been taken for a present, sometimes dragging one or two other verbs with it over to the present:

XIV: 16-18 (paraverunt . . .) venit (. . . dixit) BD (ἡτοίμασαν . . . . .) ἔρχεται (. . . . . εἶπεν). A present between two aorists.

III : 31 venit mater eius et fratres (et . . . miserunt) D ἔρχεται ἡ μήτηρ . . . . . (καὶ ἀπέστειλαν) B ἔρχονται . . . . . (καὶ ἀπέστειλαν). Present, aorist.

XIV: 66-68 venit (. . . dixit . . . negavit) BD ἔρχεται (. . . . . λέγει . . . . . ἠρνήσατο). Two presents, aorist.

V: 22-24 venit quidam (. . . cadens . . . abiit) D ἔρχεται . . . . . προσέπεσεν . . . . . ὑπῆγεν B ἔρχεται (. . . . πίπτει . . . . ἀπῆλθεν). Present and two aorists, or two presents and aorist.

III : 13 ascendit (. . . advocavit . . . venerunt) BD ἀναβαίνει (. . . . προσκαλεῖται . . . . . ἦλθον or ἀπῆλθον). Two presents, aorist.

XIV: 37 venit . . . invenit (. . dixit) BD ἔρχεται . . . . . εὑρίσκει (. . . . λέγει). Three presents. A little farther (XIV:

40) invenit (. . . fuerunt) is correctly rendered by the aorist: εὗρεν (. . . . . ἦσαν).

The perfect passive *collecta est, facta est* may be felt to be a present on account of *est:*

IV: 1 collecta est turba D συνήχθη ὁ ὄχλος (aorist) B συνάγεται (present).

IV: 37 facta est tempestas D ἐγένετο λαῖλαψ (aorist) BW γίνεται (present).

The Latin perfect covers the ground at the same time of the Greek aorist and perfect. The translator is obliged to choose:

XI : 17 fecistis eam speluncam latronum D ἐποιήσατε (aorist) B πεποιήκατε (perfect).

I : 38 ad hoc veni W ἐλήλυθα D ἐξελήλυθα (perfect) B ἐξῆλθον (aorist).

The Latin imperfect subjunctive may be rendered in Greek by the imperfect or aorist indicative. The Latin pluperfect subjunctive by the aorist, perfect, and even the present:

III : 11 cum viderent B ὅταν ἐθεώρουν (imperfect) D ὅταν εἶδον (aorist).

IX : 42 bonum illi . . . ut suspensa esset mola . . . et missus esset D καλόν . . . . . εἰ περιέκειτο . . . καὶ ἐβλήθη (aorists) B καλόν . . . εἰ περίκειται . . . καὶ βέβληται (present and perfect).

Certain neuter nouns like *triticum,* wheat, which have the same form in the nominative and accusative may confuse the translator. This accounts for the strange case of a Greek nominative following two accusatives:

IV: 28 fructum adfert: herbam . . . spicam . . . deinde plenum triticum B *καρποφορεῖ . . . . χόρτον . . . . στάχυν εἶτα πλήρης σῖτος* D . . . . . *χόρτον . . . . . σταχύας εἶτα πλήρης ὁ σῖτος.*

Some of the errors may more naturally have arisen in the frequent cases where the Latin Mark employs a form of the spoken language and departs from classical usage.

Thus it uses forms of the indicative [26] for the imperative: *offers* for *offer* (I: 44), *habeti fidem* for *habetote fidem* (IV: 40). In this latter case the force of the imperative has been lost. And the meaning absolutely prevents translation by the indicative. It is at the end of the account of the stilled storm. Jesus says: "Why are you fearful? Have faith!" One can hardly say to cowards: "You have faith." On this account a negative has been introduced: "How is it that you have no faith?" or: "Have you not faith yet?":

IV: 40 (quid timidi estis?) Habete fidem. W *πῶς οὐκ ἔχετε πίστιν*; BD *οὔπω ἔχετε πίστιν*;

The Latin Mark uses *quomodo* in the sense of *quando.*[27] For example, IV: 36: *quomodo fuit in navi* means *when he was in the boat.* This has not been understood:

IV: 36-37 adsumpserunt eum. quomodo fuit in navi . . . facta est tempestas BD *παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν, ὡς ἦν, ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ* . . . The Greek makes *quomodo fuit* the equivalent of *ita ut fuit,* they take Jesus *as he was* in the boat. Could they have taken him in any other way? The phrase *as he was* is practically meaningless.

Cum with the subjunctive is used in a subordinate clause to express a fact: *factum est cum recumberent, it came to pass*

[26] Cf. H. Roensch, *Itala und Vulgata,* 2nd ed., Marburg, 1875, p. 294: *adfers* for *adfer, adferitis* for *adferte.*

[27] Cf. Roensch, p. 403: *quomodo* tempus erat ut accenderet sacrificium.

that they were reclining. This meaning of *cum* was recognized by B, but has escaped D:

II:15 factum est cum recumberent B *γίνεται κατακεῖσθαι αὐτὸν* (read *recumberet*) D *ἐγένετο, κατακειμένων αὐτῶν, ...*

On the other hand the phrase *dico quare* is not used by the Latin Mark for *dico quia.* Yet this was conjectured by one translator, while another correctly translated *quare* by *why:*

II:16 dicebant: quare manducat . . . ? D *ἔλεγον· διότι ἐσθίει* B *ἔλεγον ὅτι ἐσθίει . . . . .*

IX:28 dicentes: quare non potuimus . . . ? D *ἠρώτων· διότι οὐκ ἠδυνήθημεν . . .*; W *λέγοντες ὅτι οὐκ ἠδυνήθημεν . . .*

The ambiguity may exist not so much in the meaning of the individual word as in its relation to the context. Hesitation may be felt regarding the antecedent of a relative pronoun or the subject of a verb. Here are two examples:

X: 13 offerebant infantes . . . discipuli autem corripiebant eos. (*Eos* are the children; the disciples rebuked them. B understands this.) B *ἐπετίμων αὐτοῖς* (For D on the contrary *eos* are those who are bringing the children) D *ἐπετίμων τοῖς προσφέρουσιν.*

XI: 3 si qui nobis dixerit: quid facistis? dicite: domino necessarius est, et continuo eum dimittet.[27a] (The subject of *dimittet* is clearly the person who is going to say something: *si qui* for *si quis.*[28] Jesus sends his disciples to fetch a young ass that is tied. If any one protests he will be told: The master[29] has need of him and *he* will let him go, *dimittet.* The

[27a] The reading of Fleck and von Soden *dimittet* (MS *dimitsit*) is required since the present *dimittit* provides a meaning no more appropriate to Jesus than to the master of the young ass. In the manuscript the letter *i* is often substituted for *e: Colligit* (collegit), *viniam* (vineam), *purpuria* (purpurea), *dico* (de eo), *cruci* (cruce), etc.

[28] Cf. VIII: 34 si *qui* voluerit; XI: 16 non sinebat ut *qui* circumferret vas.

[29] A word with double meaning: the owner of the young ass or Jesus in his role of Lord.

Greek strangely enough makes *dominus* the subject of *dimittet,* and understands that Jesus is promising to return the young ass). εἴπατε ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ χρείαν ἔχει καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτὸν ἀποστελεῖ πάλιν ὧδε. (The last two words which are added are the sign of a slightly puerile misinterpretation.)

The chief cause of ambiguity in a Latin text is the absence of the article. He who struggles to translate Latin into French or Greek must decide in the case of many nouns whether or not it is necessary to prefix the article. In this matter of articles the Greek Mark shows many cases of hesitation and error.

II: 7 dimittere peccata D τὰς ἁμαρτίας (to forgive the sins) BW ἁμαρτίας (sins).

X: 21 distribue pauperibus D θ τοῖς πτωχοῖς (to the poor) BW πτωχοῖς (to poor people).

XI: 21 cyrinaeum D τὸν κυρηναῖον (the Cyrenian) BW κυρηναῖον (a Cyrenian).

XII: 40 comedunt domos viduarum B τὰς οἰκίας τῶν χηρῶν DW οἰκίας χηρῶν.

XIV: 47 rapuit gladium B τὴν μάχαιραν (his sword) DW μάχαιραν (a sword).

XV: 12 quid . . . faciam regi iudaeorum? BW τὸν βασιλέα (with the king) D βασιλέα (with a king).

III: 20 introivit in domum εἰς οἶκον (anarthrous); IX: 33 cum venissent domum, ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ (with the article). Apparently without any reason.

XIV: 20 qui tinguet in paropside (apparently meaning: he who shall thrust his hand into *the dish* which is there, as D understood it) εἰς τὸ τρύβλιον (or into *a dish,* no matter which, just as B θ expressly say) εἰς τὸ ἓν τρύβλιον.[30]

IV: 38 (Jesus is asleep in the boat on the bow thwart) in prora super pulvinum (since the word pulvinus has the more common meaning *cushion* it has been understood: *on a cushion*)

[30] No especial dish is indicated by this latter phrase; the important thing being that it is the same dish that Jesus had dipped into. (*Translator.*)

D *ἐπὶ προσκεφαλαίον* (or *on the cushion*) B *ἐπὶ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον*. But what cushion? [81]

Occasionally the error is obvious. In the examples which follow the addition of the article is unjustified:

IX: 36 accepit puerum (he took a child) BW *παιδίον* (not *the* child since a child had not yet been mentioned) D *τὸ παιδίον*.

XV: 46 posuit eum in monumento (he laid him in a tomb, about which nothing had yet been said) BW *ἐν μνημείῳ* (not *the* tomb) D *ἐν τῷ μνήματι*.

VIII: 11 conquirere signum (to ask for a sign) BW *σημεῖον θ σημεῖόν τι* (not *the* sign) D *τὸ σημεῖον*.

In other cases, on the other hand, the omission of the article is unjustified:

IX: 31 filius hominis traditur (the Son of Man) BW *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* (not a son of man) D *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*.

II: 2 loquebatur verbum (he was speaking the Word) BW *τὸν λόγον* (not a word) D *λόγον*.

XV: 1 pontifices cum senioribus et scribis (the three orders of the Sanhedrin, viz. the chief priests, the elders, and *the* scribes) D *τῶν γραμματέων* (not *some* scribes) B *γραμματέων*.

Here are two cases where the use of the article produces a more important misinterpretation:

II: 18 erant discipuli iohannis et pharisaei ieiunantes (*some* disciples of John the Baptist and some Pharisees were fasting, probably a legal fast-day, *Yom Kippour*). Jesus is asked why it is that his disciples also are not fasting. Jesus' answer means that for Christians the Easter-fast (le jeûne de

[81] *Bow* in Latin became *stern* in Greek: *ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ*, perhaps due to the influence of the verses of Homer: Od. XIII: 74-75:

νηὸς ἐπ' ἰκριόφιν γλαφυρῆς, ἵνα νήγρετον εὕδοι,
πρύμνης.

Pâques) will take the place of the Jewish fast of *Kippour*. By the translation "*the* disciples of John and *the* Pharisees," the meaning becomes general and vague) *οἱ μαθηταὶ . . . . . οἱ φαρισαῖοι . . . . .*

XV: 7 fuit barabbas in carcere cum seditiosis qui in seditione fecerunt homicidium. (Barabbas was in prison with some rioters who had committed a murder in *a* riot of which as yet there had been no mention, and not in *the riot* as the Greek translators wrote) *ἐν τῇ στάσει.* This error in translation caused Robert Eisler and other exegetes to believe that Mark and his readers knew about a great riot which was known as the Riot as we speak of the War.

IX. Literalisms

Every translator is liable to carry over too literally an expression or idiom of one language into the other and thus to mangle the language into which he is translating. This is by no means rare in the Greek Mark.

IX: 10 sermonem tenebant apud se (*sermonem tenere,* to hold conversation is a most common expression. But if one translates *tenere* mechanically by *κρατεῖν*, the same as in I: 31: *tenens manum, κρατήσας,* one gets a strange result) *τὸν λόγον ἐκράτησαν πρὸς ἑαυτούς.* What does *τὸν λόγον ἐκράτησαν* mean? In the N. T. *κρατεῖν* is used with *παράδοσιν* (Mark VII: 3, 8; II Thes. II: 15), with *διδαχήν* (Rev. II: 14). Is the meaning that the disciples kept in their memory the *word* of Jesus (about the resurrection), as Swete and Gould understand? They keep it poorly because they do not understand it. Or is that they *observed* the suggestion (not to talk about the transfiguration), as Allen and Klostermann understand? They will have occasion to observe it only when they are with others. In any case one cannot pass from *τὸν λόγον ἐκράτησαν* to *sermonem tenebant,* which has a meaning entirely different and perfectly clear.

XV: 1 consilium fecerunt *συμβούλιον ποιήσαντες* (a bald

Latinism); III: 6 consilium faciebant W *συμβούλιον ἐποιοῦντο* D *ποιοῦντες* Θ *ἐποίησαν* B avoids the Latinism: *ἐδίδουν*.

VIII: 32 adprehensum eum *προσλαβόμενος αὐτὸν* (a reproduction of the Latin but with a very different meaning. The Greek means *helping him* [32] and does not at all conform to the context.)

IX: 21 a pueritia *ἐκ παιδιόθεν*. XI: 13; XIV: 54; XV: 40 de longiquo *ἀπὸ μακρόθεν*. Greek pleonasms perhaps due to the Latin.

XIV: 3 cum esset in bethania . . . et recumberet, *ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἐν βηθανίᾳ . . . . κατακειμένου αὐτοῦ*. An awkward construction with two genitive absolutes.

IX: 28 cum introisset . . . discipuli eum interrogabant, *εἰσελθόντες αὐτοῦ . . . . ἐπηρώτων αὐτὸν*. An even more faulty construction, although examples occur.

The *ne* which in Latin after verbs expresses a prohibition or a fear is barbarously rendered in Greek: *ἵνα μὴ*:

V: 10 obsecrabat ne . . . *παρεκάλει ἵνα μὴ . . . . .*
III: 12 corripiebat ne . . . *ἐπετίμα ἵνα μὴ . . . .*
IX: 9 praecepit ne . . . *διεστείλατο ἵνα μήδενι . . . .*
VIII: 30 admonuit ne . . . *ἐπετίμησαν ἵνα μήδενι . . . .*

The Latin construction (*adesse nuntiatur*) where an infinitive serves as subject of a passive verb is brought over into Greek in this fashion:

V: 43 ut daretur manducare . . . *δοθῆναι φαγεῖν*.

The interrogation expressed by *si* with the subjunctive: *quaerebam sicca si posset piscis arena . . . vivere* [33] also tries to smuggle its way into Greek:

[32] See M.—J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon s. Marc*, Paris, 1911, p. 207.
[33] Propertius II, 3, 5 cited by A. C. Juret, *Système de la Syntaxe latine*, Paris, 1926, p. 380.

XI: 13 venit videre si quid esset in illa D ἦλθεν ἰδεῖν ἐάν τι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ (B corrects the solecism ἐὰν ἐστίν by εἰ ἄρα with the future, which latter construction seems to have been borrowed from the usage of Acts [34]) B ἦλθεν εἰ ἄρα τι εὑρήσει. θ achieves the really Attic construction ἦλθεν ὡς εὑρήσων τι.

In contrast to literalisms loose translations (*la traduction vague*) occur. A translator sometimes uses a favorite word without regard to the nuances of the text. For example, the Greek translator of the *Apologeticum* of Tertullian uses the verb ἀνεκοινώσατο to translate *detulit* as well as *consuluit*.[35]

The Greek Mark does the same thing. He uses the intransitive verb παρίστημι impartially to translate *adesse* (IV: 29; XV: 35), *adsistere* (XIV: 47), *stare* (XIV: 70; XV: 39), and *circumstare* (XIV: 69).

X. Paraphrases

A translator is forced to do a little explaining of the text which he is translating. He adds words to complete the idea. Also as a general rule a translation is longer than the text translated.

In Mark's Greek are found attempts at exactness that evidence the redactor's hand:

V: 21 cum transfretasset D θ διαπεράσαντος B adds *in the boat* for exactness: διαπεράσαντος ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ.

XIII: 15 non descendat B μὴ καταβάτω D (for greater precision) μὴ καταβάτω εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν.

IX: 31 occident eum et resurget D καὶ ἀναστήσεται B insists: and *when he is killed* he shall rise again, καὶ ἀποκτανθεὶς ἀναστήσεται.

I: 42 continuo abiit ab eo lepra W εὐθὺς ἀπῆλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ λέπρα B adds . . . καὶ ἐκαθαρίσθη (and he was cleansed). An unnecessary exactness.

[34] Acts VIII: 22; XVII: 27; VII: 1(D). See F. Blass, *Philosophy of the Gospels*, London, 1898, p. 197.

[35] In Eusebius, *H. E.* II, 2, 4 and III, 33, 3. Cf. Tertullian, *Apolog.* V and II.

V : 15 vident daemoniacum vestitum et suae mentis D adds *seated:* καθήμενον W emphasizes: *he who had the demon 'Legion,'* τὸν ἐσχηκότα τὸν λεγεῶνα B combines them all.

VI: 4 non est propheta sine honore nisi in patria sua BD adds . . . καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγενεῦσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ αὐτοῦ. A rather pointless spinning-out.

Explanations:

IX: 38 vidimus quendam . . . qui non sequitur nobiscum et vetuimus illum B explains: *because he did not follow us.*

II: 23 coeperunt vellere spicas DW τίλλειν τοὺς στάχυας. B explains: *to make their way* plucking . . . ὁδὸν ποιεῖν τίλλοντες . . . . . .

XIV: 51 circumamictus pallam θ adds γυμνός BD ἐπὶ γυμνοῦ to explain that when the *palla* had been thrown off the young man ran off naked.

IX: 39 nemo est qui faciat virtutem in nomine meo et poterit male loqui de me W με κακολογῆσαι BD ταχὺ κακολογῆσαί με. This *quickly* limits the reach of the proverb.

V: 12 mitte nos in porcos: The Greek explains: *that we may enter into them,* ἵνα εἰς αὐτοὺς εἰσέλθωμεν.

A clumsily concealed amphibology:

VIII: 24 video homines quasi arbores ambulantes (*as trees walking*) DW θ ὡς δένδρα περιπατοῦντες (*ambulantes* is ascribed to *homines.* An absurd meaning: *walking as trees!* B tries but without success to avoid this amphibology) B ὅτι ὡς δένδρα ὁρῶ περιπατοῦντας.

An exactness of liturgical interest. At just what hour did the resurrection take place?

XVI: 2 mane D πρωὶ ἀνατέλλοντος τοῦ ἡλίου (*at sunrise*) B λίαν πρωὶ ἀνατείλαντος τοῦ ἡλίου (*after the sun had risen*)

An intended explanation may produce a misinterpretation:

VIII: 38 qui me confusus fuerit et meos . . . (whosoever shall be ashamed of me and mine . . . The Greek translator thinks that it needs a word after *meos;* he supplies the rather pointless *words*) ὃς ἐὰν ἐπαισχυνθῇ με καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους . . . . . The meaning is changed.

An addition itself may be changed as a result of a hard reading (*par mauvaise lecture*):

XV: 8 tota turba rogabat W Θ Ψ ἀναβοήσας ὁ ὄχλος ἤρξατο αἰτεῖσθαι . . . . . (The only way a crowd can implore is by uttering cries. By an easy change[36] ἀναβοήσας becomes ἀναβάς. The crowd instead of raising a cry *goes up*) D ἀναβὰς ὅλος ὁ ὄχλος ἤρξατο αἰτεῖσθαι B ἀναβὰς ὁ ὄχλος ἤρξατο αἰτεῖσθαι.

Sometimes the phrase is rounded out piously in a conventional Biblical style:

XIII: 19 ab initio creaturae B (not D) ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτίσεως ἣν ἔκτισεν ὁ θεός.

XIII: 20 propter electos B (not D) διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς οὓς ἐξελέξατο.

V: 19 quanta tibi dominus fecit D ὅσα σοι ὁ κύριος πεποίηκεν καὶ ὅτι ἐλέησέν σε B καὶ ἐλέησέν σε.

Some of the suggestive additions reveal the translator's knowledge of the style and stereotyped phraseology of Luke:[37]

XIV: 58 hic dixit BD ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος. Cf. Acts VI: 11 and 14: *we have heard him say* (Stephen).

[36] K. F. A. Fritsche, *Evangelium Marci,* Lipsiae, 1830, ad loc., pointed out the same confusion in the Septuagint in II Sam. XXIII: 9; II Kings III: 21; Hos. VIII: 9.

[37] See F. Blass, *Philology of the Gospels,* pp. 196-211.

III: 22 dicebant BD *οἱ ἀπὸ Ἱεροσολύμων καταβάντες ἔλεγον.* Cf. Acts XXV: 7 *the Jews that had come down from Jerusalem* (to accuse Paul).

XV: 24 mittentes sortem B (not D) adds: *τίς τί ἄρῃ.* Cf. Luke XIX: 15, D: *τίς τί διεπραγματεύσαντο.*

IV: 19 oblectationes saeculi B (not D) adds: *καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐπιθυμίαι.* But neither the words *ἐπιθυμία* and *λοιπός*, nor the construction of *περί* with the accusative occurs elsewhere in the Greek Mark, although all three are common in Luke.

XI. Multiple Forms of the Greek

A comparison of the manuscripts B, D, and W reveals the fact that often the same word is represented in three different ways. Examples of this can be easily multiplied. It will be sufficient to give a few:

XIII: 11 illud W *ἐκεῖνο* D *αὐτό* B *τοῦτο.*
X: 46 mendicus W *προσαιτῶν* D *ἐπαιτῶν* B *προσαίτης.*
II: 4 accedere W *προσελθεῖν* D *προσεγγίσαι* B *προσενέγκαι.*
XIV: 71 iurare W *ὀμνύειν* D *λέγειν* B *ὀμνύναι.*
XII: 14 interrogabant W *ἤρξαντο ἐρωτᾶν* D *ἐπηρώτων* B *λέγουσι.*
XI: 7 duxerunt W *ἄγουσι* D *ἤγαγον* B *φέρουσι.*
IX: 20 conturbavit W *ἐσπάραξεν* D *ἐτάραξεν* B *συνεσπάραξεν.*
X: 35 petierimus W *αἰτησόμεθα* D *ἐρωτωσώμεθα* B *αἰτήσωμεν.*
XI: 23 locutus fuerit W *λέγει* D *ἂν εἴπῃ* B *λάλει.*
XII: 41 cum sederet *ἑστώς* D *καθεζόμενος* B *καθίσας.*
IX: 6 quid responderet W *τί λάλει* D *τί λαλήσει* B *τί ἀποκριθῇ.*
XIII: 26 in nube W *ἐν νεφέλῃ* D *ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν* B *ἐν νεφέλαις.*
IV: 31 cum (seminatur) W *ὁπόταν* D *ὅτι ἂν* (wrong translation) B *ὅταν.*
XIII: 30 quoadusque W *ἕως* D *ἕως οὗ* B *μέχρις ὅτου.*
IX: 21 (temporis) ex quo W *ἐξ οὗ* D *ὡς* B *ἕως.*

These changes are insignificant as far as the meaning is concerned. It is the number of them that makes them so

impressive. One can scarcely see how they could have arisen on the basis of a Greek original through the toilsome whim of copyists or correctors. Rather they resemble the little differences which different translations of the same original show. They suggest that there were many translations of the Latin Mark.

If instead of this the Latin Mark were translated from the Greek, it would be derived from one of the different types of this Greek. It would then be found to agree regularly with one type against the others. For example, it would regularly follow D and regularly deviate from B. Its affinities would betray its dependence.

The actual case is exactly the reverse. The Latin Mark occupies a central position so far as affinity for the Greek texts is concerned. It is sometimes one of them, sometimes another, which comes the nearest to it. It has no regular affinity. It is a simple task to draw up lists of equal length to prove conclusively that it (the Latin) stands equidistant from W, D, and B. We will be content here with a few examples:

Cases where the Latin is nearer to W than to B and D.

IV: 32 crescit W *αὔξει* BD *ἀναβαίνει.*
II: 12 admirari W *θαυμάζειν* BD *ἐξίστασθαι.*
V: 6 adcucurrit W *προσέδραμεν* BD *ἔδραμεν.*
III: 10 curabit W *ἐθεράπευεν* BD *ἐθεράπευσεν.*
XIV: 30 negabis W *ἀρνήσῃ* BD *ἀπαρνήσῃ.*
I: 27 inpotentabilis W *ἐξουσιαστικὴ* BD *κατ' ἐξουσίαν.*

Cases where the opposite is true and the Latin is farther from W than from B and D.

IV: 4 volatilia BD *τὰ πέτεινὰ* W *τὰ ὄρνεα.*
VIII: 23 spuens BD *πτύσας* W *ἐνπτύσας.*
II: 23 transire BD *διαπορεύεσθαι* W *πορεύεσθαι.*

IX: 33 retractabitis BD *διελογίζεσθε* W *διελέχθητε.*
IX: 31 resurget BD *ἀναστήσεται* W *ἐγείρεται.*
VI: 5 non illic ullum BD *ἐκεῖ οὐδεμίαν* W *οὐκέτι.*

Cases where the Latin is nearer to D than to B and W.

XII: 14 capitularium D *ἐπικεφάλαιον* BW *κῆνσον.*
XIV: 21 scriptum est D *ἐστιν γεγράμμενον* BW *γέγραπται.*
XIV: 58 excitabo D *ἀναστήσω* BW *οἰκοδομήσω.*
XII: 2 darent D *δώσουσιν* BW *λάβῃ* (entirely different).
XVI: 4 revolutum D *ἀποκεκυλίσμενον* BW *ἀνακεκύλισται.*[38]
XII: 38 in docendo D *διδάσκων ἅμα* BW *ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ.*

Cases where the opposite is true and the Latin is farther from D than from B and W.

III: 3 aridam BW *ξηράν* D *ἐξηραμμένην.*
XV: 39 contra BW *ἐξ ἐναντίας αὐτοῦ* D *ἐκεῖ.*
XV: 16 colligunt BW *συγκαλοῦσιν* D *καλοῦσιν.*
X: 12 relinquit virum BW *ἀπολύσασα τὸν ἄνδρα* D *ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ ἀνδρός.*
XIV: 4 indignantes BW *ἀγανακτοῦντες* D *διεπονοῦντο.*[39]
XIV: 25 non bibam BW *οὐ μὴ πίω* D *οὐ πρόσθω πίειν.*[40]

Cases where the Latin is nearer to B than to D and W.

XVI: 8 tremor B *τρόμος* DW *φόβος.*
XV: 27 crucifixerunt B *ἐσταύρωσαν* DW *σταυροῦνται* (or *σταυροῦσιν*).
V: 6 adoravit illum B *προσεκύνησεν αὐτὸν* DW *αὐτῷ.*
VIII: 34 venire post me B *ὀπίσω μου ἐλθεῖν* DW *ὀπίσω μου ἀκολουθεῖν.*

[38] The word used by D shows his familiarity with Palestinian tombs; the stone was rolled by pushing it (*ἀπο—*). The word used by BW suggests, but wrongly, that the stone would be rolled by exerting a pressure from below (*ἀνα—*). Hoskier, I, p. 119.

[39] An uncommon word which is found again only in Acts IV: 2; XVI: 18. Blass, p. 201.

[40] An intentional Hebraism.

II: 8 continuo agnoscens B *εὐθὺς ἐπιγνοὺς* DW *ἐπιγνοὺς* (without *εὐθὺς*).

I: 45 in desertis locis conveniebant B *ἤρχοντο* DW *ἦν καὶ ἤρχοντο.*[41]

Cases where the opposite is true and the Latin is farther from B than from D and W.

XI: 32 populum DW *τὸν λαόν* B *τὸν ὄχλον.*

XVI: 5 cum introissent DW *εἰσελθοῦσαι* B *ἐλθοῦσαι*

V: 14 exierunt DW *ἐξῆλθον* B *ἦλθον.*

XIV: 7 vobiscum DW *μεθ' ὑμῶν* B *μεθ' ἑαυτῶν.*

I: 25 exi de homine DW *ἔξελθε ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* B *ἔξελθε ἐξ αὐτοῦ.*

XII: 19 habuerit uxorem DW *ἔχῃ γυναῖκα* B *καταλίπῃ γυναῖκα.*

Comparison of these six tables makes it perfectly clear that the Latin is not derived from one of the types of the Greek but that these, on the contrary, are different types of Greek all of which are derived from the Latin. The advantage of a test of this type is that it is not made subordinate to personal judgment. It depends on lists of presence, absence, and concomitant variations.

XII. Agglomerates

When numerous translations of a text are corrected one by the other, the result is that a correction instead of replacing the other reading is simply added to it. Two variant translations of the same phrase thus are found in juxtaposition. This is what is meant by an *agglomerate* (agglomérat). The presence and especially the number of the *agglomerates* allow one to distinguish between translation and original. Now no type of text of the Greek Mark is free from these double translations. All are freighted with agglomerates.

[41] The intrusion of the verb *ἦν* in DW makes *in desertis locis* refer to Jesus: *he was in desert places and they came . . .*

In some cases one of the two simple translations is read in one manuscript and one in a second, and the agglomerate is revealed in a third. Such cases provide tangible evidence as to how the situation arose:

XIV: 21 (filius hominis) vadit B *ὑπάγει* D *παραδίδοται* W *παραδίδοται ὑπάγει.*

X: 32 admirabantur qui sequebantur illum D *καὶ ἐθαμβοῦντο* Sahidic version *οἱ δὲ ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐφοβοῦντο* B *καὶ ἐθαμβοῦντο· οἱ δὲ ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐφοβοῦντο.*

XII: 44 misit totum quem habuit victum suum W *ἔβαλεν ὅλον τὸν βίον αὐτῆς.* Sinaitic Syriac version *πάντα ὅσα εἶχεν ἔβαλεν* BD *πάντα ὅσα εἶχεν ἔβαλεν, ὅλον τὸν βίον αὐτῆς.*

More often one manuscript gives one of the two simple translations and another manuscript the agglomerate. The second simple translation may be conjectured:

VIII: 15 cavete D *βλέπετε* [other translation *ὁρᾶτε*] BW *ὁρᾶτε βλέπετε.*

IV: 39 obmutesce W *φιμώθητι* [other translation *σιώπα*] D *σιώπα καὶ φιμώθητι* B *σιώπα πεφίμοσο.*

I: 35 ante lucem W *ἔννυχα* [other translation *πρωΐ*] BD *πρωΐ ἔννυχα λίαν.*

X: 30 in isto saeculo D *ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ* [other translation *νῦν*] B *νῦν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ.*

X: 4 libellum repudii scribere B*θ* *γράψαι* [other translation *δοῦναι*] D *δοῦναι γράψαι.*

I: 32 cum sol occidisset: Sinaitic Syriac version *ὅτε ἔδυσεν ὁ ἥλιος* [other translation *ὀψίας γενομένης*] BD *ὀψίας δὲ γενομένης ὅτε ἔδυσεν ὁ ἥλιος.*

V: 23 et vivet: Sinaitic Syriac version *σωθήσεται* [other translation *ἵνα ζήσῃ*] BD *ἵνα σωθῇ καὶ ζήσῃ.*

I: 38 eamus ad proxima (castella) *θ* *ἄγωμεν εἰς τὰς ἐχομένας* [other translation *ἀλλαχοῦ*] BD *ἄγωμεν ἀλλαχοῦ εἰς τὰς ἐχομένας*

. . . . . .

IV: 2 docebat illos dicens W ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς λέγων [other translation ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ] BD ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ.

Finally the mere comparison of the Latin and the Greek [42] occasionally arouses the suspicion of an agglomerate which may be confused with a paraphrase:

XII: 41 honesti mittebant multa B πολλοὶ πλούσιοι ἔβαλλον πολλά (*multa* read *multi* in a translation).

II: 25 esuriit BD χρείαν ἔσχεν καὶ ἐπείνασεν.

XIV: 41 dormite BD καθεύδετε καὶ ἀναπαύεσθε.

XIV: 61 tacebat D ἐσείγα καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίθη B ἐσιώπα καὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο.

XIV: 68 nescio BD οὔτε οἶδα οὔτε ἐπίσταμαι.

I: 45 in desertis locis BD ἔξω ἐπ' ἐρήμοις τόποις.

VIII: 11 conquirere (signum) συνζητεῖν αὐτῷ, ζητοῦντες παρ' αὐτοῦ.

XIII. Clement of Alexandria

Quotations from Mark are scarce in the early days of Christianity.[43] The most instructive are those made by Clement of Alexandria at the end of the second century:[44]

V: 34 vade in pace. Clement ἄπελθε εἰς εἰρήνην BD ὕπαγε θ πορεύου. The verb used by Clement is not found in any known Greek manuscript.

X: 22 multas divitias et agros. Clement χρήματα πολλὰ καὶ ἀγρούς D χρήματα πολλὰ (without ἀγρούς) BW κτήματα πολλὰ (without ἀγρούς). The two words *et agros* which Clement used agree with the Latin and are not found in any Greek manuscript.

[42] I. e., without any manuscript evidences such as the above examples provide. (*Translator.*)

[43] For example, the reconstruction of the New Testament of Irenæus by W. Sanday and C. H. Turner (*Old Latin Biblical Texts*, No. VII), Oxford, 1923, contains but 4 pages for Mark while Matthew has 43, Luke 26, John 16. See above, p. 41, a quotation which proves that Irenæus read a Latin Mark.

[44] See P. M. Barnard, *The Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria* (*Texts and Studies V*, 5) Cambridge, 1899; and H. C. Hoskier, *Codex B and its Allies*, London, 1914, I, pp. 198-204.

XII: 30 de tota anima tua et de tota virtute tua. Justin and Clement ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς σου καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς δυνάμεώς σου. All the Greek manuscripts[45] have three or four members. D puts ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας σου before *soul*. B intercalates, furthermore, ἐξ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας σου between *soul* and *strength*. Justin and Clement ignore the Greek manuscripts and go with the Latin.

X: 25 facilius est camellum per cavernam acus introire .... Clement quotes this passage four times: in the *Stromata* (II, 5) and in *Quis dives salvetur* (2, 4 and 26). It is noteworthy that each of the four times he quotes it in a different form and in disagreement with the Greek manuscripts. To render *facilius* once he uses εὐχόλως, once ῥᾶον, twice θάττον. Greek Mark has εὐκοπώτερον (B) and ταχεῖον (D). To render *introire per* once he uses διεκδύσεται, twice εἰσελεύσεται, once διελεύσεσθαι. Greek Mark has διελθεῖν (B) and διελεύσεται (D). For *cavernam* he uses τρήματος. Greek Mark has τρυμαλιᾶς (B) and τρυμαλίδος (D).

It is curious to find Clement quoting one passage of Mark in four different Greek forms without meeting the forms which do occur in the manuscripts.

From these examples it is evident that Clement of Alexandria followed the Latin text and was not acquainted with a settled (fixé) Greek text. If he desired to quote Mark he translated the Latin at that moment without looking to see whether he had made another translation for himself or whether there was another one in existence.

XIV. Counter-proof

Do the cases where the Latin would be a clear translation of the Greek disrupt the full and manifold evidence which shows the priority of the Latin Mark to the Greek Mark? An examination of the cases which may be alleged is necessary.

[45] Except 157 (Sod. ε 207) which has ἰσχύος instead of δυνάμεως.

The use of certain Greek words in the Latin Mark: *scandalum, scandalizare, discolum, diaconos,* (*mons*) *eleon, anastasis, gazofilacium* is no more significant than the use of certain Latin words in the Greek Mark: *κεντυρίων, λεγίων, σπεκουλάτωρ, δηνάριον, κοδράντης* (*quadrans*), *ξέστης* (*sextarius*), *φραγελλῶ* (*flagello*), *πραιτώριον.* In Rome and the large bilingual cities Latin and Greek existed side by side and were often interchanged. They borrowed from each other, they contaminated each other. Inscriptions in the catacombs show that words and even the very alphabets were interchangeable. Accordingly, a Greek original is not to be inferred from a few Greek words nor a Latin original from a few Latin words.

All the Greek words which figure in the Latin Mark are found in the Septuagint. It is possible that their introduction in the Latin was due to the liturgic usage of the Jews.[45a] Behind *σκάνδαλον, scandalum,* one is not to detect the Greek "tumbler" (gâchette) but the Hebrew word which *σκάνδαλον* translates.

Dicere quia (IX: 26), *videre* or *audire quia* (IX: 25; X: 47), *legere quoniam* (XII: 29) are not translations of the Greek. They are cases of vernacular. Tertullian uses *quia* 13 times and *quoniam* 3 times as the equivalent of the conjunction *que.*[45b] In Petronius we find: *dixi quod comedit* (46, 4); an old hag says: *vides quod aliis leporem excitavi* (131, 7). According to A. C. Juret (*Système de la syntaxe latine,* Paris, 1926, p. 317) *quia* instead of *quod* in sentences of this kind is old Latin.

Coepit . . . iurare quia: non novi hominem istum (XIV: 71) is a popular idiom as is the corresponding Greek phrase. *Quia* is used here to introduce direct discourse. One detects here a trace of its original meaning, namely, an old neuter plural accusative of *qui.*

[45a] On this point see D. S. Blondheim, *Les parlers judéo romans et la vetus latina,* Paris, 1925.

[45b] G. Mayen, *De particulis Quod, Quia, Quoniam, Ut pro acc. cum infinitivo post verba sentiendi et declarandi positis,* Kiel, 1889.

The Latin Mark is very careless in the matter of gender. This is also evidence of the popular speech. Roensch (*Itala und Vulgata,* pp. 276f.) cites in addition: civitatem *qui* dicitur, escam *quem* nescitis, hora in *quo,* viduam *qui* misit, *omnem* opus, regnum *venientem,* certamen *qualem* vidistis, etc. In the Latin Mark we find: granum *qui* . . . *minor* cum sit fit *maior.* This is not due to the scribe seeing the Greek κόκκος ὅς. Rather it is the Greek κόκκον ὅς . . . . . μικρότερον ὄν which arose from carelessness regarding the gender of *granum.*

The most curious disregard of genders is: quod est mandatum *primum? . . . haec prima* est . . . deinde *secunda* similis . . . maius his *alius* mandatum non est (XII: 28-31). Here we see all three genders used with *mandatum.* The Greek ἐντολή would explain the feminine but not the masculine.

Dominantur earum, potentantur eorum (X: 42) are Grecisms which came into use through the influence of the Septuagint. Tertullian says: *numquam dominaturi eius* (Apol. 26).

Visus est illis helias (IX: 4) with the dative instead of *ab* with the ablative is an idiom often employed by Cicero (*audita tibi*), Tacitus, Tertullian, etc. (Roensch, p. 436). *Fuerunt conloquentes* (ibid) is a periphrastic construction akin to *audiens sum,* which is old Latin and classical (Juret, p. 72).

Hoc factum est ei (IX: 21), a passive with the dative of the recipient of the action, is Latin and is not to be explained as a copy of the Greek.

Contristatus super illum sermonem (X: 22), *admirabantur super sermonem eius* (X: 26) are popular idioms and do not presuppose ἐπὶ with the dative. *Super,* meaning *by reason of,* occurs in familiar speech. We find it with the ablative in Plautus (*super Euclionis filia rem tenes*), in Cicero's letters (*hac super re*), in Apuleius (*famam super quondam Demochare*). Here the accusative takes the place of the ablative which is not classical but nevertheless is a far step from ἐπὶ with the dative.

In nullo potest exire nisi orationibus (IX: 29) is popular and does not strongly suggest the Greek. The instrumental ablative is here preceded by *in* as in the familiar *in hoc signo vinces.*

Novissime habet (V: 23) is Latin like *male habet* (he is ill), *habet invitius* (he is opposed), *habet tranquillius* (he is tranquil). This is the Greek ἐσχάτως ἔχει which is a Latinism.

Restitutus est ut videret (VIII: 25) is a good Latin idiom like *arboribus consita Halia est ut pomarium videatur* (Varro).

Sequitur nobiscum (IX: 38) is not a "tracing" of ἀκολουθεῖ ἡμῖν. It is ἀκολουθεῖ μεθ' ἡμῶν, the reading of Codex Regius (L) and Codex Beratinus (Φ), which is copied from the Latin.

Gaudentes (IX: 15) is most appropriate of the men who had been sad at seeing the disciples unable to perform a miracle and who rejoiced at seeing Jesus. *Expavit* depicts a movement of great surprise.

Dilexit illum (X: 21) is appropriately used after the man who is seeking eternal life has answered that he has observed all the commandments since the time of his youth. The verb means either Jesus chose him, or esteemed him, treated him with distinction, loved him, with a hint of choice or approval. *Dilexit illum* does not yield an inch to ἠγάπησεν αὐτὸν, even if the latter be given the meaning *he embraced him.*

Misit minuta duo quod est quadrans (XII: 42) is a mere pleonasm. *Minutum* is not a unit of Roman currency, nor is there any Roman coin valued at half a *quadrans.* (The quadrans was divided into three "ounces"). The meaning is: she cast two little coins of the value of a *quadrans.*

Non sapis quae sunt dei (VIII: 33) is most appropriate after Peter's silly flutter at the mention of the Passion. *Sapis* is not to be understood as coming from φρονεῖς which is, on the contrary, less apt.

Arescit (IX: 18), he becomes stiff, is good Latin and fits in very well with the description of an epileptic fit. It is intelligible without recourse to the Greek ξηραίνεται.

Seminatio for *semen* (IV: 26) is not a copy of σπόρος. Words in *-atio* are characteristic of the phraseology of the Latin Mark: *excusatio* (XII: 40), *executio* (XIII: 14), *generatio* (*fructus* XIV: 25), *baptizatio* (VIII: 28), *blasphematio* (XIV: 64).

Docentia (XI: 18) is not a copy of διδαχή, but is akin to many feminine nouns in *-ntia* (Roensch, pp. 49-52). These nouns are as a general rule based on a present participle: *nascentia, sufficentia, sustinentia, apparentia, errantia, expavescentia, erubescentia, fraudulentia,* etc. Tertullian uses *discentia.*

Cena pura (XV: 42) is not a mutilation of παρασκευή. It was a common term for Friday in use by Latin-speaking Jews. (Tertullian, *Ad Nat.* I, 13; Augustine *In Johann.,* 120, 5; *Sermones* CCXXI). It passed from the Jews to the Christians. It persists in the Sardinian dialect where Friday is called *Kenápura, Kenábura.*[45c] According to a passage of Festus[45d] *cena pura* was a pagan ritual term. It apparently signified a meal in preparation for the mysteries, characterized by abstaining from certain dishes. It is curious that the Latin-speaking Jews took over this term to designate the preparation for their Sabbath. Had they likened in some way or other the celebration of the Sabbath to that of the mysteries?

In short, the counter-proof does not weaken in the slightest degree the evidence, either as a whole or in detail, which unites in proving that the Latin Mark is the original, the Greek Mark the copy.

Conclusion

This assembly of evidence proves that the Gospel of Mark was written in Latin as the subscriptions say. The reason a Greek version of Mark was put in the New Testament was

45c Meyer-Lübke, *Rom. etym. Wörterb,* §1806, quoted by Blondheim, p. LX.
45d P. 230b, ed. Müller, Leipzig, 1839, quoted by Blondheim LIX.

that it was convenient to have the whole collection in the same language.

Many Greek versions superficially harmonized were made of the original Mark. To seek to bring them back to a Greek archetype is wasted effort. The "critical" editions of Westcott and Hort, of Nestle, of von Soden in so far as they depart from B produce an artificial text of Mark which never existed. It would be far more critical to edit separately B, D, and W as the Old Syriac version and the Peshitta have been edited separately. There was no original Greek of Mark. The original is Latin.

The Gospel of Mark was probably written in Rome in that group of the Christian community which spoke Latin and for that group. The works of George La Piana [46] show the increasingly important position this group assumed in the course of the second century, one of its members, Victor, even succeeding to the episcopate in 190. In the third century Hippolytus who speaks Greek is an anachronism. The Latin group contained many Africans. It possessed their tendencies. The Gospel of Mark was the doctrinal manifesto and liturgical handbook of this group.

The Greek versions were apparently made in Egypt. W shows the effect of hobnobbing with the Coptic. B is allied to the oldest Coptic version.[47] D has some bad readings which appear to have been due to abbreviations in use in the Egyptian papyri.[48]

D was carried to the occident where it was translated back into Latin at the time a Latin version of the complete New Testament was made. The original Latin text, however, is not

[46] *Il problema della chiesa latina in Roma,* Rome, 1922; *La successione episcopale in Roma e gli albori del primato,* Rome, 1922; *The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century,* Harvard Theological Review, July, 1925.

[47] See W. Bousset, *Textkritische Studien zum N. T.,* Leipzig, 1894. H. C. Hoskier, *Codex B,* pp. 79-87. (G. Horner) *The Coptic Version of the N. T.,* Oxford, 1921. H. A. Sanders, *The Washington Manuscript of the Four Gospels,* New York, 1912, Introduction. In B and W are to be observed some Greek words peculiar to Egypt, as ἐξάπινα (IX: 8).

[48] See Sir Frederic G. Kenyon, *A Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament,* 2nd ed., London, 1912, p. 96.

completely lost. It was read by Saint Cyprian. It has come down to us in large part in Codex Bobiensis and Codex Palatinus.

Two lines of Saint Jerome give a good résumé of the history of the Gospel of Mark: "Mark at the request of the brethren at Rome wrote a brief Gospel . . . Taking the Gospel which he had composed he went to Egypt."[49] Is this the history of the author? At any rate it is of the book.

[49] *Catalogus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum.* Quoted by Hoskier, I, p. 202.

"THE BLAZING EVIDENCE OF IMMORTALITY"

DANIEL EVANS, Professor of Systematic Theology
Andover Theological Seminary

THE genius sees in a sudden flash of light what other men only dimly descry. He beholds an object, or scene, or truth in a heavenly light, and from the highest point of view. And in his light we see light, and have clearer views of life's eternal values. In reading *Emerson's Journal* the other day I came across this great sentence, "The blazing evidence of immortality is our dissatisfaction with any other solution." It is a great utterance. It means much to us. It is true that in quoting him on this subject of immortality I go contrary to his own expressed wish. In the same Journal he wrote, "I notice that as soon as writers broach this subject they begin to quote. I hate quotations. Tell me what you know." It depends, however, very largely from whom one quotes, and what he quotes, and when it is from Emerson one quotes and such a passage, there is some justification for it, as will be recognized in what follows:

It appears that he was walking through Sleepy Hollow. There were the graves of the many dead, of family and friends and neighbors. He was confronted with the problem of life and death. The old question visited him, "If a man die shall he live again?" In the presence of these graves, there flashed through his mind the idea of the blazing evidence of immortality. The other solutions of the problem left him dissatisfied. His very dissatisfaction was itself an argument for the continued life. The evidence blazed, flashed before his mind. The solution of the problem of immortality in utterly negative terms did not satisfy him. Not for him the solution that one French writer gives: The man dies in the Sahara Desert; his eyes close on the glorious expanse of starry heaven; he lies prone on the sands; the birds and locusts that feed on dead

men's flesh strip his bones; the bones lie bleached by sun and winds; the sand fills the eyes and mouth of the whitened skull; these bones and skull are the only remains, and they are destined to disintegrate and mix with the shifting sands.

This negative solution could not satisfy Emerson. The dust of these graves contained the mortal remains of the dead, but their minds were elsewhere, and alive.

Nor could the biological solution yield him satisfaction. Some have thought that the only continuous life possible to human beings is that which they pass on, in the germ plasm, and through the successive generations. The possibility of a life beyond the individual life is through one's own descendants. This solution has appealed to men in all ages and from primitive times, and finds expression in Shakespeare's Sonnets, and in recent years has received reinforcement from the new interest in a study of biology. There is deep in the human heart a desire for descendants to carry on the family name, the hereditary inheritance, and one's own life. There are some families greatly blessed in this respect, and none more than Emerson's own family. But this is not a satisfactory solution. It does not yield the kind of immortality we seek. It is not individual immortality, at best it is only racial. It is biological, it is not psychological. And alas in innumerable instances there are no descendants, the family dies out and with it all biological continuance. This dissatisfying solution makes the evidence for immortality blaze in brightness and for warmth of our hearts.

There is another solution, which is true to much that is human in us, and to a degree satisfies deep desires in our hearts. It is the solution which holds that while the body dies and goes to dust, and while the personal consciousness ceases to be, yet the influence of the life lived, the thoughts expressed, the good deeds done, the causes served, the changes wrought in the very climate of life—these all continue consciously or unconsciously in the lives of others. One in dying joins the

choir invisible and thus lives again, or lives on in other lives made better by one's own life. It is a great boon granted to us that we can so live that our lives may tell for all that is good, true, and beautiful long after we leave this earthly scene. Though dead we may yet speak. This is the satisfaction of a noble, altruistic impulse, and for some in our day it suffices. But for others, and Emerson amongst them, it is not completely satisfying, certainly not with respect to those whom they love most and from whom they have received the richest heritage of life. For them we crave a double immortality: the immortality of influence and the persistence of their own conscious centers of intelligence, affection, and will. Our dissatisfaction with this solution of the problem lies in the fact that it does not make for their personal conservation, and this dissatisfaction once more makes for the blazing evidence of immortality.

Another solution leaves us in the same state of mind. It is that given by certain absolute idealist philosophers. If the second and third solutions provided us with only a racial immortality, through biological processes and moral influences, this apparently secures for us an immortality in the Absolute. All the experiences, all the achievements, all the influences, all that we have ever been or could be are eternally secured in the Absolute. We merge in God, or the All, or the Absolute. We coalesce with the All. We take all that we are with us. Nothing human dies, vanishes, passes away. It would appear that this is the great immortality. But so far as the human self is concerned, as a center of consciousness, as a living individual, a persisting personality, as a being maintaining individuality and identity—he is no more. He is lost in God; he is transmuted in the Absolute; he himself no longer is. Even to be lost in God is not a final or enduring satisfaction.

This solution, however, suggests another and more satisfactory one, which Emerson maintained and gave utterance to in his great lines:

All that is excellent
As God lives is permanent.

This permanency of the excellent through the life of God is the solution which satisfies and blazes as our best evidence. The most excellent thing we know in the world is personality. The greatest difference, as Hegel said, is between things and persons. Persons are the intelligences that can understand the world, create objects of beauty, and love one another. Values get their meaning through their relation to persons. They persist through their conservation. The permanency of the excellent involves the persistence of persons. And as God is they find their conservation in and through Him. They shall still have, from God, a handbreadth of space from Him in which to live their own lives, think their own thoughts, pursue their true ends, and be themselves. It is true that whether we shall live eternally and how we shall live depends wholly upon God. Our immortality is not in our own hands: it is not in our care and keeping. We are dependent beings here and now, and anywhere else and forever. This truth has been expressed in words beyond which for clarity of insight, depth of thought, and confident assurance, we have not been able to go:

God is not the God of the dead, but of the living
And all live unto him.

Here the mind of the philosopher and the heart of the saint have found the satisfying solution of the problem of life and death. We may conclude with one more quotation from Emerson's Journal on immortality:

All the comfort I have found shall teach me to confide, that I shall not have less in times and places that I do not yet know.

For him the blazing evidence of immortality created the mood of confidence and serenity.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

President Milton G. Evans of the Seminary offers a brief but clear and comprehensive study of the topic, "The Christian Faith and the Historicity of Jesus."

As an interpreter of "The Crisis Movement in Present German Theology," Dr. S. V. McCasland has had advantages of first hand contacts. At present he is Research Fellow in the Disciples Divinity House of the University of Chicago in New Testament and early Church History. He has the following scholastic record: A. B., Simmons College, Abilene, Texas, 1918; Th. B., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, 1922; A. M., in New Testament, The University of Chicago, 1924; Ph. D., in New Testament, The University of Chicago, 1926, with Professor Shirley Jackson Case.

In June, 1926, he went to Germany with a fellowship from the University of Chicago and with another from the German American Theological Exchange. He was in Europe fourteen months, thirteen months in Germany. He spent ten months in the University of Berlin, taking work with Hans Lietzmann and Harnack, among others; was five weeks in Münster, with Karl Barth, the leader of the Crisis Movement; five weeks in Marburg, with Bultmann and Otto; five weeks in Tübingen, with Karl Heim. All of the summer semester was devoted to the study of this Crisis Movement, the last three universities named being the leading representatives of it.

Mr. McCasland is thirty-one years of age and expects to teach New Testament.

We welcome to the pages of The Crozer Quarterly Doctor Paul-Louis Couchoud, of Paris, France. M. Couchoud is the founder and director of two collections *Christianisme*

and *Textes du Christianisme* (Paris, Rieder), and is the author of several important books: *Sayes et poètes d'Asie* (1916), *L'Apocalypse, traduction nouvelle selon le rhythme de l'originale* (1921); *Le Mystère de Jésus* (1914). He is also the organizer and general secretary of the *Congrès d'histoire du Christianisme* (Jubilé Alfred Loisy, 1927). His present article ("Was the Gospel of Mark Written in Latin?") should prove a valuable source for study of the Latin text of this Gospel.

The paper is made available for our readers through the work in translation by Professor Morton Scott Enslin of the Department of the New Testament in Crozer Seminary. The inquiry is of both interest and value to all critical students of the New Testament; and Doctor Enslin puts the QUARTERLY, the Seminary, and New Testament scholars under obligation by thus making this article accessible in the English language.

THE REVEREND PROFESSOR DANIEL EVANS, D. D., favors us with a reflection on Immortality. He is the well-known Professor of Systematic Theology in The Andover Theological Seminary in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and will offer other contributions later.

NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS

UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION

THE primary, elementary interest and activity of man is religion. Man is not only essentially religious, he is religious before he is anything else—before magic, science, art, philosophy or morals, even though for the primitive these all may be loosely fused in his dominantingly regnant religion attitude; to be differentiated more or less perfectly later. Logically, whether chronologically or not is of secondary significance, religion is the fundamental, creative functioning of man. In history archæologists, and in common experience every-day individuals, are finding this out.

Hardly any really intelligent person denies this if he investigates human experience and reflects. Only the over-sophisticated modern, who has rerationalized his own inner and spiritual life, thinks he is not or may not recognize that he is religious. But the reflective observer is not misled by this modern guile.

This sophisticated modern has another or other gods, and a different cult, with different forms of worship than those of the plain man. His supplications have no speech, and his prayers no written language; but his devotions are regularly offered and he lives by what he thinks he knows of the will of his god. He calls on, for he feels and knows he is dependent on what he or others name Nature, or Law, or Force. He fears, more than he reveres, his new, though not named gods. He knows he must, so he tries to conform to their order or will. His prayers are not in words of petition, as of a person to person; they are in form experiments, hypotheses, observation, and the combinations of matter he subjects to the forces that affect them. His church is the laboratory, or factory, or

studio, or counting-house, and he has faith that his prayers will really be answered.

It is a different "rationalization" of his experience, affected by different principles of discrimination. There is a different set of concepts with a different set of terms, a seemingly different entity to which he yields homage and makes his appeals; but he is still essentially religious.

For he recognizes a Superior in the world, a supra-human in the universe, perhaps he identifies this with the universe. On this he knows he is dependent in every sense. He knows this Superior-God, or Devil, Force, or Matter, World or Universe—may be friendly, may be inimical, or may be indifferent; and he seeks to make use of "That," or tries to do so, to satisfy his needs and achieve his ends. He can change his ideas of and give other names to this "That" of his devotions. He may repudiate the common ways of approach to "It," and the methods of appeal; but he can no more escape or ignore that Superior than he can escape life.

And what, from all points of view, is so common to the concept of religion in man, as this inevitable reaction to the inescapable sense of a Somewhat or a Someone, an Extra-human, Cosmic Greater, on whom we know we depend and whom inevitably we must serve?

This is, of course, not the highest type of religion, and commonly is not recognized as such. In this aspect the difference between science and religion, or art and religion, or morals and religion, or perhaps even magic and religion is almost negligible; but why not? The point of interest being that this elemental religion is the essential of all the spiritual activities of man, each of which therefore participates in, or better, is an expression of, his essentially spiritual or religious nature. Religion, in the specific sense, arises only when to this Superior are ascribed personal and social qualities, and recognition is made of the fact that man may enter into personal social relations with the Superior, above the merely physical and mechan-

ical relations of these lower types of functioning. The character we ascribe to the Superior—Nature, Law, Force, God—will determine the nature and personal value of the man or people. The concept or idea of that cosmic Superior is the differentiating principle of the lower and higher types of religion and of the variations in the higher types themselves. Out of the character, thus ascribed, will flow, as effect from cause, the whole body of individual conduct and the religion observances of a people.

The Managing Editor writes in *The Methodist Review,* for November, on the topic "Divorce and Remarriage," in which he seeks to redirect discussion on this matter to a reconsideration of the spiritual ethics of Jesus. He calls attention to the baleful results to the family and to the type of life conceived by the younger people as normal or socially permissible, which comes from the extent and frequency of divorce. A mere child said to her mother, "When I get married I will have two children, so that when I get divorced, my husband can have one and I can have the other." That is, the child had come to think of divorce as belonging to the order of married life. Consideration is given to the questions: (1) What is the cause of so many divorces? (2) How can the rapid increase of legal separations be checked? (3) Should divorce be granted for other than so-called Scriptural grounds? (4) Are there any Scriptural grounds for divorce?

In his volume, *The Philosophy of Personalism,* Dean Albert C. Knudson, of Boston University Divinity School, makes a serious call to fundamental thinking:

> Nothing at present [he says] is more needed in the field of religious thought than a revival of metaphysical theology. Much of current theology as well as philosophy has run into the shallows. Particularly regrettable is the fact that not a little of the advanced theological thinking of the day seems to be linking itself up with

crude realism, dualism, pragmatism, or positivism. This represents a marked decline both in intellectual depth and power as compared with the liberalism of a generation or two ago.

The popular (among certain groups) outcry against metaphysical theology is so far unthinking that it overlooks the fact that science, even physics, does not avoid the metaphysical, since all its theories posit some world-view; something beyond the matter of facts. Religion is itself essentially metaphysical —has to do with what is, in experience and logic, beyond the physical; has to do with a real or conceived relation between the human person and the beyond-human Being. And metaphysical theology is simply thinking through to fundamental reality all that is in the relation and what is implied in it. The rejection of some systems of metaphysical theology does not require the rejection of all metaphysics in theology. Until philosophy has revealed its utter inutility and metaphysics, in every realm, is abandoned as useless to the understanding of the universe and life, religion must have its theology (and there is none without metaphysic of some sort) or be utterly discredited to scientific and rational minds.

THE values of free translations of the Old and New Testaments are not a few. The technical values of translations by collaborating scholars are widely recognized—such as more correct rendering of words and phrases, the elimination of archaic terms, the introduction of the more modern dialect, etc.

What is not so generally noted in the single, individual free translations and their increasing use, is a group of values of a practical sort. Much reading of these individual translations is sure to produce a liberalizing of the reader and a saner view of inspiration in all its aspects. Moffatt and Goodspeed, the Jewish Publication Society's Old Testament, Mrs. Montgomery's New Testament, G. B. Stevens' *Epistles of Paul in Modern English, The Twentieth Century New Testament,* Weymouth's *The Modern Speech New Testament,* Arthur S.

Way's *The Letters of St. Paul,* Ferrar Fenton's *The New Testament in Modern English,* and others; *all,* even though not of equal critical value, have renderings of a free exegetical sort which accomplish these several results.

They disabuse the mind of the notion of a mechanical inspiration, or equally of a magical inspiration, both of which exaggerate the importance of the letter at the expense of the spirit, and become a bondage to the mind. Familiarity with the fact that the truth may be freely expressed in other than canonical ways ends the tyranny of the letter; and from the etymologically meticulous the mind opens to the spirit of the truth.

A homiletical value of special significance to the preacher is derived from free reading of these translations. There is opened a fresh, even new meaning in familiar (verbally familiar) passages; or "a new slant" is given. It is not to be forgotten that every translation is in effect an exegesis. An absolutely literal translation is incredibly impossible. No word in Greek or Hebrew has a single absolute meaning, and no single English word is an absolute synonym of any word of another language. Words are but symbols of concepts. What two peoples ever matched concepts perfectly? The translator or translators inevitably embody in the words chosen, or the phrase preferred, a religion or theological concept; in a word they make an exegesis conforming to their religion experience and insight. Perhaps we should then say that every translation is an "eisegesis." Well! let it go at that. The point is that many minds, in free translations, contribute a wealth of homiletical matter, useful to reader and preacher. They constitute the finest kind of a commentary, and might well be a substitute so far as homiletical use of these is made.

Allied to this is the fact that these readings take the mind from oft-repeated, almost meaningless words, words from which intellectual and spiritual value is gone because they no longer grip the mind and soul; make no whole with a present

experience. By verbal familiarity they are only remembered formulæ which have come to have simply a magical significance; and the idea engages us that religious value is achieved by mere repetition of them, even in parrotlike fashion. Such ascription of magical or sacrosanct character to the Bible tends to make religion allied to superstition which is always a bondage.

Mary Austin, said by an eminent physician of the new school of medicine in England, to be the most intelligent woman in America, writes of "Primitive Man" in the November *Forum*. Teacher, writer, and lecturer, she has devoted the most of her time to Indians, their culture and their myths. In her article she deals frankly and critically with anthropologists and finds the present notion of primitive man almost grotesquely mistaken, and the widely erroneous notions of what man primarily is she thinks have to do with the present dissatisfactions of men with life and society.

Certain assumptions are flatly contradicted such as that the primitive is absorbingly and continuously engaged in the quest of food and that society becomes civilized in proportion as men's quest is transferred to other objectives. It is affirmed to the contrary that this uses the least of his energy and that he is energetically engrossed with art, literature, and religion. The primitive will not take on economic worry. Similar contradictions are made concerning his indisposition to thrift, his sex relations, and religion. The fashion of crediting all religion origins to fear is called "a premise so injuriously mistaken"; and the assertion is made that confidence, rather than fear, a confidence based on religious intuition and primitive ratiocination is the major premise of their religions.

Miss Austin declares that what is needed is "an Outline of Religion which will carefully dissect the evolution of Religious Consciousness from the intellectual explanations which accompanied it." Come into touch with an "unself-conscious"

religion and it is possible to find that religious impulses take the lead, shaped but not controlled by tradition and sparingly rationalized. What will the text-book anthropologists reply?

In the October *Atlantic,* in an article entitled "The Two Sciences," A. E. Douglas, Professor of Astronomy and Director of the Steward Observatory at the University of Arizona, states that he finds "a complete identity between science and religion." The "two sciences" are astronomy and evolution. The first has broken down the idol of past ages—the idea of a small or limited space; and made us know that the whole matter of extension of space is not a religious matter at all. Evolution does the same with the primitive and still popular idea of time as a limited past and limited future, that is, shows that time itself is not a religious matter. Astronomy has given us a perspective of space and evolution a perspective of time that make clear that Heaven, in the religious sense, is right here, not among the stars; and that "the beginning" and "ending" are so remote that we must see that both are now going on, as God's method of creation, continuous and ever present.

S. B. M.

WHAT'S WHAT IN THE MAGAZINES

"CURRICULUM AS ENRICHED AND CONTROLLED EXPERIENCE"

Professor William Clayton Bower, of the University of Chicago, has written freely on the subject of "the Curriculum as Enriched and Controlled Experience." His latest contribution to the theme is found in the *Journal of Religion,* October, 1927, pp. 505-519. Neither the child, a Christian content of knowledge, nor society, is the center of the educational process in religion. The person (of whatever age) who is learning to share his purposes with those of the more mature members of the human race, and thereby enrich and control his experience, is the chief interest in education. But this person must learn to adjust himself to "a Supreme Person," God, "not as an addition to all other adjustments, but as a permeating and conditioning factor in every adjustment to nature and man." This theistic appreciation of all life relations constitutes the heart of religious education. Personality must become religious in order to rise to its highest social expression.

The curriculum required for the education of immature persons in religious well-being will issue out of the common-day experiences of life. Typical familial, industrial, civic, play, and so on, experiences will make up the subjects for reflection "in terms of spiritual ideals and purposes." The author does not provide for the source of these standards in his article. Not only current experiences of these types, but historical experiences of the race will serve as valuable criteria for evaluation and control in the person's conduct. The learner thus becomes "a responsible participant in the learning process." As he contributes to the better solution of life-problems he shares in the making of the Godlike world and he

adds curriculum materials for the consideration and control of others who follow after him.

S. G. C.

THE "EXPERIMENTAL" COLLEGE

Since Antioch College has made a striking turn in educational procedure, several other institutions of learning have attempted to follow a similar course. Professor Alexander Meikeljohn is experimenting with a group of select students in the University of Wisconsin. Dr. Hamilton Holt has instituted like methods as the new executive in charge of Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida. Professor E. O. Grover of this institution has referred editorially to the character of the adventure in the October number of *Religious Education*.

President Holt has abandoned the formal lecture method in Rollins College. Youth are not expected to "take courses," receive "grades," and graduate as "educated" persons. The professor assumes the rôle of "guide, philosopher and friend"; the student that of fellow-adventurer in quest of truth. The burden of education is shifted from the college to youth, who must find knowledge by "provoking it out of the soul." The "two-hour conference plan of study" has been substituted for lecture and quiz practises. This college is at work fitting a technique for this end.

S. G. C.

Gerar, the City of Abimelech and Isaac, has been excavated during the last year by the veteran archæologist Sir Flinders Petrie. It might be more correct to say by Sir Flinders and Lady Petrie, for in their copartnership in this important work Lady Petrie is as active as her husband. Gerar, or the modern Tel el Jemmeh, lies some eight miles south of Gaza. Here Sir Flinders with his excellent assistants began work late last autumn and remained at work over six months. During this time they went down through the debris of six ancient cities, from A. D. 1500 back to 1350 B. C. In the early days

it was an Egyptian guard city and necessarily passed through many vicissitudes. Among the most interesting things found, was a little dump of broken pottery that came from the eighth-century period and was clearly Assyrian. The historian immediately remembers the Assyrian expeditions down into Egypt and their conquest of the land in this period. Did they place a garrison in Gerar? Did the petty officer's wife carry her household goods down with her when she accompanied her lord on his new duties? How modern those ancient ladies were! Of almost equal interest is the little group of long, narrow, finely worked arrow-points found in the same strata. Professor Petrie says they are of South Russian manufacture. Ah! the Scythians? We again remember the old story of their descent on this country and the terror they spread throughout the land of Judah. Are these some of the weapons with which they caused the panic? Well might they be for they are the most vicious points the writer has ever seen.

I. G. M.

Ur of the Chaldees, a city of ancient renown, is again becoming the center of very great interest. The name, in the Old Testament associated with that of Abraham, has for centuries been basking in the glory shed on it by a possible association with the patriarch. Now it shines out with a luster all its own. The Universities of Pennsylvania and Oxford, under the able direction of Dr. Leonard Wooley, have for five years been associated in the work of excavation in and around Ur. Each year has given its reward, and has disclosed a wealth of detailed information about the past. The city has been shown to be very ancient. At the time of Abraham it was hoary with age, having then between two and three thousand years to its credit. Nor were these millennia of rude culture; they possessed a mastery of the arts and sciences that amazes us even today. The excavators tell us there was an old city there in 4,600 B. C., and that preceding 3,500 B. C. there were

produced some of the finest specimens of the goldsmith's art. As evidence of this they produced the last article found in the spring of 1927, a dagger, the blade of solid gold with the sides finely ornamented, encased in a solid gold sheath, with the handle of lapis lazuli inlaid with gold. This perfectly preserved and exceedingly beautiful dagger is a symbol of the civilization of the city antedating 3,500 B. C.

Not only was it a city of high culture, but as has been long known, it was Sumerian and not Semitic. It was founded and occupied by those strange, peace-loving, highly cultured peoples who came from the East and settled the southern part of the valley by 5,000 B. C. When all the evidence is in, we shall be able to read the pages of that ancient past with a great deal of detail. The kings and princes gradually step out of obscurity and move to the places that they occupied when alive; the priests appear chanting their ancient ritual; the theologians again raise their voices and tell us the traditions of the ancestors, while the common people again throng the streets under our very eyes. As reconstruction of the life of this city goes on, if there should be difficulty in locating Abraham, the Amorite nomad, in the throng, surely Ur of the Chaldees will live in the minds of succeeding generations with a luster all its own.

I. G. M.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Making of Luke—Acts. Henry J. Cadbury. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. x, 385.

Of old the preacher wrote, "Of making many books there is no end." Had he lived in our day, he would probably have found little reason for omitting this remark. The flood of writing that is engulfing the land can hardly be explained save perhaps by a paraphrase of Augustine's justly famous remark, "These things I say, not that they may be so said, but that I need not keep silent." This at least gives a clew for understanding the prolific output of writers on subjects of which they are not profoundly informed.

It is with pleasure that one discovers a book wherein the author writes of matters he is competent to discuss. Such a book is Professor Cadbury's *The Making of Luke—Acts*. For years his chief interest has been the Lucan writings. His volume *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (*Harvard Theological Studies VI*), 1920, which was the outgrowth of his doctor's dissertation, has received wide and merited recognition. His more recent work in connection with the series of volumes on *The Beginnings of Christianity* has deepened his acquaintance with his subject. And the new book reveals it.

The author's purpose was not to produce an introduction nor a commentary. His problem has been to discuss the literary process that produced the writings we know as the Third Gospel and the book of Acts. Because they are separated by the Gospel of John the fact has been obscured that they comprise one continuous work, not two independent writings from the same pen. In fact, the opening words of Acts translated "the former treatise" would better be rendered simply "volume one." How was this writing produced?

Four main factors of composition are stressed. The book is an exposition of these four points: (1) What materials were accessible? What was the author's knowledge? What were his sources? The half dozen chapters that are concerned with the materials could hardly be improved.

But while sources of information, written and oral alike, are as important for the book-maker as is the raw material for the factory, they do not account for the finished volume. (2) How were they used and modified? To answer this question one must do far more than read

Luke—Acts. He must have some knowledge of the way other writers were working. "Luke" was not the only man writing in Greek. He used this language in common with hundreds of other authors. Only as one has familiarity with them can one appreciate him. Perhaps the most valuable contribution of Professor Cadbury's work is this second part of his volume in which he discusses with constant illustration the way in which ancient historians were wont to set about their task—their use of language and idiom, their use of earlier writings. Professor Cadbury is fitted as are few scholars to do this task as it should be done. His extended familiarity with a host of writers, now unfortunately little more than names to most who seek to dig in the mines of the New Testament, is clear—one might almost say, embarrassingly clear—on every page.

(3) Yet an author—at least a tolerable one—is no mere automaton. His own personality and genius must be recognized. Mannerisms, interests, prejudices, all alike are present. He may seek zealously to remain hidden. The task is hopeless. So with the author of Luke—Acts. Not alone the way he writes—language and style—but what he thinks, his secular interests, his religious attitudes, his theological bias: all these must be considered.

(4) And finally why did he write? The material was available to others; others indeed had already written. What caused him to put his pen on the parchment? Our author has told us:

> Whereas many have ventured to recompose a narrative about the matters consummated among us, as those who had been at the start witnesses and helpers in the mission handed down to us, I also, gentle Theophilus, decided to write for you seriatim since I had been now for a long time back in immediate touch with everything circumstantially, in order that you may gather the correctness as regards the accounts that you have been given to understand.

Who "gentle Theophilus" was we do not know. Whether he was an official, a patron, or a name, it would seem probable the dedicated work was not intended to confirm his religious faith as much as to correct misinformation about the nature of Christianity itself. And so this writing is after all not entirely dissimilar from the later and more clearly avowed *apologias* of Justin and his fellows. Had Luke been asked to phrase his purpose, he might well have selected sentences such as:

> God sent the word unto the children of Israel, preaching good tidings of peace by Jesus Christ.
>
> God visited the Gentiles, to take out of them a people for his name.
>
> Neither against the law of the Jews, nor against the temple, nor against Cæsar, have I gained at all.

These rather than the "golden texts" that we might select may fairly limn his purpose.

A final chapter raises without an attempt at answer the question of authorship, date of composition, and the historical accuracy of the work. The same carefully balanced judgment that marks the whole volume is found here. The thin thread of tradition which ties Luke's name to the work is suggested, difficulties are hinted at, but definiteness of statement seems unwise. All we can do is content ourselves with the thought that after all

> the main lines in the picture are quite independent of any assurance about such less important matters as the author's name or occupation, or even about his quondam association with Paul.

A similar reticence is necessary in regard to the matter of accuracy. The dictum of Sir William Ramsay that "it may be taken for granted that, if Luke did not write the Acts, it could not possibly be accepted [as trustworthy]. The case for belief rests on his personality" is so manifestly absurd that it need hardly be mentioned save as an awful example of what apologetics can do to a formerly competent scholar. Far wiser is it to recognize that the same work may be relatively more accurate in some places than others than to answer the question "Is it true?" by a categorical yes or no.

The careful reading of this book—and any other is almost certainly foredoomed to failure—can not fail to cause the reader to lay it down with a new appreciation of the unknown *autor ad Theophilum.*

M. S. E.

Light from the Ancient East. The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Græco-Roman World. Adolf Deissmann, D. Theol. (Marburg), D. D. (Aberdeen, St. Andrew, Manchester); Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Berlin; Corresponding Member of the Archæological Institute of the German Reich. Translated by Lionel R. M. Strachan, M. A., German Lecturer in the University of Birmingham; formerly Scholar of St. John's College, Oxford. New and Completely Revised Edition with eighty-five illustrations from the latest German Edition. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. xxxii, 535. Price, $10.00.

Doctor Deissmann's monumental work *Licht vom Osten,* first published in 1908 and translated into English in 1910 by Mr. Strachan under the title *Light from the Ancient East,* is so well known and justly appreciated that it is necessary but to draw attention to the fact that the author

has now completely rewritten the work, introducing new and valuable material in the light of new discoveries. All the excellencies of the former work are retained; fifteen new illustrations, five new appendices, one being a review of Kautsky's *Origin of Christianity,* all add to the worth of this splendid work.

The publishers are justified in their boast on the jacket of this new edition:

> The book, as it now stands, constitutes the latest, fullest statement of the views of this great authority, who taught us to study the New Testament in the light thrown upon its language by the Egyptian papyri and ostraca. It shows us the New Testament as an Eastern book, a book of the people, but also as the Book of Books.

M. S. E.

Jesus—A New Biography. Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1927. Pp. ix, 453. $3.00.

This is a remarkable book. Not only is it readable and scholarly—epithets normally applied by a reviewer to a book that is sufficiently inconsequential not to require warmer praise or even warmer attack—but it is really important. Doctor Case is a representative of a group of scholars, more numerous than is sometimes imagined, who are not satisfied to harmonize the various contradictory verdicts about Jesus into an innocuous quasi-agreement wherein all that is either significant or striking has been carefully canceled. Jesus was a flesh-and-blood man who exerted a tremendous influence upon those of his own day, and an even greater influence on each subsequent day. Who, then, was he? This is the question our author sets for himself.

> Today portraits of him, whether products of brush or pen, are legion. Their variety grows constantly more perplexing, even though they often show Jesus in poses and colors highly pleasing to the eye of the present-day observer. But the inquirer asks, "Is the picture true to life?"

Probably the average reader will say on finishing the book—if the average reader actually does finish reading this book—"No." For few of the shibboleths are left. This is not a book which begins by laying out a gleaming array of surgical instruments—in modern theological jargon, *prolegomena*—and then concludes by using poultices. The surgeon and not the physician appears in every page. And while the patient still lives at the end of the operation, a good bit of the tissue has been removed.

Jesus was of his own race and day. To see him as he was we must

see him as his fellows saw him, nor can we do this by reading the pages of the Gospels. Their authors were not concerned with photographing him for later eyes. They were far more interested in seeking to account for their own interest in him. Explaining him was much more edifying then as now than obeying him. The accounts we have are far more truly portraits of the several authors than of the figure they sought to sketch.

Most scholars are agreeing that this is the case for the Fourth Gospel. Doctor Case does not stop there. It is equally true of Matthew and Luke, yes, even of Mark and Q—that convenient source of which we write so much and know so little. In these oldest sources it is true, even as in the later ones, that the choice and preservation of material—even granting for the moment that it fairly represented what Jesus had said or done—were due to its practical value to the writers as they faced their problems. The parable of the mustard seed may have fallen from Jesus' lips. Was it not prized and later immortalized in the Gospel pages to revive the drooping spirits of congregations discouraged by their struggle to save a world that responded none too eagerly to their message? In many other cases were not the early Christians convinced that they had found the remedy for present ills and equally convinced that Jesus had both foreseen that ill and also the remedy they were then applying?

> Every statement in the records is to be judged by the degree of its suitableness to the distinctive environment of Jesus, on the one hand, and to that of the framers of gospel tradition at one or another stage in the history of Christianity, on the other. When consistently applied, this test will prove our safest guide in recovering from the present gospel records dependable information regarding the life and teaching of the earthly Jesus.

The outline of the book is brief. Eight chapters hold the story: Ancient Biographies of Jesus, The Return to the Historical Jesus, Jewish Life in Palestine, The Home Life of Jesus, Jesus' Choice of a Task, Jesus' Pursuit of His Task, The Religion Jesus Lived, and The Religion Jesus Taught. They must tell their own story. For the man who can read a book whose pages are charged with lively dynamite without becoming furiously angry and crying out "Unclean, unclean"—perhaps the expense of the volume will tend to keep it from such latter hands—*Jesus—A New Biography* can be confidently recommended as the most valuable and worth-while study which has appeared these many years of the one of whom it fitly says:

> His own loyalty to the ideals that he preached carried the prophet from the carpenter's home in Nazareth to Christendom's cross on the Golgotha hill.

M. S. E.

Madeleine Sémer, Convert and Mystic, 1874-1921. Abbé Felix Klein, Institut Catholique of Paris. Translated by Foster Stearns. New York: The Macmillan Company.

A biography of a woman, a contemporary mystic, written by a distinguished author and professor of philosophy. In addition to being a most engaging biography, directed by a profound human sympathy and spiritual insight, it is a treatise that must be of interest to psychologists and theologians. One can with difficulty let go the fascinating story of this vivid and deep religious experience.

S. B. M.

The Religious Mind. A Psychological Study of Religious Experience. C. K. Mahoney, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, Dakota Wesleyan University.

Doctor Mahoney here offers a study of the mental processes of the religious person. It is not a study of religion with reference to psychology. The author realizes that such a book may be out of date by the time he gets it published, such is the rapid progress and shift of emphasis in the subject.

The book is timely, however, and in the chapters "Religion and Recent Psychology" and "The Achieved Experience" is material consonant with the revival of the faith that religion is not a self-generated type of experience and that its activities are responses to a power not ourselves; and holds that this view, that religion is response to a divine initiative, is not illogical, and may be grounded psychologically in the Stimulus-Response theory.

S. B. M.

The Paradox of Religion. Willard L. Sperry. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Two lectures, the material which formed the basis of this year's Hibbert Trust lectures. The first, *What Religion Is,* warns against the over-simplification of religion, insists that reality in religion demands clear recognition of complexity and gets its "feel" of reality from certain paradoxical factors. Religion is described

> as that real life of which man becomes increasingly conscious as he finds his place in a divine order at once *like* and *unlike* him.

But religion in theory must go into practise, "since all thought is simply action in suspense"; so the second chapter proposes "What Religion Does." Sometimes men seek to manipulate the supernatural, and

their religion is the attempt to have God do things for them, thus scarcely rising above "magic." Here failure means for many agnosticism and atheism. Again, in others, religion is conceived as a way of compelling man to do things for God; to be rid of self-interest, and set self-hatred against self-love. But such attention to the abnegation of self really becomes an actual ruling self-consciousness, takes self too seriously as if it were the whole. Furthermore it is not clear that the expulsion of the self does mean always a coming in of a better spirit, and may mean the possession of the life by "the seven worse" of Jesus' parable. This latter is an altogether nobler and more adequate account of religion than magic; but the trouble with each is their indifference to the complexity of religion. The magical idea "tends to get rid of God"; the mystical "tends to get rid of man."

Magic ignores the stubborn, independent actuality of the outer world; mysticism ignores the equally stubborn actuality of self-consciousness. The magician kills his God; the mystic sacrifices himself.

Religion must preserve "the independent actuality and worth of both God and man." This is done historically in the doctrine of Grace and its correlative doctrine of the Liberty of the Christian Man. The religious relation must not be construed as a means to an end, neither making God a means of terrestrial gain, nor the sacrifice of man as an augment of God's glory; it is capable of being and ought to be its own end. "Religion is not a means to any end; it is its own end." The metaphor of father and son is the best figure to describe the religious relation.

What matters between father and his mature son is not their ability to make use of each other. The son who makes use of his father is a bully. The father who makes use of his son is a brute. What matters is their deepening understanding of each other and their joy in one another's concerns and company.

These two brief chapters offer a brief but profound philosophy of religion which a superficial reading may not at once disclose. But it is a religion rather academic and remote from the throngs who think themselves deeply and truly religious. Here is a blazed trail: who will care to follow? It is an ideal: who can realize it?

S. B. M.

The Religious Attitude. A Psychological Study of Its Differentiation. Angus Stewart Woodburne. New York: The Macmillan Company.

This is a study of concrete religious attitudes and practises not only among uncivilized peoples, but in the more complete religions in their complicated and highly developed stages. It is refreshing to find a study which does

not determine the nature of religion by study alone of its primitive forms and associations.

Professor Woodburne considers the origin of religion from the point of view of psychology and opposes the idea of religion as an *instinct*. This latter term belongs to the terminology of biology, describes a type of behavior which does not necessarily involve consciousness; while the religious, æsthetic, scientific, and moral types of behavior inevitably involve mental process on the level of consciousness. The better term is that chosen by the writer, "attitude," which he defines as "a conscious and habitual tendency to react in a characteristic manner to certain types of stimuli"; or earlier in his work as "a mental and motor tendency toward a certain type of activity. It is a set of the psycho-physical organism."

Magic, science, art, and morality belong in this sphere of attitudes. *His work is to differentiate these attitudes and show the discreteness of religion.* For this work his equipment particularly well fits him, his scholarly acquaintance with primitive religions and not only his masterly knowledge of the Christian religion but his first-hand acquaintance with that of India.

He finds that the life of primitive peoples is psychologically describable as an undivided continuum and that with the beginning of reflection that continuum was resolved into the various "attitudes" and techniques which we now describe as religion, art, science, morality, and the other spiritual activities of man.

While thus having common origin they are distinguished and their dissimilarities clearly shown. Religion never was magic and does not have its genesis in magic. Science, which has the same motive as magic, is more nearly its offspring, since both seek control of the physical environment, and

> arise out of a mechanical attitude toward an environing universe and function by means of mechanically manipulated techniques for control.

Furthermore, religion functions in spiritual adjustments to and modifications of the extra-human environment, while science functions through mechanical adjustments, etc.

The treatment of his material is full and clear; and abundant evidence is offered to confirm his conclusions. Religion he finds best represented as "man's socializing of his extra-human environment in the interests of a more abundant life," and this socializing attitude "towards the cosmic environment is the fundamental character of the religious consciousness." Thus defined he holds that all available evidence seems to

show that religion is ineradicably grounded in human nature, and emerges among all peoples and in all stages of culture.

Being a psychological study one does not look for a proposition of a metaphysical sort, which might account for the origin and nature of religion as primarily the activity of the Spirit, God, in the soul of man, and man's reciprocal activity; but the conclusions are not hostile to such a thesis; and certainly do not exclude God, rather otherwise, from the extra-human environment to which man reacts.

S. B. M.

New Studies in Mystical Religion. Rufus M. Jones. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 205.

The word new in the title of this volume is justified by twenty years of study and reflection since the author wrote *Studies in Mystical Religion.* For more than twenty years Professor Jones has been making significant contributions to contemporary religious thought. Few writers of our generation have a wider following. He has the rare ability of clothing results of his research and of his philosophic inquiry in simple language, and by apt illustration from commonplace things of life easily wins the attention and confidence of readers interested in experimental religion. Those who have read his earlier works will almost certainly read the present volume, and those who now know the influential Professor of Philosophy in Haverford College only by name, should at once become acquainted with these *New Studies.* They are " The Ely Lectures " delivered at Union Theological Seminary, New York, in 1927. They leave untouched none of the most significant contributions of the study of the psychology of religion and of the philosophy of religion within the past two decades. They discuss such absorbing themes as: Mystical Experience and the Abnormal; Mysticism and Asceticism; Mysticism and Religious Education; Mysticism and Organization; The Testimony of the Soul. In the " Introduction " to the volume the author gives his purpose in his own words:

> The mystic, as I hope to show, is not a peculiarly favored mortal who by a lucky chance has received into his life a windfall from some heavenly Bread-fruit tree, while he lay dreaming of iridescent rainbows. He is, rather, a person who has cultivated, with more strenuous care and discipline than others have done, the native homing passion of the soul for the Beyond, and has creatively developed the outreach of his nature in the God-direction. The result is that he has occasions when the larger Life with which he feels himself kin seems to surround him and answer back to his soul's quest, as a sensitized magnetic needle, if it were conscious, might feel itself enveloped by the currents that sweep back upon it from the electrical storehouse of the sun.

To accompany him in the realization of his purpose is a stimulating religious experience. Life is richer and more significant when the reading has been finished.

M. G. E.

Man, God, and Immortality: Thoughts on Human Progress. Sir James George Frazer. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. xvi, 437.

This book does not pretend to be a contribution of new material by the distinguished and prolific author. It is described as "passages chosen from the writings of Sir James George Frazer." Its preface tells the content and purpose of the selections:

> In this volume are collected some of the more general conclusions to which my studies of early society and religion led me in past years, and for the convenience of readers who lack the leisure or the taste to pursue the subject in detail they have been disengaged from the heavy masses of facts on which they are founded. . . While the volume has, I trust, a certain unity of design, it is hardly necessary to warn the reader that it does not pretend to exhibit even in outline a continuous picture, still less a history, of man's progress at any stage of his mental and social development. To paint such a picture, to write such a history, would call for a range of knowledge and a compass of mind to which I can lay no claim. All that I have attempted to do in the past is to study some phases of human evolution, and all that I have attempted in the present volume is to crystallize, as it were, the results of my studies into an optic glass which may afford the reader some momentary glimpses of the long march of humanity on the upward road from savagery to civilization. The march is still in progress and no doubt will continue without a halt when we are gone. Its destination is unknown, hidden in the mists of the future. If the marching columns should carry in their baggage any of my works, perhaps this book may be found in some of the knapsacks. At least I have sought to lighten the burden by throwing out a heavy load of facts.

Any one who wishes in convenient form the main conclusions of the distinguished anthropologist on such permanent subjects of human interest as man, God, and immortality, may well add to his library this recent volume. If his interest should be awakened, he will have a clue to guide him through the mazes of his larger works.

M. G. E.

Christian Ethics: The George Dana Boardman Lectures, 1927. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1927. Pp. 152. $1.50.

This volume should be of interest to all who are concerned with the subject of conduct and especially to all friends of Crozer Theological Seminary. Doctor Boardman, in addition to his many other public services, was one of the charter members of the Board of Trustees of Crozer Theo-

logical Seminary. From the organization of the Seminary in 1867 to his death in 1903, he contributed to the shaping and development of the Seminary life.

He was likewise identified with the development of the University of Pennsylvania. As an evidence of that interest in the University he and Mrs. Boardman on June 6, 1899, established a foundation in the University to be known as "The Boardman Lectureship in Christian Ethics." In February, 1900, Doctor Boardman was appointed by the University as the first lecturer on the foundation, and this lecture was later published with the title, "The Golden Rule," a small volume which has had a wide circulation. Seven other lectures by eminent thinkers in the field of conduct have since been published.

The present volume is different from its predecessors in that it is composed of five rather brief lectures, which at the same time combine to review important aspects of present-day ethical topics. Frederick R. Griffin, D. D., pastor of the First Unitarian Church of Philadelphia, treats Christian Ethics in every-day life; Edwin C. Broome, LL. D., Superintendent of the Public Schools of Philadelphia, sketches Ethics in Education; William P. McNally, Ph. D., Rector of the Roman Catholic High School, Philadelphia, writes on The Christian Home; George C. Foley, S. T. D., Professor of Systematic Divinity in the Philadelphia Divinity School, discusses The Originality of Christian Ethics; and in the fifth essay by Boyd Edwards, S. T. D., Headmaster of the Hill School, Pottstown, Pennsylvania, we have a presentation of The Two Roads, outlining in distinctive fashion two ways of life.

The reviewer need not urge that the volume is well worth attention on the part of students of conduct and leaders in social welfare.

F. G. L.

Religious Education on Public School Time. Floyd S. Gove. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. 1926. Pp. xvi, 113.

This monograph is number eleven of the *Harvard Bulletins in Education.* Professor Gove has gathered together and organized in summary manner most of the important information bearing on the vital subject of week-day religious instruction. An outline history of this school movement from the experiment of Gary, Indiana, to the time of writing is furnished the reader. Community and legislative problems in church-state cooperation on behalf of children are set forth in helpful manner. Reference to the unique experiment in Flint, Michigan, is omitted. Recognition of that work would have led the writer to change certain conclusions in his survey

treatment. Important statistics are registered to signify the remarkable growth of this adventure in the last decade. Several diagrams elucidate the nature of organization and government of types of schools. The author is convinced that this institution of Christianity is quite indispensable to the best promotion of our faith, but that it requires "release" of public-school time, approved educational standards, a pragmatic curriculum, and well-equipped leadership, to achieve its purposes.

No better source-book of information could fall into the hands of one who desires an introduction to the aims and tasks involved in promoting week-day religious education in community life. A rather inclusive bibliography accompanies the study. The text would have been much improved by the addition of an index.

S. G. C.

The Church and the Country Community. Edwin V. O'Hara. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 115.

The Roman Catholic Church has learned that it must cultivate a more intelligent rural clientele if it is to maintain its organic strength in America. Doctor O'Hara, a country-bred man, has considered the need of this kind of strategy, and suggested the methods for its prosecution. Five-sixths of the Romanists reside in cities. Nine-tenths of their parochial schools, leadership, and ecclesiastical equipment, are found in urban areas. Yet farm families average three children, while city families average only one and six-tenths children. The source of Catholic strength comes from baptisms rather than converts. The imperative duty of promoting the church in agricultural communities is therefore recognized. The author calls for "ten thousand strong rural parishes" in America.

To meet this religious challenge, the Roman Church is urged to provide a thoroughly modern rural-culture crusade. Regional conferences should be established throughout the Church to train Catholics in the psychology of agricultural life, in the dignity of farming as a vocation, and in the social values that accrue from country habitation. Religious vacation schools (there were forty last summer with an aggregate attenddance of twenty thousand children) should become the common property of every local parish. The author suggests that seminary courses be listed to train priests in the specialized character of rural leadership. Country priests are begged to keep close to the agricultural State colleges, promote their institutes and lecture courses, and help establish "credit unions" for the economic service of the people. The Catholic parish is asked to become an "effective agent of a progressive sanitation program."

Striking Roman experiments of a rural nature in European countries

are held up as exemplary projects for the American people. Every phase of rural problem or life interest should be gathered up in parish programs in the name of the Church. References to the encyclicals of Leo XIII support this humanitarian approach to church obligations. The American Catholic Life Conference and its press organ, *Catholic Rural Life,* are the official agencies of the Church to carry forward this splendid propaganda.

S. G. C.

The Hebrew Family: A Study in Historical Sociology. Earle Bennett Cross, Ph. D., Professor of Hebrew Language and Literature in the Rochester Theological Seminary, N. Y. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1927.

In this volume Professor Cross has done a praiseworthy piece of work. It is a study in sociology by one who is a competent student of the Hebrew Old Testament. As such the Old Testament is used as a source-book in sociology. This if not a departure in Biblical studies is a sign of the times. Formerly our Scriptures were used largely for theological and homiletic purposes. Ofttimes they were completely divorced from the historical conditions in which they originated. The " Word of God " was conceived to have been let down from heaven, and whatsoever there might have been of human origin was always a possible source of pollution. Inductive studies are reversing not only methods but also estimates.

Professor Cross has carefully accumulated and organized a host of facts that he has interpreted in the light of the larger world of social origins. He has traced the family in most of its social relationships from those remnants suggestive of primitive conceptions down to the latest development in the life of the Hebrews. The influence of the matriarchate and the patriarchate, the relations of men and women, before, during and after marriage, tribal relationships, slaves and children as related to masters and parents as glimpsed in the Old Testament literature are fully treated in the 217 pages of this volume.

The author works not only from the Hebrew text but, from what seems quite as necessary, from a corrected Hebrew text. Apart from this little progress can be made in the interpretation of Scripture. Necessarily also the critical theory of literary origins is assumed. For this, neither explanation nor justification should now be required. The uninformed layman will not only find no difficulty in following the interpretation as presented, but as he studies the development and the change of the various laws through the various documents and codes he will recognize the justification of the theory.

This little volume is looking in the right direction. The closing chapter touches the vexed question of the day, the sex and family problem. To get the greatest values out of any scripture it must be treated in the light of all its human relationships, that is, sociologically. To gain the surest solution of any modern problem it must be studied in relation to all antecedent history. This book should be helpful in both directions.

I. G. M.

A History of Messianic Speculations in Israel, from the First Through the Seventeenth Centuries. Abba Hillel Silver, D. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 268. $3.50.

This is a sad book. It is the story of the ever-recurring Jewish-Messianic hope, which ever failed in fulfilment. As with the Christian Chiliasts the book of Daniel is the starting point and center of such hopes, and allegory, gematria, Notakrion, Ziruf, Temurah, all of which honored the letter and the word of Scripture, were the methods used in order to interpret the "signs of the times." The "signs" were always abundant and definite. The interpreters were ever alert and often brilliant. However, the "Messianic year" never arrived and people hopeful to the verge of ecstasy were always disillusioned. What must have been the heart-break and the disaster when the Shabbetai Ẓebi Messiahship failed? From the Sacred Scriptures it had been conclusively proved that the long-looked-for restoration would take place between 1648 and 1690. Shebbatai Ẓebi, self-convinced of the rôle he was to play, acknowledged his Messiahship to his disciples in 1648. Next it was proved by a careful coordination of Scripture that the beginning of the "restoration" was to take place in 1666. But soon the appointed time was moved forward by stern necessity to 1670. Then the dates 1675, 1680, 1686, 1692, 1706, and 1710, were each in turn accepted, and the wave of expectancy rose to its crest, only each time in turn to prove false and leave but bitterness and despair in the hearts of the hopeful. This, only one illustration out of many that go to make up the book, indicates how closely the shattered hopes of Christian millennialists have been paralleled by Jewish Messianic speculations.

A sad book, indeed, but there is a silver lining. The calculations concerning the "Hope" were always wrong, but the "Hope" refused to be denied. It was based in a confidence in a God who was an ethical being. Hence the Jew must have justice. It was rooted in the nature of the human mind, that insists that a golden age lies ahead. Two thousand years of continuous oppression and continuous disappointment could

not silence Jewish expectations. "Hope springs immortal in the human breast." This study will be found most illuminating and helpful to all students of Christian history who are ready to learn from parallel movements found in other religions.

I. G. M.

The Achievement of Israel. HERBERT R. PURINTON, Professor of Biblical Literature and Religion in Bates College. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1927. $1.25.

HERE is a small volume of approximately 200 pages by the Professor of Biblical Literature of Bates College. It is divided into 7 parts and subdivided into 25 chapters, treating the history of Israel from the Nomadic period down to the days of Herod. It is readable, informing, has excellent historical perspective, and throughout the vital religious interest is prominent. Ample illustrative material from outside national history keeps the student in touch with world-thought, while a selected bibliography at the end of the volume, opens the door to further study. This is an excellent introductory volume for any one wishing trustworthy guidance in the history of the Hebrew people. Our college students are to be congratulated in having professors so competent in scholarship and so devout in spirit as Professor Purinton.

I. G. M.

Understanding the Apostles' Creed. DONALD MCFAYDEN, Ph. D., William Eliot Smith Professor of History, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 318. $2.60.

A CONFESSED apologetic, if not polemic, on behalf of retaining the Apostles' Creed as an essential "symbol" of the Christian faith. In fact the recital of the creed is looked upon by the author not as a confession of faith alone, but as a "sacramental act" through which one shares in "the communion of the saints." Therefore, though its phrasing is archaic, yet, if rightly understood, its recital may be made to bestow this spiritual blessing upon all who participate in it. And toward this right understanding one advances by a knowledge of the origin, purpose, and history of the creed. This avenue the author proceeds to open up through the jungle of ecclesiastical growth of the centuries.

The creed, in the form in which we have it today, is found to be a relic of the *redditio symboli* used by the Roman Church as the candidate's statement of faith at his final examination preparatory to baptism. This *redditio symboli* was immemorial at the time of Rufinus of Aquileia, 400 A. D. and probably reaches back to the second century. It is known to modern scholars as the Old Roman Symbol and runs as follows:

I believe in God, Father, Almighty:

And in Christ Jesus, his only son, our Lord; who was born of (the) Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin; who was crucified in the time of Pontius Pilate, and buried, and on the third day rose from among the dead, ascended into the heavens, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father, whence he is to come to judge living and dead;

And in (the) Holy Spirit, Holy Church, remission of sins, a resurrection of the flesh.

When, however, other churches in the West began to copy this baptismal creed of Rome they modified it, principally by making minor additions. So that "the Apostles' Creed is clearly the outcome of an effort to incorporate all the significant additions which these enlarged versions contained," which was accomplished, perhaps, in the time of Charlemagne.

The motive for formulating this Old Roman Symbol was, the author believes, to establish a "standard of faith" by which the Christian message might be transmitted in its "purity," safeguarding it from "those elements in the current thought which were alien to its genius" and by which the early Christian preacher might state succinctly the truth of the gospel so that his hearers might easily grasp its essence. The phraseology of the creed and its outgrown world view-point, which gives rise to the bulk of present-day criticism and objection to its use in the services of the church, is then explained upon the basis of the scientific and religious conceptions predominating at the period of its origin. When we understand this, and recognize the motive and purpose for formulating the creed, Christian people of today may enter into its spiritual values and the fellowship of all believers, by a recital of it. The scientific spirit of today, therefore, cannot overthrow or destroy the ageless facts which this faith of the universal church seeks to express. Such are the author's conclusions.

Yet though the historical treatment may be scientific and scholarly is it not fair that we should ask: Does the creed express for us today the heart of the gospel, whatever it may have done for those of the second century? Was it not then, and perhaps more so now, the gospel *about* Jesus rather than the gospel *of* Jesus? And is it not of this latter we today so greatly stand in need? Is it not this, of which it has been robbed these many centuries, the world today demands?

Moreover, if under the urge and pressure of certain human needs the church in the past formulated what it conceived to be the epitome of the gospel, and for years thereafter as requirement demanded, modified that creed, making it intelligible and emancipating for the lives of men, why should not the church today, in this new age of science and religious

enlightenment abandon, if need be, that ancient form and create anew its gospel summary that shall grasp and convince the heart and mind in this twentieth century?

One word more. The book is interesting also in the light of the present controversy in England aroused by the suggestions of Bishop Barnes of Birmingham.

R. E. E. H.

Morals in Review. A. K. Rogers, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Price, $3.50.

The reading public has had many an "Outline" since that first great, successful one given it by the versatile H. G. Wells, *An Outline of History,* followed by *Outline of Science; An Outline of Christianity; The Story of Philosophy,* and now *Morals in Review.* And this latest product of the modern method of presenting a survey and general digest of the entire scope of human knowledge and achievement is a worthy member of the enlarging list. Yet it may be doubted if this book will ever attain the popularity accorded any one of the preceding. Revealing, as it does, a wealth of knowledge and a keen understanding of the sharp distinctions and shades of emphasis occurring within the various systems of ethics brought under examination, it may yet be ventured that for the more general reader it has been written too much in the style and manner of the traditional philosopher, whose dictum is, according to Schiller, the English pragmatist, "that which I can understand, that I abhor." For enlightening as the *Review* is, and giving an impression of the author's exhaustive grasp upon his subject, yet the minute analysis of the many concepts held by these representatives within the history of ethics, is at times difficult to follow.

And "an analysis of concepts discovered within this developing stream of ethics" the work designedly is. It is not a history of philosophy, the author tells us, nor of human conduct, nor of ideals as set forth by great leaders and which may have become the conduct of their fellows. Rather, it constitutes an effort to

> get a speculative understanding of the terms which the ethical experiences has been employing, to systematize them, and bring them into consistency with one another and with the facts.

But, again,

> An accurate description of the meaning of the moral concepts is hopeless except as the philosopher keeps dipping back into the stream of ethical experience, racial as well as individual.

Here, then we have the task which the author has set himself to accomplish. It is not merely to give a synopsis of the ethical positions held by the many philosophers throughout the years but it is to present an exposition of those positions in the light of an enlarging world-view, scientific knowledge, and individual characteristics at each successive stage in the history of his subject. And it must be admitted that this the author does well.

But one other limit Professor Rogers sets upon himself, which in view of the present size of the book (452 pages) may have been deemed wise. He tells us that he is not going to be concerned in his review with everything philosophers have said about ethics but only with those significant contributions "that are still relevant to discussions at the present day." So from the ethics of the Greeks, he leads us through those of the Church, to those of Naturalism, Utilitarianism, Metaphysics, and Science, the latter represented by such men as Spencer and Huxley.

A few illustrations of the author's methods and ability in vivid analysis may be given.

The Ethics of Socrates has been popularly expressed in the brief phrase "knowledge is virtue." But what content did Socrates place within the word knowledge? The great philosopher of the ancients is presented as a mystic—one whose final quest is a mystical vision of absolute truth which is also absolute goodness and absolute beauty. Thus the knowledge with which virtue is identified is the mystic's knowledge, a joyous contemplation rather than ratiocination. It is something more than civic or moral excellence—something other than prudence or practical intelligence—it is passion and insight, that vision which sees that eternal goodness constitutes the highest goal of human nature. And, moreover, this goodness is not utility but an absolute and emotion-stirring value, so that knowledge, in the Socratic sense, is not merely a *means* to happiness or virtue but is virtue itself. True knowledge, according to this mystic, involves the will to accept and to do, and the essence of virtue is the response of human nature to what is seen to be the highest and best; it is that insight which is at once knowledge and emotional love.

Consequently Socrates did not define virtue but rather he sought to make men "discover in their own experiences the nature of their ultimate standards of worth."

With Plato,

virtue is that quality in a man which enables him to realize his preappointed end, or to function in the manner nature meant him to. Happiness, or well-being, is the state in which this consummation has been reached. And the end itself, con-

ceived as an ideal toward which the essential urge of his being is directed, is what constitutes, for man at least, the good.

What is this "end"? It is an ideal of life that shows moderation in desire, that aims at a rounded development rather than an intensity of one-sided satisfaction, that draws back from extremes of every sort—the ideal of "nothing too much."

And it is this "nothing too much" stressed by Plato, that saves him from pure individualism. It bears a social implication and places the good in human relationships.

The final illustration is taken from Scientific Ethics, of which Herbert Spencer is the outstanding representative.

The good is that which gives pleasure or satisfaction. But why does it give this sense of worth? Spencer, under the "Darwinian" influence of his day, seeks the scientific causality and believes if it can be found man will have a guide for conduct.

The fact that a being finds certain conduct pleasant is prima facie evidence that it has proved useful in the struggle for existence and so can be identified with well-being, but since in the evolutionary process environment and circumstances are ever changing, that conduct once good may under new conditions become injurious. Consequently, ethics is ever modified by this adjustment to environment.

Moreover, in this developing process of evolution there comes an increased complexity of existence. Individual interest conflicts with that of the group—egoism with altruism. Briefly stated, then, the Darwinian principle is given a new shift of emphasis by which we learn that the individual finds his greatest good in promoting the largest human good. Thus, for men of this scientific age, the standard of ethics becomes relative rather than absolute.

R. E. E. H.

The Catholic Anthology. Thomas Walsh, Ph. D., Litt. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. $2.50.

The purpose of this collection of religious verse is expressed by the author in the preface as follows:

> The Catholic Anthology is intended primarily as a selection of Catholic poems written by Catholics and bearing the impress of Catholic dogma, tradition, and life; so that the editor has purposely chosen the completely Catholic utterances of his poets in preference sometimes to their pieces of general æsthetic charm.

The editor has held to his purpose throughout. Catholic dogma stands in the forefront. Yet it is interesting to find the Fourth Eclogue of

Virgil as the first selection in the book, Abelard the heretic sharing the page with his ancient enemy Bernard, Chaucer's encomium on Wycliffe, selections from Piers Plowman and one from Thomas More in the collection. There has also been included a group of 44 "Catholic" poems by non-Catholics. Valuable bibliographical data is placed at the end of the volume. It is a choice selection and conforms to the stated purpose of the editor.

I. G. M.

As Modern Writers See Jesus. Adelaide T. Case. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1927. Pp. 128. Price, $1.25.

Here in brief but very well-written reviews are summarized nearly one hundred recent books about Jesus for an age in which all sorts of "digests" are increasingly popular. For any one who seeks a guide, or a summary substitute, for modern writings on the life of Christ this "descriptive bibliography" will prove an invaluable companion. Along with biographies are included modern translations, books dealing with special aspects of the life of Jesus, stories for children, poetry, plays, and pictures. Books are classified under general headings and indexed under both title and author for handy reference.

It was a delight for the present reviewer to find Papini put in his proper place—a very low one—and this one excellent treatment is typical of the clear, penetrating, and eminently fair analysis of the other books reviewed.

A. E. L.

The Shadow of the Rock, and Other Sermons. Orrin Philip Gifford, D. D. Fleming H. Revell Company. $1.25.

These are delightful sermons in which are gathered up the ripe experiences of one of our leading American preachers. No matter what the text, there is only one theme, the Christ; no matter what the personal experience, whether in Syria, Egypt, Canada or at home, all has been drawn on to enrich that theme. Sitting in an underground, troglodyte city with the Palestinian archæologist Macalister, making connections on the network of American railways or passing an ancestral buck-thorn hedge, the preacher finds cogent and vivid illustration for his gospel. Literature from Homer to Conrad, treatises on evangelism and on biology, all help to enliven the flow of oratory. Terse, epigrammatic sentences ring out one after another, while the play of a facile imagination and apt illustration crowd the pages of the book. To all who read these pages there will be enjoyment and profit, but to those who in the past have had the privi-

lege of listening to the preacher, the wave of the hand, the flash of the eye, and the tone of the voice of the preacher will again be seen and heard.

I. G. M.

The Fine Art of Living Together. Rev. A. W. Beaven, D. D. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1927. Pp. 176. $1.50.

Doctor Beaven dedicated this quite unusual book to his wife and mother, "the two gracious women who have taught me a deep appreciation of the fine art of living together as it can be learned in that loveliest of all schools, the home."

This dedication reveals the purpose of the book and in itself is sufficient to indicate the suggestiveness of the volume for all those who are interested in the welfare of homes.

The worth of the book appears again from the fact that it consists essentially of a series of addresses which Doctor Beaven delivered in the Lake Avenue Baptist Church, Rochester, New York, of which he has been pastor for a goodly number of years and, through his leadership, has made an outstanding Christian influence not only for his own city but for many people in a wide circle throughout the country.

The book should be read and its suggestions and experiences taken carefully into account, both by pastors of churches and by all who are concerned for social well-being generally.

F. G. L.

The Evangelistic Church. Frederick E. Taylor, D. D. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. 232. Price, $1.50.

The cream of the thought and experience of one who has special qualifications to discuss evangelism is offered in this book. For more than thirty years Doctor Taylor has had marked success in this field of service. In his present pastorate of twenty-one years at the First Baptist Church of Indianapolis he has had unusual opportunity to test the methods presented.

Defining the evangelistic church as

> a church which from pulpit to primary is permeated by a desire to see a constant inflow of people who have come to know Christ as Saviour and Lord, and who in turn, are seeking to lead others to the same experience,

he sets himself the task of suggesting workable methods to bring this about. Emphasis is laid upon "concern" for human souls, prayer in its relation to evangelism, preaching to win men to a confession of Christ, and the development of the resources of the church in men and women

who should enlist in this form of service. In the chapter on "Personal Work for Training Classes" the author gives in outline a series of lessons used by himself in teaching such classes. It is to be regretted that more adequate consideration is not given to the whole matter of the relation of education to evangelism in the life of the church.

The book is surcharged with the earnest spirit of the writer and is full of practical suggestions for promoting evangelistic work.

R. N.

Soul-Trapping and Other Sermons. JOHN SNAPE, D. D. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. 150. Price, $1.25.

THIS volume from the pen of the pastor of the Euclid Avenue Baptist Church, Cleveland, Ohio, takes its title from the first sermon, one on evangelism from the text "Thou shalt take men alive." The remaining eight sermons cover a wide range of topics from the "Compassion of Jesus" to the "Christian Attitude Toward War." Varied human needs are considered with sympathetic understanding. The final sermon is autobiographical and discusses "A Minister's Changing Ideals." It is an interesting record of the development that has come to a thoughtful minister in these modern days.

In a brief foreword the author says: "Preaching, divorced from personality, limps and languishes and loses half its power." This may be true, nevertheless he succeeds in carrying over to the reader much of his own cheerful optimism, buoyant faith, and broad sympathy.

R. N.

Pulpit Mirrors. EDWIN H. BYINGTON. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1927. Pp. viii, 203. Price, $2.00.

THE author is convinced of the necessity of a new approach to homiletics in ministerial training. The "laboratory method" is required in this field as in allied disciplines. After eight years of experimentation with this approach in the Gordon School of Theology and Missions, he ventures to give the public the benefit of his findings. The text is divided into three parts: Case studies, principles of homiletics deduced from the "specimens" studied, and the use of these principles in sermon-making.

The personality of the preacher is in evidence on every page in the volume. Casual comments are freely interspersed throughout the specimen analyses. Hortatory words flow from the pen of the writer as readily as interpretative meanings. Though many suggestive side-lights are

thrown upon the types of church services treated, there is no sufficient inquiry into the problem of social source of sermon material. Only the slightest beginning in this fundamental question is made in the chapter on "Psychoanalysis of Congregations." Failure to come to terms with the empirical needs of present-day communities and of individuated persons, leaves the writer free to support the conservative aims in evangelical preaching.

S. G. C.

Crannell's Pocket Lessons for 1928. PHILIP W. CRANNELL. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. 213.

MANY church schoolmen still adopt the international uniform lessons (improved series) in their local work. The majority of such educators depend upon popular "helps" to give them brief and pointed comments on the weekly lessons. Doctor Crannell's vest-pocket manual is furnished to meet this need. The American Standard Revision of the Bible is used. The author tries to clarify the aims of the International Lesson Committee in his use of the Biblical materials.

S. G. C.

Snowden's Sunday School Lessons, 1928. JAMES H. SNOWDEN. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 384. Price, $1.25.

THIS is the seventh annual volume of a series of expositions of the International Sunday School Lessons. The writer is a member of the faculty of Western Theological Seminary, editor of the *Presbyterian Magazine,* and author of a score of books on religious subjects. The work is scholarly and simple, conservative yet not narrow; it is noteworthy for clear exposition, forceful application, practical arrangement. Each lesson is carefully planned and plainly outlined with important statements printed in bold-faced type. A really helpful handbook for the busy Sunday-school teacher.

R. N.

Tarbell's Teachers' Guide to the International Sunday-school Lessons, Improved Uniform Course for 1928. MARTHA TARBELL, Ph. D.

THIS is the twenty-third annual volume of this guide. The chief criticism of it is that it leaves little or nothing to the initiative of the teacher. All that is most needed for interpretation, illustration, and application is found here. Any one who masters the nine pages allotted to each lesson will be thoroughly furnished for the intellectual side of the teacher's task.

I. G. M.

The Evolution of the English Hymn: An Historical Survey of the Origins and Development of the Hymns of the Christian Church. FREDERICK JOHN GILLMAN. With a Foreword by Sir Walford Davies. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 312.

IF we consider only what the author of this book has done, we may give him qualified praise. His tracing of the origin and history of hymns, though necessarily much condensed, is well done; and the opening chapter on the Relation of Music and Religion is judicious and suggests much more than it says. The account of mediæval hymns and hymn writers is perhaps the best part of the book, and much of it will be quite new to those who have not previously made themselves acquainted with Archbishop Trench's "Medieval Latin Hymns," or some similar collection. It is not until he gets to Chapter XI and the hymns of Isaac Watts that the author comes to grips with his real subject, and as he has used up more than half his space with introductory matter, he is compelled to do scant justice to his main topic. The result is that much of the later chapters are little more than lists of names, with almost no particulars about what many of the writers have contributed to English hymnology. As a book for consultation when one lacks information, it will be found very unsatisfactory; but as a stimulus to the further study of hymnody and a help towards appreciation of the best, it will serve a good purpose.

One finds, however, a more serious defect than bad apportioning of space, namely, unaccountable neglect of things that should have had due consideration. The "jacket" announces the book as "a comprehensive survey of the origins and development of Christian hymns from the first century to the present day." That describes what the book should have been, rather than what it actually is. It lacks much of being "comprehensive." It fails altogether to recognize the rich contribution of American writers to modern English hymnology. One might have expected at least a recognition of hymn writers of the American branch of the author's own church; as, for instance, Bishop Coxe's fine hymn, "O where are kings and empires now"; or, in connection with the treatment of children's hymns, that beautiful one of Phillips Brooks, "O little town of Bethlehem." Can the author possibly be ignorant of the fact that some of the best modern hymns have been written by Americans; such as, "My faith looks up to thee" (Palmer), "We may not climb the heavenly steeps" (Whittier), "O Master, let me walk with thee" (Gladden), "Jesus thou divine companion" (Van Duke). These are the first of many that come to mind and they have few equals and no superiors among modern hymns.

One discovers another noteworthy lack—while the author gives a chapter each to "Hymns of childhood" and "Hymn Tunes," he is silent

about two of the most remarkable developments of nineteenth century hymnology: Sunday school hymns, of which William B. Bradbury was the originator, and the "Gospel Hymns" of Ira D. Sankey and others. Whatever one may hold as to the literary and musical value of these contributions to hymnology, they cannot be ignored in any adequate treatment of modern hymnology. And, if a writer should decide to ignore them, as belonging to a greatly inferior class, he should at least make mention of Lowell Mason and Thomas Hastings and other more serious American composers. Is it insular ignorance, one wonders, or something even less excusable, that causes the assumption by so many British writers that England has a monopoly of the English language?

H. C. V.

The Drifting Home. Ernest R. Groves. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1926. Pp. viii and 217.

Everybody knows that the American home is drifting. Few have set themselves to account for this social phenomenon. Professor Groves does not pretend to have analyzed thoroughly the nature of the problem, though he does venture to uncover the most significant forces making for the disintegration of this basic institution in America, to define resulting problematical conditions in it, and to suggest some important means for the re-establishment of genuine home morale in our culture.

The home has suffered revolutionary change due to the industrialization of the American people. The severe agents of economic competition have made it difficult for many families to maintain their organic identity. The passing of man's dominance and the corresponding new educational advantages of woman, financially and governmentally, has introduced strange problems in family polity. Lack of preparation for parental responsibilities thrusts heavy burdens upon young fathers and mothers, and leads to misunderstandings and disharmony. The rapid increase in comforts and luxuries, permitting housewives to farm out much of the work which their mothers carried, has introduced the leisure time problem in housekeeping.

These and a host of allied conditions have stirred up restlessness, anxiety, conflict, and disintegration in thousands of American homes. Parenthood has become an affair of choice; the birth-rate is declining among middle class people, the group which a nation can least afford to lose. The school system has usurped many of the former functions of the home and is more concerned with regimenting children into standardized educational devices than in breeding self-reflecting and enlarging per-

sonalities. "Bad" families are pictured in terms of several well-known types. The childish parent who suffers emotional unbalance and has never learned to curb his feelings to lead children into richer and more mature experiences of culture, is a common liability in our time. Companionate marriages are a plenty and divorce cases as multiple. The revolt of youth has arisen as a natural product of the conflicting social forces to increase the burdens of family existence.

"The new woman and the new man" are joining in experimental marriage today. They require scientific education regarding such vital subjects as marriage guidance, child nature and child education. A significant set of "don'ts" for parents is offered on pp. 182-4. The nursery school may become a great ally of inexperienced mothers and fathers. Free child clinics with psychiatric as well as health advice, will help much to lift the well-being of the family circle. Nothing short of a new birth is required in public and higher schools of learning, the church, and the industrial system, in order to bring these users of life to function in favor of child rights. There is no substitute for genuine parent-child fellowship if the American home is to be conserved.

The author has not lost faith in the home, though he is certain the historic western type has passed. He sees considerable disturbance in family circles for some time. A high rate of marriage failures will continue for years. Companionators will continue to increase their company. But eventually an education pitched in terms of domestic demands will overtake the drifting process and substitute a stabilized institution, reared to carry the happy burdens of biological and social reproduction that are its distinguishing privileges in society.

S. G. C.

The Church and the Church School. William Everett Chalmers. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. 186.

This text presents "the Church organized for Religious Education" in the Keystone Standard Training Course series of The American Baptist Publication Society. Such typical themes as teaching, school aim, curriculum, worship, and service, are presented. The author's historical approach to various phases of the educational work of the church is a happy innovation in training texts. It is unfortunate that he felt it necessary to confine the traditional materials to such brief exposition. To see the development of evangelical school theory through the years is quite as important in order to understand present-day problems, as is a presentation of current pedagogical practice. The frequent quotations from well-known

texts in the modern field of education add point and emphasis to the writer's position.

The author never seems to get away from his sense of official responsibility to a conservative church constituency. Though he advocates certain progressive measures in religious education, frequently he feels forced to guard his utterances. Evangelism must precede Christian education, and be ranked superior to it. If the curriculum is to be "pupil-centered," can it necessarily be "biblical" at all times? He gives as much space in his closing chapter to the criticisms of the opponents of religious education, as he does to supporting its place in modern church work.

S. G. C.

The Teaching of Ideals. W. W. CHARTERS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. xiii and 372.

HUMAN personality can be changed for more idealistic ends of life. This is more than an aphorism in the face of the position of modern enthenists. It is a scientific discovery of euthenists. The public schools of the country can become a party to promoting better moral stock through the teaching of ideals. But teaching must be a more critical procedure than the traditional way. Trial and error methods are not sufficient in a day when precise moral tests and complicated social demands are implicated. Doctor Charters has presented to parents, teachers and preachers, the conditions under which he conceives ethical teaching to be effective in producing sound character. The principles he enunciates are as applicable in home and in pulpit as in school class-room. The text is one of unusual merit and deserves the widest circulation. It is equally applicable for leaders of youth in church and state.

There are two ways of teaching honesty, courage, obedience, etc. One, the abstract noun way; the other, the adverbial way. The former is the common approach. The teacher presents a homily on the meaning, value and appeal of honesty, and hopes the child will practice the ideal. What follows the instruction? The child may understand the content of honesty but he may not want to be honest. This atomistic treatment of ideals runs contrary to the laws of life. There is no such thing as honesty as such, courage as such. Honesty is a phase of a situation in the life of an individual and it must be treated in that relation. Right information does not insure good conduct. The desires of the heart must be tapped to produce superior social action.

When human traits (ideals) are used adverbially and presented to children as phases of behavior, honesty becomes an activity in given life-

situations. The whole setting of the boy is analyzed in terms of sequences and consequences, intentions and desires, penalties and rewards, and so on, and so on, with the *value* aspect kept uppermost in order to lead the individual to reflect and choose the better way of living. The child learns honesty, not as an abstract principle, but as a vital social trait. It is to be observed that a trait is not quite identical under all conditions of life. There is courage in having a tooth pulled, courage in saving a drowning person, courage in telling the truth, courage in returning a kindness to one who has done you an unkindness. And courage changes in the process of being courageous. There is flux and flow in the content of ideals as there is change in life-situations.

To make an ideal the subject of study in the class-room where the situation is present only in imagination raises the problem of "transfer" in education. What guarantee is there of carry-over of the standard of action into later conduct? Transfer is dependent upon (a) knowledge and (b) resolution. It is easy to stimulate knowledge but difficult to incite desire. Much depends upon the social atmosphere in the class-room how well the second aim is accomplished. The thinking of the children must be dramatic in terms of the concrete experiences of every-day life. The leader must be attractive. Harmony must prevail in the group. The ideals and life-situations treated must be applicable to the group. The language used must represent the level of understanding of the class. These and other factors enter into the difficult profession of educating for character. The test of teacher's, parent's or preacher's work is the degree of transfer of knowledge and intention into the every-day occasions of behavior that condition the finished human personality. Doctor Charters presents many of the best experiments in character education that schools are carrying forward in America. He also includes considerable biblical and religious illustration in his exposition.

Doctor Charters sponsors the "direct method" of character education. His technique calls for "ideal-situation-(trait)-activity" procedure. Many educators believe that the "indirect method" of teaching ideals is the more rewarding. These men follow the situation-ideal-activity sequence in teaching. There are merits in both systems. Each has a necessary place in curriculum. Some would discount the advisability of the author's insistence upon having the teachers always choose the ideals for study in the standard course. Pupil-participation at every stage in class-room work is a very important new discovery in teaching. Again, it is rather difficult to see how we can move from the *descriptions* of honest activity to a *definition* of honesty, and then make it an *abstract* norm by which to gauge later multiple *concrete* life-situations. Serviceable ideals must be

almost as flexible as the conditions of life of the people they are to serve. This is more and more needful in our rapidly transitory culture today. The author's position requires the advocacy of a *given* set of ideals in every stage in child development. There appears to be an underlying conflict in his position between ideal absolutes and experiential relatives in his theory of ethical education. This problem leads to the conclusion that possibly the life-situations rather than the ideals had better become the point of departure in teaching, and hence permit the child to elect his own ideals inductively on the basis of honest social investigation in the light of all the evidence, historical and immediate, that the class-room can produce.

S. G. C.

How We Got Our Denominations. An Outline of Church History. STANLEY I. STUBER. New York: Association Press. 1927. Pp. 225.

AS NOT infrequently happens, the subtitle of this book describes its contents much better than the title. It is equally adapted for private reading, by those who wish to get a fair general idea of the history of Christianity, and for use by classes of young people or others with the same end in view. The author has made diligent use of good authorities, has grasped the significance of men and movements and set them forth with concise clearness. It is doubtful if his avoidance of technical terms deserves the praise of his sponsor, President Purinton, of Bates College, who contributes the brief Introduction. Technical terms have a well-established meaning, which is easily learned, while untechnical language may mean anything and sometimes means nothing. This is not, however, the chief defect of the book, which is failure to state accurately the doctrinal teachings that are so frequently summarized. The author's studies in the history of doctrine seem to lack thoroughness, or else his statements have not been formed with sufficient care. A few sample cases will suffice.

"He [Calvin] did not hesitate to send all non-elect infants to eternal hell." As matter of fact, Calvin did hesitate. His (p. 112) teaching is well stated in the words of the Westminster Confession, "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are saved." Infant damnation may be a logical inference, but Calvin and the Confession deliberately omit it. Beza and others had more courage and insisted on the doctrine of reprobation, as well as election. "Charles II, a bitter and cruel Catholic." No epithets could less describe Charles. He was an easy-going, amiable man, without courage to avow himself a Romanist until he lay on his death-bed. The author is particularly unfortunate in describing the Roman doctrine and practise of the sacraments—in which he resembles most Protestants. Mass, he declares

is said daily "throughout the day." Mass is never said after noon, since the priest is required to celebrate and communicate fasting, and it would be unreasonable to require him to fast all day. "Baptism is valid only when it is done in the name of the Church." On the contrary, baptism performed by heretics and by laymen in cases of necessity, has been accepted as valid since the day of Augustine, when performed in good faith, "in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." A careful revision would remove these and like blemishes. The book is so good in the main that it deserves to be made better.

H. C. V.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Hurry Call of Jesus. THOMAS JEFFERSON VILLERS, D. D., LL. D., Pastor of White Temple, Portland, Oregon. The Judson Press. $1.50.

FIFTEEN sermons by this minister of recognized pulpit power, dealing with evangelical themes, problems of youth, and the great days of the church calendar. It could be wished that to this list might be added "and the real problems that concern America's welfare today."

R. E. E. H.

Secrets of Effective Living. JAMES GORDON GILKEY, M. A., D. D., Minister of the South Congregational Church of Springfield, Mass. The Macmillan Company. Pp. 172. $1.75.

ONE of the many books that have appeared since the publication of Basil King's *Conquest of Fear,* and dealing with the same theme. Very helpful for the overwrought lady of society.

R. E. E. H.

"Lord, I Believe!" ROBERT G. LEE, Pastor Citadel Square Baptist Church, Charleston, S. C. New York: George H. Doran Company.

A SERIES of sermons in which the author passionately affirms his unconditioned faith in all the miracles of the Bible with an uncritical attempt to justify that faith on the basis of the sovereignty of God and the marvels of modern science.

S. B. M.

Two Words. MARGARET SLATTERY. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1927. Pp. 56.

SMALL wonder that countless teen-age young people have been helped to make right decisions by the author of such a book! Any boy or girl will read this book with real delight. Miss Slattery speaks the teen-age language and her stories ring true to the life experiences of modern youth. The binding is an attractive red and gold color combination, boards, pocket size; just the thing for an appropriate gift for young people in high school or college. To start this book circulating among the young people of the parish will amply justify itself.

A. E. L.

THERE has been received by the Managing Editor, Vol. I, No. 2, of *The Home Mission College Review* for November, 1927. It is the organ of the colleges for Negro youth, mainly supported by The American Baptist Home Mission Society and the Woman's American Baptist Home Mission Society. The editor is Benjamin Brawley, and the *Review* is published bimonthly during the college year. A perusal of its contents shows matters of great interest, which are cheering in their evidence of the serious work being done by these colleges and by their students. It must be indispensable to all concerned with the outlook and destiny of the youths of the Negro race.

Jan. 26. 1928